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ERISA requires that plan administrators provide consumers with understandable 
health plan documents.  The present study assessed the readability and comprehensibility 
of medical necessity and claims procedure clauses.  For Study 1, I collected 40 summary 
plan descriptions from a diverse sample of employers and ran readability tests on the 
medical necessity and claims procedure clauses.  Scores on the Flesch Reading Ease, 
Flesch Grade Level, and Fog Index indicated that the clauses were, in violation of 
ERISA’s disclosure requirement, written at reading levels beyond those one might expect 
the average plan participant to possess. 
In Studies 2 and 3, employees read either original or redrafted versions of the 
clauses that received low readability scores in Study 1.  Participants completed a 
comprehension test regarding the clauses.  In both studies, participants’ overall 
comprehension accuracy scores (.15 in Study 2 and .19 in Study 3) indicated that 
participants did not understand the clauses.  Contrary to hypotheses, participants who 
received the redrafted versions of the clauses did not perform better on the 
  
comprehension test than participants who received the original versions of the clauses 
did. 
In Study 3, employees read the clauses either as a reading-to-learn or a reading-to-
do task.  Contrary to hypotheses, participants in the reading-to-do condition did not 
perform better on the comprehension test than participants in the reading-to-learn 
condition.  The strength of the medical necessity claim also was manipulated in Study 3, 
and participants were informed that coverage for a treatment they sought had been 
denied.  Consistent with hypotheses, participants were less likely to appeal a claim the 
more they felt the health plan was procedurally fair and the more they were satisfied with 
the health plan (ß=-.22, p<.001).  In addition, participants were less likely to appeal a 
claim the more they comprehended the health plan (ß = -.24, p < .01), especially when 
they had a weak claim (ß=.21, p<.05), R2=.34, F(4, 204)=26.04, p<.001.  Therefore, 
better comprehension led to more appropriate appeal decisions.  Findings from this study 
have implications for enforcing ERISA’s disclosure requirement and for reducing 
healthcare expenditures by reducing the number of lawsuits over plan coverage. 
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Comprehension of Health Plan Language 
for Denial of Benefit Claims 
The federal government has elected to regulate the American healthcare industry 
primarily through informing consumers of their rights and obligations regarding 
healthcare coverage (Sage, 1999; Sage, 2003).  By requiring healthcare insurers and 
providers to disclose material information to patients, the federal government has 
attempted to increase consumer knowledge while protecting America’s commitment to 
patient autonomy and self-determination (Sage, 1999).  Disclosure requirements, 
however, cannot have their intended consequences unless consumers can understand and 
implement the information they receive. 
The present study explored consumers’ comprehension of their rights regarding 
denied healthcare benefits, which are governed by the disclosure requirements and civil 
enforcement mechanisms of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).  In 
Study 1, health plan documents distributed to employees of large corporations and 
documents received by plaintiffs in recent litigation concerning denied benefits were 
collected and submitted to readability formulas.  In Study 2, employees were tested on 
their comprehension of their ERISA rights after reading either an original or redrafted 
version of plan documents.  In Study 3, employees read plan documents either without 
any a priori knowledge or knowing they had been denied coverage.  Again consumers 
were tested on their comprehension of their rights after reading plan documents, and they 
assessed the fairness of the appeal process. 
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ERISA 
Approximately 63% of the population receive their healthcare benefits from 
employer-sponsored healthcare plans according to 2001 U.S. Census data.  In recognition 
of the growing number and economic impact of employee benefit plans, Congress 
enacted ERISA in 1974 to regulate employee pension benefit plans and employee welfare 
benefit plans, which include employer-sponsored healthcare plans (29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461).  According to ERISA § 2(b), one of the purposes of ERISA is to protect the 
interests of heathcare plan participants and beneficiaries by requiring the disclosure of 
information and providing adequate remedies. 
ERISA’s Disclosure Requirements.  ERISA § 102(a) requires that plan 
administrators provide plan participants and beneficiaries with a summary plan 
description (SPD) of the employee benefit plan.  Accordingly, the SPD “shall be written 
in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be 
sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and 
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan” (29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)).  Plans 
may have a difficult time drafting SPDs because the documents must serve two 
conflicting purposes (Eddy, 1996).  Because the SPD must inform plan participants and 
beneficiaries of their rights and responsibilities regarding their healthcare plan, it must be 
precise, which implies that it should be a technical and comprehensive description.  
However, the SPD also must be comprehensible to plan participants and beneficiaries, 
which suggests that it should be free of jargon and be as concise as possible.  One 
problem with SPDs is that it may be difficult for plan administrators to communicate 
effectively through a written document alone the information necessary for participants to 
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make informed healthcare decisions (Medill, Wiener, Bornstein, & McGorty, 2006; U.S. 
Department of Labor, 2005). 
The SPD typically explains, in three main sections, what benefits will be covered 
(Eddy, 1996).  The first section, often referred to as coverage categories, identifies the 
broad categories of services that the plan will cover (e.g., inpatient hospital services and 
maternal care).  The second section, coverage stipulations, explains whether participants 
will have to share any of the costs of the services and how long they can utilize the 
services.  The third section, often referred to as coverage criteria, attempts to distinguish 
between the particular services that will be covered within a coverage category and those 
services that will not be covered.  Within their coverage criteria, SPDs often inform 
participants that the healthcare plan will only cover or reimburse care that is “medically 
necessary,” a term of art in health insurance contracts (Bergthold, 1995; Hall & 
Anderson, 1992).  To determine whether plan administrators meet their obligations to 
make SPDs understandable to the average plan participant, selected clauses from actual 
SPDs were submitted to readability formulas in Study 1. 
Medical Necessity.  Medical necessity provisions are the primary legal 
mechanism health plans use to limit the services they will cover to beneficial and cost-
effective treatments (Eddy, 1996).  Although medical necessity provisions inform plan 
participants and beneficiaries about what types of care will be covered (i.e., treatment 
deemed medically necessary), they often fail to define or describe the process or criteria 
used to make the determination (Bergthold, 1995; Singer & Bergthold, 2001).  According 
to Sage (2003), health plans use such broad terms as medical necessity in health 
insurance policies “partly from the belief among both insurers and regulators that 
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unsophisticated consumers are incapable of understanding more detailed contractual 
provisions” (p. 637). 
Although no research has examined consumers’ abilities to understand medical 
necessity clauses, interviews with consumer representatives and their treating physicians 
revealed dissatisfaction with the amount, clarity, utility, and accessibility of information 
disclosed (Singer & Bergthold, 2001).  Medical necessity disputes are frequently 
characterized by inconsistent administration and poor communication (Sage, 2003; 
Singer & Bergthold, 2001).  Consumers and policymakers rated improving 
communication as the most effective and feasible recommendation for improving medical 
necessity practices (Singer & Bergthold, 2001).  Problems obtaining care that Medicaid 
enrollees or their physicians believed was medically necessary was one of the most 
frequent complaints in the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans Survey (Venus, Rector, 
& Shah, 2003).  The three sampled health plans received poorer scores on the survey 
when enrollees reported problems obtaining care that they believed was medically 
necessary.  For two of the three plans, enrollees reported problems obtaining care 
believed medically necessary significantly more often when they did not find or 
understand written information from the plan, as compared to when they did find or 
understand the written information. 
A few studies have explored the prevalence and characteristics of medical 
necessity appeals.  In one study, archival analysis of appeals to employer-sponsored 
healthcare plans revealed that 11% of retrospective appeals (i.e., appeals concerning 
denial of reimbursement for services already obtained) and 49% of prospective appeals 
(i.e., appeals concerning denials of access to services) involved medical necessity 
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disputes (Gresenz, Studdert, Campbell, & Hensler, 2002).  In retrospective appeals, plan 
participants or beneficiaries sought treatment that a utilization review already had 
determined was medically unnecessary.  Prospective appeals primarily addressed whether 
a treatment should be covered at all, whether an alternative or more conservative 
treatment should be tried first, or whether the duration or intensity of the treatment was 
clinically sufficient. 
In another study, 37% of prospective appeals involved medical necessity disputes, 
and 52% of those denials were reversed (Studdert & Gresenz, 2003).  Nearly 30% of the 
appeals dealt with surgical procedures (mostly gastric bypass, breast alteration, and 
removal of varicose veins), 24% concerned office consultations with specialists (mostly 
dermatologists, orthopedic surgeons, and psychiatrists), 20% regarded diagnostic tests 
(mostly magnetic resonance imaging, bone density, and sleep studies), and 12% involved 
disputes over denied treatment for scars or benign lesions.  Therefore, most medical 
necessity disputes concerned cosmetic or nonessential treatments.  Due to the vague and 
ambiguous nature of medical necessity and evidence that it leads to disputes (Bergthold, 
1995; Sage, 2003; Singer & Bergthold, 2001), the present study focused on 
comprehension of this provision in SPDs.  In Studies 2 and 3, a medical necessity dispute 
led to the opportunity to exercise ERISA civil enforcement rights through a prospective 
appeal. 
ERISA’s Civil Enforcement Mechanism.  If the plan administrator denies a claim 
for benefits, under ERISA § 503 the plan administrator must provide the plan participant 
or beneficiary with adequate notice in writing, “setting forth the specific reasons for such 
denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant.”  Singer and 
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Bergthold (2001) examined denial letters and found them lacking information regarding 
who made the decision, what reasons they had for the decision, what evidence they 
considered for the decision, and what policies they applied toward the decision.  
Interviewed consumers believed that more informative denial letters would increase 
public trust in managed care. 
ERISA § 503 also requires that healthcare plans establish a reasonable procedure 
to review participants’ and beneficiaries’ appeals of denied benefits (29 U.S.C. § 1133).  
A plan’s SPD explains these procedures to participants and beneficiaries.  Research 
indicates that employer-sponsored health plans adjudicate approximately 250,000 appeals 
annually (Gresenz et al., 2002).  Most plans require that a plan participant or beneficiary 
must exhaust the plan’s internal appeal procedures before they can seek external review 
(Gresenz et al., 2002).  It is imperative that plan participants and beneficiaries understand 
the internal review process for two reasons.  First, courts may dismiss claims with 
prejudice due to failure to exhaust the plan’s administrative appeal procedure (Harrow v. 
Prudential Ins. Co., 2002; Diaz v. United Agricultural Employee Welfare Benefit Plan & 
Trust, 1995).  Second, judges are generally limited to reviewing the documents that the 
plan administrators had before them at the time of the benefit denial (Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 1989).  Because internal appeal procedures have implications on 
later lawsuits, the present study assessed the point in the process at which participants 
believe they should seek out legal advice.  Stolle and Slain (1997) found that when asked 
what they would do if they were harmed as a result of a contracted for service, 46% of 
undergraduate participants would seek legal advice and 29% would handle the situation 
themselves.  SPDs are similar to contracts because they outline the terms of an agreement 
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between two parties, the plan administrator and the plan participant.  As a result, ERISA 
statutes and litigation are driven by contract law principles. 
In an effort to ensure that health plans are medically justified in denying benefits, 
41 states and the District of Columbia require that health plans submit their denied claims 
to independent external review (Mariner, 2002).  Because state laws vary on several 
dimensions (e.g., what rules the reviewers must use and whether the reviewers’ decisions 
are binding), they are beyond the scope of this paper.  Instead, the present study focused 
on the federal mechanism for enforcing plan benefits.  ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) allows 
healthcare plan participants and beneficiaries to bring civil suits against their plan 
administrators to recover benefits due to them under the terms of the plan, to enforce their 
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify their rights to future benefits under the 
terms of the plan. 
ERISA litigation, which often favors the health plan administrator over the plan 
participant, is premised on the assumption that plan participants and beneficiaries 
comprehend the information they receive in the SPD and, as a result, know their rights 
regarding their health plan.  The present study examined whether this presumption is 
valid.  Recent ERISA litigation suggests that the written language of many SPDs may be 
inadequate to satisfy the legal standard for participant understanding established under 
ERISA (Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 2004; Pegram v. Herdrich, 2000; Rush Prudential 
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 2002).  One of the underlying policy considerations for ERISA’s 
disclosure requirements is that well-informed employees can more effectively protect 
their rights to plan benefits.  However, if SPDs are written above the reading ability of 
the average plan participant, this objective cannot be met.  The present study not only 
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determined the readability and comprehensibility of SPDs but also whether the 
comprehensibility of SPDs influenced participants’ decisions to exercise their right to 
appeal coverage denials. 
Comprehension 
Research suggests individuals do not always read legal documents, and one of the 
self-reported reasons individuals sign legal documents without reading them first is their 
perception that the documents are too difficult to understand (Wogalter, Howe, Sifuentes, 
& Luginbuhl, 1999).  A national survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates (1995) 
of 1,081 adults found that half of the insured respondents either did not read or merely 
skimmed materials about their health plans (as cited by Isaacs, 1996).  Although getting 
consumers to read documents governed by ERISA is critical, the present study focused 
on the average person’s ability to comprehend those documents if he or she did read 
them. 
According to the text comprehension theory of van Dijk and Kintsch (1983), there 
are three levels of comprehension.  The most superficial level of comprehension is called 
the surface structure; at this level, individuals encode words and phrases and the 
linguistic relations between them.  Comprehension of the textbase involves encoding the 
semantic and rhetorical structure of the text.  The deepest level of comprehension is 
called the situation model.  At this level, individuals use their prior knowledge to 
elaborate on information provided by the text, and they integrate the new information into 
their existing knowledge base.  The completeness of the situation model determines 
whether an individual merely will have memory for the text or actually will learn from 
the text (Kintsch, 1994).  Whereas text memory means one can reproduce the text in some 
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form, text learning means one can apply the information from the text to a novel 
situation..  In Studies 2 and 3, participants read medical necessity and claims procedure 
clauses extracted from SPDs to form a hypothetical health plan.  They completed a 
multiple-choice comprehension test on the clauses.  This exercise in comprehension was 
designed to assess participants’ text memory of information provided by a health plan. 
Because plan participants and beneficiaries may read their SPDs only when they 
first receive them or after a dispute occurs, the present study examined comprehension 
under both circumstances.  In doing research on readability and comprehension in 
general, Duffy and Kabance (1982) distinguished between two types of reading tasks.  In 
a reading-to-learn task, individuals attempt to store and retain information for use in the 
future.  Thus, when plan participants and beneficiaries read their SPDs when they first 
receive them, they are engaging in a reading-to-learn task.  On the other hand, in a 
reading-to-do task, individuals read with specific objectives and plan to use their newly-
acquired information immediately.  Plan participants and beneficiaries engage in reading-
to-do tasks when they revisit their SPDs once a dispute has arisen.  In the present study, 
all participants engaged in a reading-to-learn task regarding portions of a SPD in Study 2.  
In Study 3, half the participants engaged in a reading-to-learn task and the other half 
engaged in a simulated reading-to-do task regarding portions of a SPD.  In the reading-to-
do task, participants were instructed that their health plan had determined care they had 
requested was not medically necessary.  Because reading-to-do tasks should prompt 
individuals to pay greater attention to relevant information, process information more 
selectively, and engage in deeper integration of information (Duffy & Kabance, 1982), I 
expected comprehension would be better when participants had a priori knowledge that 
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benefits had been denied.  Whereas the reading-to-learn task may only result in text 
memory, the reading-to-do task should encourage text learning.  Text learning requires 
deeper understanding of the subject matter so that individuals can use newly acquired 
information in novel environments (Kintsch, 1994).  As a result, participants in the 
reading-to-do task should be better at using the health plan language to answer the 
multiple-choice question comprehension test. 
Health Information and Individual Differences.  In general, legal documents tend 
to be difficult to read due to their length, complexity, and technical nature (Hartley, 2000; 
Wogalter et al., 1999).  Documents governed by ERISA may be particularly hard to 
comprehend due to the technical nature of healthcare information (Sage, 1999).  In an 
effort to control healthcare spending, the health insurance industry has turned to 
consumer-driven healthcare (Robinson, 2004).  This movement has shifted significantly 
more responsibility to plan participants for decisions concerning the utilization of 
healthcare services.  Plan participants may find it more difficult to navigate consumer-
driven healthcare plans than traditional healthcare plans, and they may find it more 
difficult to understand the benefits covered by their plans and the rights and 
responsibilities they have under their plans (Medill et al., 2006).  Indeed, studies show 
that a high percentage of Americans do not understand how healthcare plans operate, 
which might be a prerequisite for understanding more detailed processes such as benefit 
denials (Edgman-Levitan & Cleary, 1996; Hibbard & Jewett, 1997; Hibbard, Jewett, 
Englemann, & Tusker, 1998; Isaacs, 1996; Lubalin & Harris-Kojetin, 1999; McCormack 
et al., 2002).  In addition, consumer-driven healthcare presumes that plan participants will 
use their health plan documents as a tool for medical decision making, but only four to 
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six percent of health plan participants trust their healthcare plan to provide the kind of 
information (e.g., the cost and quality of providers) they need to make informed decisions 
about the utilization of healthcare services (EBRI/Commonwealth Fund, 2005).  Plan 
participants may be skeptical of the information provided by their health plans due, in 
part, to their inability to comprehend health plan documents, such as SPDs (Medill et al., 
2006). 
Furthermore, consumers may struggle to comprehend health information due to 
their underlying characteristics (Sage, 1999).  Several studies have found that consumers’ 
knowledge of health insurance varies depending on individual characteristics.  Greater 
knowledge of health insurance has been associated with higher education (Cafferata, 
1984; Hibbard et al., 1998; Lambert, 1980; Marquis, 1983; McCall, Rice, & Sangl, 1986; 
McCormack et al., 2002), higher income (Hibbard et al., 1998; Lambert, 1980; Marquis, 
1983; McCall et al., 1986; McCormack et al., 2002; Rice, McCall, & Boismier, 1991), 
younger age (Cafferata, 1984; Lambert, 1980; McCall et al., 1986), being White 
(Marquis, 1983; McCall et al., 1986; McCormack et al., 2002), and being male (Lambert, 
1980; McCormack et al., 2002).  As a result, the present study asked participants to report 
their demographic information.  In addition, experience with the healthcare industry may 
influence understanding of how health plans operate.  Hibbard and Jewett (1996) suggest 
that the chronically or severely ill may assess healthcare services differently from healthy 
consumers.  Consequently, the present study assessed participants’ experience with the 
healthcare industry. 
Perhaps more central to issues of comprehension, individuals may differ in their 
health literacy.  Functional health literacy measures consumer ability to read and 
 12 
understand health information (Andrus & Roth, 2002).  Over 30% of English-speaking 
Americans have inadequate or marginal health literacy as measured by the Test of 
Functional Health Literacy in Adults (TOFHLA) or the Short Test of Functional Health 
Literacy in Adults (S-TOFHLA; Gazmararian et al., 1999; Gazmararian, Williams, Peel, 
& Baker, 2003; Parker & Gazmararian, 2003; Williams et al., 1995).  For example, a 
study assessing health literacy found that as many as 60% of consumers could not 
understand standard consent forms for medical procedures (Williams et al., 1995).  The 
Ad Hoc Committee on Health Literacy for the Council on Scientific Affairs (1999) 
conducted a comprehensive search of the health literacy literature.  Their research 
indicates that even when controlling for such factors as education level and 
socioeconomic status, inadequate health literacy is associated with inferior understanding 
of health-related information along with worse health, less use of preventative health 
services, and inflated healthcare costs.  The wide assortment of available health 
information, including SPDs, cannot have its intended effect of informing and protecting 
consumers if consumers lack the health literacy necessary to comprehend it (Bernhardt & 
Cameron, 2003).  The present study assessed the health literacy of a population of 
employed adults and determined whether their health literacy related to their 
comprehension of SPDs. 
Readability of Healthcare Information.  One measure of comprehension is 
readability assessments.  Readability assessments can be used to show that drafters are 
overestimating document readability (Hochhauser, 1999).  Gray, Cooke, and 
Tannenbaum (1978) found over 77% of 1526 research consent forms, as measured by the 
widely-used Flesch readability formula, were written at the academic or scientific level.  
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Several studies have examined the readability of medical consent forms.  A study of 60 
medical consent forms found that the average readability of the forms was only slightly 
lower than readability scores for scientific medical journals, as measured by the Flesch 
readability formula, and that 61% of the forms required college-level reading ability, as 
measured by the Fry Readability Scale (Morrow, 1980).  Another study found that the 
mean reading level of 88 medical consent forms, as measured by the Fry Readability 
Scale, was 13.4 years of schooling (LoVerde, Prochazka, & Byyny, 1989). 
The present study assessed readability scores for SPD sections on medical 
necessity and claims procedure.  Based on assessments of medical consent forms and 
surveys of plan participants, I expected to find that SPDs were written above the reading 
levels the average plan participant is likely to possess.  A search of 61 institutional review 
board websites found that specific readability standards for medical consent forms ranged 
from 5th- to 10th-grade reading levels (Paasche-Orlow, Taylor, & Brancati, 2003).  A 
finding that SPDs require high levels of reading ability could be problematic given the 
National Adult Literacy Survey’s finding that 20 to 23% of the 191 million adults 
sampled were functionally illiterate and another 26% had marginal reading skills (Kirsh, 
Jungeblut, Jenkins, & Kolstad, 1993).  According to 2005 U.S. Census data, 16% of 
adults age 25 or older have not graduated from high school. 
Declarative and Procedural Knowledge.  The present study not only assessed the 
readability of a sample of medical necessity and claims procedure clauses but also 
directly measured comprehension by assessing health consumers’ knowledge after 
reading those clauses.  Little research has examined participants’ comprehension of their 
legal rights based on written documents.  Morton and Green (1991) evaluated children’s 
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and adolescents’ comprehension of terminology related to their rights as inpatients by 
having participants define vocabulary words, paraphrase statements, and determine 
whether paraphrased statements were accurate.  Comprehension was related to abstract 
reasoning ability, decision-making ability, intelligence, and age.  Tymchuk, Ouslander, 
and Rader (1986) had elderly residents of a long-term care facility read or listen to 
versions of a resident’s bill of rights and evaluate whether rights were erroneously denied 
or correctly claimed.  Participants who received the simplified language version of the 
bill of rights demonstrated better comprehension than participants who received the large 
print, storybook, or videotape versions.  The present study is the first to research plan 
participants’ comprehension of their ERISA rights.  Based on research concerning health 
insurance knowledge and comprehension of informed consent forms, I expected to find 
that participants’ comprehension was low. 
Because readability scores do not always accurately predict objective 
comprehension (Black, 1981; Duffy & Kabance, 1982), the present study directly 
measured comprehension by assessing health consumers’ knowledge of their rights after 
reading SPDs.  Several studies have examined comprehension of jury instructions and 
suggest a methodology for evaluating comprehension of other legal documents (Wiener, 
Pritchard, & Weston, 1995; Wiener et al., 1998; Wiener et al., 2004).  Smith (1994) 
examines two types of knowledge—declarative knowledge, which is meaning- and 
content-based information stored as semantic concepts, schemata, scripts, or prototypes, 
and procedural knowledge, which operates on the declarative knowledge stored in long- 
and short-term memory.  Wiener et al. (1998, 2004) assessed these two types of 
knowledge in an effort to gain a more complete understanding of comprehension of jury 
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instructions.  Declarative knowledge was measured by questioning participants about 
legal concepts, terms, definitions, and rules outlined in the jury instructions.  Procedural 
knowledge was measured by asking participants to determine whether a hypothetical 
juror followed the jury instructions given the hypothetical facts of a case.  The present 
study assessed participants’ declarative and procedural knowledge of their benefits and 
their rights and responsibilities after reading documents governed by ERISA.  Because 
declarative knowledge is memory for meaning- and content-based information, it is 
similar to text memory, which simply involves reproduction of text in some form 
(Kintsch, 1994).  Procedural knowledge, on the other hand, is similar to text learning 
because it involves applying stored information in a novel way.  Thus, procedural 
knowledge may require a deeper level of comprehension than declarative knowledge. 
Improving Comprehension.  Due to complaints that legal documents are difficult 
to read and comprehend, several states have taken steps to promote the incorporation of 
plain language into legal documents (Black, 1981; Wogalter et al., 1999).  For example, 
researchers have demonstrated that the comprehension of jury instructions can be 
improved through redrafting (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1977, 
1982).  Research focused on insurance information and informed consent forms may 
provide insight into ways to improve the comprehensibility of SPDs.  Researchers were 
able to improve Medicare beneficiaries’ knowledge of their healthcare coverage by 
supplying beneficiaries with a Medicare & You handbook (McCormack et al., 2001; 
McCormack et al., 2002).  Harris-Kojetin, McCormack, Jael, Sangl, and Garfinkel (2001) 
interviewed and conducted focus groups with publicly- and privately-insured consumers 
to gather suggestions for improving the comprehensibility of several insurance booklets.  
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They found that consumers wanted the insurance materials to be shorter, simpler, and 
clearer. 
Several studies have attempted to improve the comprehensibility of informed 
consent forms.  Young, Hooker, and Freeberg (1990) found that individuals scored higher 
on a multiple-choice comprehension test when a research consent form was written at a 
lower reading level as compared to a higher reading level.  The high reading level 
consent form, which required grade level 16 reading ability, was reduced to the sixth-
grade level, as measured by the Flesch-Kincaid readability formula, by using words with 
fewer syllables, less technical jargon, and fewer complex sentences.  Participants who 
received the low reading level version reported that the consent form was easier to 
understand than participants who received the high reading level version.  Holding 
reading level constant, shortening and removing detail from consent forms also has 
improved their comprehension (Mann, 1984).  Masson and Waldron (1994) increased 
comprehension of several standard legal documents (e.g., mortgages and bank loans) by 
removing or replacing archaic words and legal terms and simplifying sentence structure. 
In a series of experiments, Wogalter et al. (1999) examined factors related to the 
comprehension of legal documents.  Participants in the first two studies suggested and 
rated highly the following recommendations for improving comprehension of legal 
documents: decreasing technicality, giving explanations, providing definitions, and 
giving examples.  Wogalter et al. were able to improve comprehension and readability of 
a conventional consent form by enlarging the print, shortening the length, changing the 
tone from third to first person, and reducing the technical nature of the document.  
Participants who received the improved consent form, as compared to the conventional 
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form, reported that they read it more carefully, understood the form better, and were more 
informed about their rights.  These participant perceptions were correlated with their 
objective comprehension. 
The present study incorporated the mechanisms employed by Wogalter et al. 
(1999) to improve comprehension of SPD provisions.  Based on the success of redrafting 
other legal documents, I expected to find that participants would demonstrate greater 
comprehension of health plan requirements and ERISA rights when they read a redrafted, 
as compared to an original, SPD.  Based on Duffy and Kabance’s (1982) reasoning that 
redrafting facilitates comprehension only when readers are required to integrate and 
organize the information (i.e., when they must summarize the information or when they 
must apply a procedure) and because appealing benefit denials is a procedural process, I 
expected comprehension to improve more when participants engaged in a reading-to-do 
task (i.e., when they knew a benefit had been denied) as opposed to a reading-to-learn 
task. 
One of the policy considerations underlying ERISA’s disclosure requirement is to 
make employers and insurers who sponsor plans feel more accountable for their 
compliance with ERISA and the terms of their plans.  Employers and plan administrators 
may be motivated to improve the comprehension of their SPDs if plan participants and 
beneficiaries’ decisions to appeal coverage denials are influenced by their knowledge of 
their rights according to the terms of their healthcare plans.  Increased comprehension 
could lead to fewer appeals because participants would know what to and what not to 
expect from their plan administrators.  On the other hand, increased comprehension could 
lead to more appeals because participants would be better equipped to begin the appeal 
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process.  In Study 3, participants reacted to being denied healthcare benefits they sought 
from a hypothetical health plan.  I expected comprehension to influence participants’ 
decisions to appeal benefit denials, such that participants would make sounder appeal 
decisions the more they understood the health plan.  Whereas the multiple-choice 
comprehension test was designed to assess participants’ text memory, the simulated 
appeals process was designed to assess participants’ text learning of the information 
provided by a health plan (Kintsch, 1994).  The appeals process required participants to 
apply information they read from the health plan to the novel situation of challenging the 
health plan’s decision.  Thus, successful completion of the appeals process may require a 
deeper understanding of the material than successful completion of the comprehension 
test.  The strength of the medical necessity claim was manipulated.  Participants either 
had a strong or weak claim for appealing the health plan’s decision to deny benefits.  I 
hypothesized that better comprehension would be associated with an increased propensity 
to appeal a strong claim and a decreased propensity to appeal a weak claim. 
Plan Satisfaction.  The decision to appeal benefit denials may be mediated not 
only by comprehension of SPDs but also by satisfaction with the plan.  According to 
Sage (2003), “Public trust in the health care system has collective importance, and fair 
deliberative procedures reassure individuals as consumers, patients, and citizens that 
health plans, even as private actors, are seeking a reasonable balance between access to 
(or quality of) health care and its costs” (p. 621-622).   Procedural justice concerns the 
fairness of the process used to come to a decision (Tyler, 1989).  The present study 
focused on participants’ satisfaction with the health plan and with the ERISA appeals 
process. 
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Because healthcare plans follow a procedure for denying benefits, studies on 
procedural fairness may provide insight into perceptions of health plans and the claims 
denial process.  Lind and Tyler (1988) proposed that reactions to decisions are influenced 
by perceptions of procedural fairness, independent of outcomes.  Control, neutrality, 
social standing, and trust influence perceptions of procedural justice (Tyler, 1989).  
Control indicates that each side had an influence on the decision, neutrality occurs when 
decisions are made in an unbiased manner, trust depends on the relationship between the 
individual and the authority figure making the decision, and social standing reflects an 
individual’s assessment of their status in the group.  Tyler (1989) suggests that 
individuals will perceive decisions as fairer when they have some choice and voice in the 
decision-making process. 
Hughes and Larson (1991) extended the principle of procedural fairness to the 
healthcare setting.  Participants rated the procedural fairness of prescription selection 
when a physician either asked or failed to ask a patient’s preferences regarding several 
characteristics of the medication.  Hughes and Larson found that participants rated the 
prescription decision as more fair when the patient was given the chance to voice his 
preferences, independent of the outcome of the decision. 
Murphy-Berman, Cross, and Fondacaro (1999) asked adults enrolled in health 
plans to recall a time over the past 12 months when their healthcare administrator made a 
decision regarding the care they were able to receive.  After describing this experience, 
respondents reported their perceptions of the procedural fairness of the situation.  
Respondents who rated the situation as more procedurally fair expected to have a better 
relationship with their health plan administrator, to have a closer relationship with their 
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health plan group, to have more status in their health plan group, and to feel better about 
themselves. 
To improve participant satisfaction with their health plans, the Ethical 
Fundamental Obligations Report Card Evaluations program suggests that coverage 
decisions ought to be transparent, participatory, equitable and consistent, sensitive to 
value, and compassionate (Wynia et al., 2004).  Research suggests that individuals are 
more likely to accept undesirable outcomes when they perceive the process that generated 
the outcomes as fair (Lind & Tyler, 1988).  If individuals perceive a decision-making 
process as unfair, they may be more likely to take action against the decision.  Skarlicki 
and Folger (1997) investigated the relationship between workers’ perceptions of 
procedural fairness and organizational retaliation behavior.  They found that perceptions 
of procedural fairness did not influence claiming behavior.  In a study of workers’ 
compensation claims, Roberts and Markel (2001) assessed perceptions of fairness shortly 
after company physicians reported an injury and one year later.  Again, perceptions of 
procedural fairness did not influence claiming behavior.   
The present study determined whether this finding extended to the decision to file 
ERISA denial of benefit claims.  Perhaps, procedural fairness factors relate to perceptions 
of procedural fairness but do not predict behavior.  The present study measured both 
perceptions of procedural fairness and appeal behavior.  In spite of Skarlicki and Folger’s 
results and Roberts and Markel’s findings, I expected participants to appeal denials more 
often when they perceived the decision-making process as procedurally unfair and 
reported being less satisfied with the health plan.  In addition, I expected comprehension 
to influence participants’ perceptions of the health plan, but it was unclear in which 
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direction.  Increased comprehension could lead to greater plan approval because 
participants would know what to and what not to expect from their plan administrators.  
On the other hand, increased comprehension could lead to more dissatisfaction because 
participants would realize the limitations of the health plan coverage and the 
administrative obstacles they would have to overcome to get the results they wanted. 
Present Study 
The present study explored consumers’ comprehension of their benefits and their 
rights and responsibilities regarding denied healthcare benefits and investigated 
consumers’ perceptions of fairness and decision preferences in hypothetical situations 
where coverage had been denied.  In Study 1, the medical necessity and claims procedure 
clauses of SPDs were analyzed using readability formulas.  Based on assessments of 
medical consent forms, I expected to find that these SPD clauses were written at reading 
levels beyond those one might expect the average plan participant to possess. 
In Study 2, employees were tested on their comprehension of their rights after 
reading either original or redrafted versions of medical necessity and claims procedure 
clauses.  Participants also completed a health literacy test and reported their personal 
health history and insurance status.  I hypothesized that employees with higher health 
literacy and more experience with the healthcare industry would demonstrate greater 
comprehension than employees with lower health literacy and less familiarity with the 
healthcare industry.  More importantly, I expected to find that participants who received 
the redrafted clauses would demonstrate better comprehension than participants who 
received the original clauses would. 
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In Study 3, employees either read plan documents without any a priori knowledge 
(reading-to-learn) or knowing they had been denied coverage (reading-to-do).  Claim 
strength was manipulated as well.  Participants were tested on their comprehension of 
their rights after reading plan documents, and they reported their satisfaction with the 
health plan and the appeals process.  I expected comprehension to be better for the 
redrafted clauses, as compared to the original clauses, and for the reading-to-do task, as 
compared to the reading-to-learn task.  I also expected comprehension, perceptions of 
fairness, and the strength of the claim to predict the decision to appeal.  I hypothesized 
that better comprehension would be associated with an increased propensity to appeal a 
strong claim and a decreased propensity to appeal a weak claim.  I also expected 
participants to appeal the plan administrator’s decision more often when they perceived 
the decision-making process as procedurally unfair and when they were less satisfied 
with the health plan. 
Study 1 
Method 
Materials.  As part of a larger project (Medill et al., 2006) that examined six types 
of clauses in SPDs, I collected and tested the medical necessity and claims procedure 
clauses from 40 health plan SPDs.  The study sample included a diverse geographic range 
of employers from across the United States.  Both large employers and small employers 
representing a variety of industrial sectors were included in the study sample.  The study 
sample included both healthcare plans sponsored by a single employer for its workers and 
multiemployer healthcare plans sponsored jointly by employers and labor unions for 
collective bargaining unit employees.  The study sample also included different types of 
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healthcare plans, including traditional indemnity healthcare plans offered through 
insurance companies, employer self-insured healthcare plans with a third party 
administrator and a utilization review manager, managed care plans, and one high-
deductible healthcare plan with a corresponding health savings account feature. 
The majority of the SPDs were obtained by conducting a random search of the 
internet.  SPDs also were obtained from employees who participated in plans.  A few of 
the SPDs were obtained from attorneys who had represented plan participants in recent 
federal court litigation where the language of the SPD was related to the issue in dispute. 
Procedure.  Two experts in ERISA coded each SPD.  A law school professor with 
a combined total of fourteen years of private legal practice and academic research 
experience with ERISA coded all of the SPDs in the sample.  Three other expert readers, 
with 3.5 to 6 years of private legal practice experience with ERISA, each coded a portion 
of the entire sample set of SPDs.  All four coders are considered experts on ERISA-
regulated healthcare plans by their peers in the legal profession. 
Each expert reader received a detailed coding instruction book (see Appendix A 
for general and specific instructions for the medical necessity and claims procedure 
clauses) that outlined the criteria for the reader to use in determining what language in the 
SPD should be identified as part of a clause.  The coding instruction book included the 
legal definition and function of the clause along with appropriate citations to the relevant 
statutory provisions of ERISA.  The coding instruction book gave specific guidance to 
the expert readers regarding what language should be included as part of the clause.  The 
coding instruction book also told the expert readers what language should be excluded 
from relevant clauses when appropriate. 
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I assessed the readability of the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses 
that were identified by the expert readers.  Because all of the readers are considered 
experts on ERISA-regulated healthcare plans, any language that was identified by an 
expert reader as part of a tested clause was subjected to a readability assessment.  This 
procedure guaranteed that the portions of the SPDs that were analyzed for readability 
were maximally inclusive and did not depend on the judgments of a single expert reader. 
Inter-rater reliability.  However, I did calculate inter-rater agreement among the 
expert coders.  The primary coder served as the standard for calculating agreement with 
each of the three secondary coders.  I computed agreement as the number of paragraphs 
that both raters marked off for a given clause, divided by the total number of paragraphs 
that either coder marked as part of that clause.  To illustrate this procedure, assume that 
the first expert reader identified 10 paragraphs as constituting a claims procedure clause 
and the second expert reader identified 9 paragraphs.  The two expert readers agreed 
upon 8 paragraphs (i.e., they both marked off the same 8 paragraphs), but they disagreed 
on three others.  For this clause, the inter-rater agreement would equal 8/11, or 72%.  If 
the coders agreed that a particular plan lacked any relevant clause, agreement was 
assigned a value of 100% for this analysis. 
For medical necessity clauses, inter-rater reliability ignoring differences across 
SPDs in the number of observed paragraphs was 42% (SD = 31%) and inter-rater 
reliability weighing the number of observed paragraphs was 31%.  For claims procedure 
clauses, inter-rater reliability ignoring differences in the number of observed paragraphs 
was 83% (SD = 24%) and inter-rater reliability weighing the number of observed 
paragraphs was 85%.  Although medical necessity clauses were substantially more 
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difficult to identify reliably than claims procedure clauses, these results indicate that 
overall even trained ERISA experts struggle to reliably determine the language in SPDs 
that describes the benefits covered by the plan and the participant’s rights and 
responsibilities under the plan (Medill et al., 2006).  As described above, to maximize 
inclusiveness, any language that was identified by an expert reader as part of a tested 
clause was included in the readability analysis. 
Measures.  The medical necessity and claims procedure clauses were submitted to 
three widely used readability measures: the Flesch Reading Ease formula, Flesch Grade 
Level formula, and Fog Index.  The Flesch Reading Ease formula yields a readability 
score between 0 and 100 with lower scores indicating the material is more difficult to 
comprehend (Flesch, 1948).  The formula for the Flesch Reading Ease score takes into 
account average sentence length and average number of syllables per word.  The resulting 
scores are associated with grade levels (e.g., 0-30 = college graduates; 30-50 = college 
years; 50-60 = 10th-12th graders).  The related Flesch Grade Level indicates the minimum 
education level required for the reader to be able to understand the document (Kincaid, 
Fishbume, Rogers, & Chissom, 1975).  The formula for the Flesch Grade Level is also 
based on average sentence length and average number of syllables per word.  The Flesch 
Grade Level formula uses different coefficients from the Flesch Reading Ease Formula, 
and the output is stated in terms of grade level.  The Fog Index uses different indicators to 
measure language complexity.  The Fog Index weighs the total number of words, words 
of three or more syllables, and sentences (Gunning, 1968).  Commentary accompanying 
the Fog Index recommends that technical material should score no higher than 14, 
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business material should score no higher than 12, and clerical material should score no 
higher than 8 (Thomas, Hartley, & Kincaid, 1975). 
Results and Discussion 
The results of the readability analyses are set forth in Table 1 for the medical 
necessity clauses and Table 2 for the claims procedure clauses. 
 
Table 1.  Average Objective Readability of Medical Necessity Clauses 
  M  SD  Range 
Flesch Reading Ease  32.4  7.8  15-50 
Flesch Grade Level  13.0  1.8  9.9-17.2 
FOG Index   16.0  2.1  10.9-20.9 
 
 
Table 2.  Average Objective Readability of Claims Procedure Clauses 
  M  SD  Range 
Flesch Reading Ease  47.6  8.3  31-65 
Flesch Grade Level  11.3  2.1  7.4-16.4 
FOG Index   13.9  2.2  9.7-18.9 
 
Consistent with assessments of medical consent forms, I found that both types of 
clauses were written at reading levels beyond those one might expect the average plan 
participant to possess.  The Flesch Reading Ease mean of 32.4 for medical necessity and 
47.6 for claims procedure indicates that the language of the clauses tested is written at a 
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college reading level.  The related Flesch Grade Level indicates that the minimum 
education level required for the reader to be able to understand the language of the 
average clause is 13.0 for medical necessity and 11.3 for claims procedure (with 12 being 
equivalent to a high school degree).  The Fog Index mean of 16.0 for medical necessity 
and 13.9 for claims procedure is at or higher than the recommended level for technical 
material (14) and higher than the recommended level for business material (12; Thomas 
et al., 1975). 
These findings indicate that some SPDs may not comply with ERISA § 102(a)’s 
requirement that SPDs “shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the 
average plan participant” (29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)).  Furthermore, the federal law’s purpose 
of providing participants and beneficiaries with full disclosure of relevant information 
concerning their health plans may be frustrated by the high level of reading ability needed 
to understand SPDs.  Although ERISA does not detail the standards by which 
understanding should be measured, it does require that SPDs be understandable to the 
average employee.  To date, the reading ability of the average employee has not been 
determined.  However, the National Adult Literacy Survey found that 20 to 23% of adults 
are functionally illiterate and another 26% have marginal literary skills (Kirsh et al., 
1993).  Furthermore, 16% of adults age 25 or older have not graduated from high school 
according to 2005 U.S. Census data. 
The finding from the present study that some SPDs require college-age reading 
ability, if replicated, could have serious implications.  Because this finding is based on a 
small sample of SPDs, these results should be interpreted with caution.  Nevertheless, 
SPDs are the primary source of information for participants in employer-sponsored 
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healthcare plans.  In this age of consumer-driven healthcare, it is critical that individuals 
be able to understand the benefits covered by their plans and the rights and 
responsibilities they have under their plans.  Along these lines, many institutional review 
boards require that medical consent forms be written at 5th- to 10th-grade reading levels 
(Paasche-Orlow et al., 2003).  The present study indicates that some SPDs are written 
well above this standard and likely fail to meet ERISA’s requirement that SPDs be 
understandable to the average plan participant. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, employees read either original or redrafted versions of medical 
necessity and claims procedure clauses.  Participants were tested on their comprehension 
of the clauses, and they completed a health literacy test.  Participants also reported their 
personal health history and insurance status.  I hypothesized that employees with higher 
health literacy and more experience with the healthcare industry would demonstrate 
greater comprehension than employees with lower health literacy and less familiarity 
with the healthcare industry.  More importantly, I expected to find that participants who 
received the redrafted clauses would demonstrate better comprehension than participants 
who received the original clauses would. 
Method 
Participants.  Employed adults (N = 400), who had volunteered to participate in 
web-based research through www.studyresponse.com, were recruited through an email 
which contained a link to the study website.  Participants who completed the study were 
entered into a lottery to receive gift certificates for their participation.  Of the 400 
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employed adults recruited to participate in the study, 88 individuals (22%) completed the 
study. 
Materials.  I chose the clauses for Study 2 and 3 based on the readability scores 
found in Study 1.  Reliability analyses on z-scores from each readability measure (i.e., 
Flesch Reading Ease formula, Flesch Grade Level formula, and Fog Index) produced 
alpha coefficients of .94 for the medical necessity clauses and .98 for the claims 
procedure clauses.  These results demonstrate that these three indicators of readability 
were measuring the same construct.  A single standard score was created by computing 
the average of the transformed readability scores. 
For each clause, the standard scores were divided into quartiles.  To increase 
generalizability, two medical necessity and two claims procedure clauses that were 
representative (e.g., average word count, contained all sections of the clauses) of each 
type of clause were chosen from the 10 medical necessity and 10 claims procedure 
clauses with the poorest readability scores. 
To create the redrafted clauses, complex sentences were broken up into simpler 
sentences, long words were made into shorter words, the tone was changed from third to 
second person, and the technical nature of the documents was reduced by eliminating 
jargon (Wogalter et al., 1999).  Although readability scores are also dependent on word 
count, it is difficult to reduce word count without changing meaning, so I attempted to 
keep the word count similar for the original and redrafted versions.  The redrafted clauses 
also were improved in ways, such as enlarging the font, reordering the text, and indenting 
subcategories, that would not change the readability scores.  The original and redrafted 
clauses are presented side by side in Appendix B; although the redrafted clauses were 
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displayed in a larger font than the original clauses on the website, the redrafted and 
original clauses are presented in the same font size in Appendix B for ease of 
comparison.  A professor of ERISA law compared the original and redrafted documents 
to ensure the substantive content had remained the same.  The readability scores for the 
original and redrafted clauses are presented in Table 3 for the medical necessity clauses 
and in Table 4 for the claims procedure clauses. 
 
Table 3.  Objective Readability of Selected Medical Necessity Clauses 
       Plan 1            Plan 2 
       Original       Redrafted         Original       Redrafted 
Flesch Reading Ease 28  37   21  37 
Flesch Grade Level 14.3  12.6   14.4  11.5 
FOG Index  17.2  15.5   17.0  14.0 
Words   859  900   774  776 
    1 syllable  446  490   395  427 
    ≥3 syllables  226  208   241  201 
Difficult Words  202  186   202  165 
Syllables   1618  1617   1543  1432 
Sentences   44  50   47  57 
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Table 4.  Objective Readability of Selected Claims Procedure Clauses 
        Plan 1            Plan 2 
       Original       Redrafted         Original       Redrafted 
Flesch Reading Ease 31  50   34  47 
Flesch Grade Level 16.4  11.5   15.5  12.0 
FOG Index  18.9  14.2   18.3  14.7 
Words   2635  2656   1772  1834 
    1 syllable  1566  1721   1075  1171 
    ≥3 syllables  525  449   350  313 
Difficult Words  458  386   313  280 
Syllables   4526  4247   3024  2983 
Sentences   88  126   63  85 
 
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the versions of the 
clauses (original v. redrafted).  They read one medical necessity and one claims 
procedure clause. Participants completed the study over the internet.  After providing 
informed consent, participants were instructed to read the sections of a Health Plan as if 
they were members of the Health Plan.  They were informed they would be questioned 
about the Health Plan and the Health Plan would be available for them to refer back to. 
After reading the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses, participants 
answered demographic questions. 
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As a manipulation check, participants rated their agreement with the following 
statements on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree): (1) 
the Health Plan sections on coverage (medical necessity) were easy to understand; (2) I 
understood the Health Plan sections on coverage (medical necessity); (3) the Health Plan 
sections on claims were easy to understand; and (4) I understood the Health Plan sections 
on claims. 
Then, participants completed a comprehension test on the Health Plan (see 
Appendix C), during which they were able to refer back to the clauses.  The questionnaire 
assessed declarative knowledge (e.g., when is care considered medically necessary?) and 
procedural knowledge (e.g., do participants have to exhaust the plan’s administrative 
appeal process?) through multiple-choice questions.  Although the questions set out in 
Appendix C are grouped by clause and question type, the order of questions presented to 
participants was mixed. 
Based on Wiener et al.’s (1998, 2004) methods, responses to the comprehension 
test were coded as follows: correct responses (hits) = 1; incorrect responses (misses) = -1; 
and I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question (do not know) 
responses = 0.  This method of calculation rewarded hits, neutralized do not know 
responses, and penalized misses.  Accuracy averages could range from 1.00 (all hits) to -
1.00 (all misses).  I calculated an overall comprehension accuracy score and subscale 
comprehension accuracy scores.  Each subscale score was calculated by summing up the 
scores of the items on that subscale and dividing by the total number of items on that 
subscale. 
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Following the comprehension test, participants completed the reading 
comprehension section of the short version of the Test of Functional Health Literacy in 
Adults (S-TOFHLA; Baker, Williams, Parker, Gazmararian, & Nurss, 1999; see 
Appendix D).  The comprehension section of the S-TOFHLA has internal consistency (α  
= .97) and is strongly correlated (r = .81) with the Rapid Estimate of Adult Literacy in 
Medicine (REALM), similar to the full version of the TOFHLA (r = .84; Baker et al., 
1999).  For this test, participants read prose passages written at grade levels of 4.3 and 
10.4, as measured by the Gunning-Fox index.  The passages are instructions for 
preparation for an upper gastrointestinal tract radiograph procedure and the patient 
“Rights and Responsibilities” section of the Medicaid application, respectively.  
Comprehension is measured by a 36-item test using the modified Cloze procedure; that 
is, every fifth to seventh word in the passages is missing, and participants must choose 
from four multiple choice options.  Correct responses receive one point, and incorrect 
responses receive no points.  Scores from 0 to 16 indicate inadequate health literacy, such 
that individuals will often misread the simplest materials, including prescription bottles 
and appointment slips.  Scores from 17 to 22 indicate marginal health literacy, such that 
individuals will perform better on the simplest tasks but will have difficulty with more 
complex material, including insurance information about their rights and responsibilities.  
Scores from 23 to 36 indicate adequate health literacy, such that individuals will 
successfully complete most tasks necessary to function in the healthcare setting but may 
have difficulty with materials written above the 10th-grade reading level. 
Then participants provided information about their health history.  Participants 
were asked to rate their health status as poor, fair, good, or excellent.  Participants were 
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asked whether they have at least one chronic disease, whether they were hospitalized for 
inpatient or outpatient treatment in the last year, and if hospitalized, how many days they 
were hospitalized.  Participants also were asked whether they have seen a doctor in the 
last two years; if so, how many doctors they have seen in the last two years; and whether 
they have seen a specialist in the last two years. 
In addition, participants were asked questions concerning their health insurance 
status.  Participants indicated whether they have health insurance, whether they have 
privately-funded health insurance (e.g., HMOs, PPOs, fee-for-service), whether they have 
publicly-funded health insurance (e.g., Medicaid, Medicare), whether they have health 
insurance through their employer or a family member’s employer, and whether they have 
supplemental health insurance.  If they had health insurance, participants reported the 
number of years they have had health insurance.  Participants also were asked whether 
they have sought pre-authorization for coverage, submitted a pre-service claim, submitted 
a post-service claim, appealed a denial of coverage to their health plan, or appealed a 
denial of coverage through a lawsuit. 
Results and Discussion 
 Participants (N = 6) who spent less than five minutes answering study questions 
were excluded from data analyses, leaving 81 participants.  There were 36 participants in 
the original clause condition, and 45 participants in the redrafted clause condition.  
Participants dropped from data analyses were not more likely to be in the original clause 
condition than in the redrafted clause condition, χ2(1, N = 87) = .07, p = .79.  Participants 
included in analyses spent an average of 1040.14 seconds (~17 minutes; SD = 1768.61) 
answering questions.  The demographic characteristics of the 81 participants included in 
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subsequent analyses are presented in Table 5.  There was only one difference in 
comprehension across demographic groups.  Older participants had better 
comprehension, r(81) = .37, p < .01, which is inconsistent with the finding that greater 
knowledge of health insurance has been associated with younger age (Cafferata, 1984; 
Lambert, 1980; McCall et al., 1986).  Because 96.3% of participants demonstrated 
adequate health literacy (M = 34.10, SD = 3.66, Range = 13-36) as measured by the S-
TOFHLA, I was not able to use health literacy in subsequent analyses. 
 
Table 5.  Participant Demographic Information 
Gender   35.9% men 
Race    82.7% Caucasian 
Age    M = 40.31 years 
Education   51.9% some college or more 
Household Income  43.8% less than $50,000 
Work for pay   97.5% 
Work > 30 hrs a week  86.4% 
States represented  29 
 
Plan Differences.  To determine whether the clauses from Health Plan 1 and 2 
could be combined for analyses, I compared the scores on the appropriate comprehension 
subscales for each Plan.  For the medical necessity clauses, scores of participants who 
received the original version of Plan 1 (M = .14, SD = .42; M = -.10, SD = .38) did not 
differ on the declarative and procedural question subscales from scores of participants 
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who received the original version of Plan 2 (M = .28, SD = .33; M = -.14, SD = .36), ts(1, 
34) = 1.10, .33, ps = .28, .74.  Scores of participants who received the redrafted version of 
Plan 1 (M = .23, SD = .36; M = .06, SD = .31) did not differ on the declarative and 
procedural question subscales from scores of participants who received the redrafted 
version of Plan 2 (M = .31, SD = .32; M = .06, SD = .39), ts(1, 43) = .75, .09, ps = .46, 
.93.  Because scores on the declarative and procedural questions did not differ depending 
on whether participants read the medical necessity clause from Plan 1 or Plan 2, the Plans 
were collapsed for analyses. 
For the claims procedure clauses, scores of participants who received the original 
version of Plan 1 (M = .05, SD = .16; M = .39, SD = .25) did not differ on the declarative 
and procedural question subscales from scores of participants who received the original 
version of Plan 2 (M = .02, SD = .33; M = .35, SD = .26), ts(1, 34) = .31, .52, ps = .76, 
.61.  Scores of participants who received the redrafted version of Plan 1 (M = .05, SD = 
.31; M = .31, SD = .31) did not differ on the declarative and procedural question 
subscales from scores of participants who received the redrafted version of Plan 2 (M = 
.12, SD = .44; M = .21, SD = .28), ts(1, 43) = .61, 1.18, ps = .54, .25.  Because scores on 
the declarative and procedural questions did not differ depending on whether participants 
read the claims procedure clause from Plan 1 or Plan 2, the Plans were collapsed for 
analyses. 
Manipulation Checks.  To test whether participants detected a difference in the 
readability of the original and redrafted clauses, t-tests were used to examine perceptions 
of understandability.  Participants were asked to rate how easy it was to understand the 
clauses and how well they understood the clauses.  For the medical necessity clauses, 
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participants in the redrafted clause condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.12) did not rate the clause 
they read as any easier to understand than did participants in the original clause condition 
(M = 3.36, SD = 1.05) did, t(1, 79) = .16, p = .87, d = .04.  Similarly, participants in the 
redrafted clause condition (M = 3.60, SD = 1.07) did not claim that they understood the 
clause they read any better than did participants in the original clause condition (M = 
3.64, SD = .87) did, t(1, 79) = .18, p = .86, d = .04. 
For the claims procedure clauses, participants in the redrafted clause condition (M 
= 3.16, SD = 1.15) did not rate the clause they read as any easier to understand than did 
participants in the original clause condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.06) did, t(1, 78) = .86, p = 
.39, d = .19.  Similarly, participants in the redrafted clause condition (M = 3.38, SD = 
1.09) did not claim that they understood the clause they read any better than did 
participants in the original clause condition (M = 3.58, SD = .94) did, t(1, 79) = .90, p = 
.37, d = .20. 
Because the manipulation check failed when participants saw only one version of 
the clauses, I ran a post-hoc study to establish that the redrafted clauses were more 
readable than the original clauses when participants read both versions.  Undergraduates 
(N = 25) and employees (N = 21) were instructed to compare the readability of the 
original and redrafted clauses.  Participants were given one of the versions (original or 
redrafted) of either Plan 1 or Plan 2’s medical necessity clause followed by the other 
version; the order of presentation was counterbalanced.  Then participants were asked to 
rate which clause was easier to read on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (Clause A was 
much easier to read) to 7 (Clause B was much easier to read), and which clause was 
more understandable on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (Clause A was much more 
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understandable) to 7 (Clause B was much more understandable).  Participants also were 
asked to rate which clause they found preferable on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 
(Strongly prefer Clause A) to 7 (Strongly prefer Clause B).  On all the scales, 4 was 
labeled Neutral.  Then, participants repeated the same procedure with one of the versions 
(original or redrafted) of either Plan 1 or Plan 2’s claims procedure clause. 
Because the reliability coefficients for the three questions was high regarding the 
medical necessity clauses (α = .94) and the claims procedure clauses (α = .90), the 
measures were combined into one readability index.  The ratings for each of the questions 
and the combined readability index are presented in Table 6 and 7.  As reported here, 
higher scores indicate that the redrafted clauses were easier to read, easier to understand, 
and more preferable. 
  
Table 6.  Average Subjective Readability of Medical Necessity Clauses 
           Plan 1 (N = 23)         Plan 2 (N = 23)        Total (N = 46) 
  M (SD)     M (SD)      M (SD) 
Readable  6.00 (1.48)  5.22 (1.70)  5.61 (1.63) 
Understandable 5.83 (1.83)  4.87 (1.52)  5.35 (1.73) 
Preferable  6.04 (1.58)  5.48 (1.70)  5.76 (1.65) 
Readability Index 5.96 (1.54)  5.19 (1.56)  5.57 (1.58) 
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Table 7.  Average Subjective Readability of Claims Procedure Clauses 
           Plan 1 (N = 22)         Plan 2 (N = 23)        Total (N = 45) 
  M (SD)     M (SD)      M (SD) 
Readable  5.73 (1.61)  5.57 (1.70)  5.64 (1.64) 
Understandable 5.41 (1.22)  5.65 (1.47)  5.53 (1.34) 
Preferable  5.77 (1.41)  5.78 (1.35)  5.78 (1.36) 
Readability Index 5.64 (1.32)  5.67 (1.37)  5.65 (1.33) 
 
The means indicate that participants rated the redrafted clauses on average as 
slightly to somewhat more readable, understandable, and preferable than the original 
clauses.  There were no significant differences between Plan 1 and Plan 2 for the medical 
necessity clauses or the claims procedure clauses.  An independent t-test was run 
comparing the readability index score to the neutral point (i.e., 4) on the scale of the pilot 
questions.  The t-test revealed that participants rated the redrafted clauses as more 
readable than the original clauses for both the medical necessity clauses, t(1, 45) = 6.74, p 
< .001, d = 2.00, and the claims procedure clauses, t(1, 44) = 8.35, p < .001, d = 2.49.  
These findings indicate that, despite the manipulation check failure, the redrafting did 
affect the clauses’ readability and comprehensibility. 
Redrafting.  In Study 2, participants completed a comprehension test to 
demonstrate their understanding of the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses.  
The mean overall comprehension accuracy score across all test items was .15 (SD = .20), 
which indicates that participants made slightly more correct responses than incorrect 
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responses.  Although .15 is not very far above the chance level of zero, an independent t-
test showed that this difference was significant, t(1, 80) = 6.78, p < .001, d = 1.52.  On 
average, 52.98% of participants’ responses were hits, 37.68% were misses, and 9.34% 
were do not know answers.  Thus, participants demonstrated poor comprehension of their 
benefits and their rights and responsibilities regarding the Health Plan.  This result is 
similar to the poor comprehension (.21) found in Wiener et al.’s (1998) Juror 
Comprehension Survey, where 56% of participants’ responses were hits, 33.5% were 
misses, and 10.5% were do not know answers. 
I hypothesized that participants who received the redrafted clauses would 
demonstrate better comprehension than participants who received the original clauses.  A 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed with clause subject (i.e., medical necessity 
and claims procedure) and knowledge type (i.e., declarative and procedural) as within-
subjects factors and clause (original v. redrafted) as the between-subjects factor.  The 
ANOVA revealed no main effect for clause, F(1, 79) = .93, p = .34, ηp2 = .01.  
Inconsistent with predictions, redrafting did not improve comprehension.  This finding is 
discussed further with results from Study 3. 
There was a significant main effect for clause subject, F(1, 79) = 6.48, p < .05, ηp2 
= .08, such that participants had better knowledge for the claims procedure clauses (M 
=.18, SD = .24) than for the medical necessity clauses (M = .11, SD = .26).  This finding 
suggests that the claims procedure questions may have been easier than the medical 
necessity questions.  There was a significant 2-way interaction between clause subject 
and knowledge type, F(1, 79) = 64.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .45; the means for the different 
subscales are presented in Table 8. 
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Table 8.  Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales 
M  SD  Range 
Medical Necessity 
     Declarative   .25  .35  -.71-.71 
     Procedural   -.02  .36  -.71-.86 
Claims Procedure 
     Declarative   .06  .33  -.78-1.00 
     Procedural   .31  .28  -.56-.89 
 
Participants were more accurate when medical necessity questions were directed at 
declarative knowledge rather than procedural knowledge, t(1, 80) = 4.99, p < .001, d = 
1.12, and when claims procedure questions were directed at procedural knowledge rather 
than declarative knowledge t(1, 80) = 5.66, p < .001, d = 1.27.  This finding makes sense 
given the nature of the clauses; medical necessity clauses contain content-based 
information, and claims procedure clauses contain applications of concepts.  Wiener et al. 
(1998) also found differences in participants’ comprehension of jury instructions 
depending on question type, such that participants performed better on declarative 
knowledge questions than on procedural knowledge questions. 
In addition, there was a significant 2-way interaction between clause subject and 
clause, F(1, 79) = 4.60, p < .05, ηp2 = .06.  Redrafting improved comprehension for the 
medical necessity clauses, t(1, 79) = 2.01, p < .05, d = .45, but not for the claims 
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procedure clauses, t(1, 79) = .40, p = .69, d =.09.  The average scores for the clause 
subjects and the subscales as a function of clause are shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9.  Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales as a Function of Clause 
     Original (N = 36)              Redrafted (N = 45) 
M (SD)    M (SD) 
Medical Necessity  .05 (.27)   .16 (.24) 
     Declarative   .23 (.37)   .26 (.34) 
     Procedural   -.13 (.36)   .06 (.34) 
Claims Procedure  .20 (.21)   .17 (.26) 
     Declarative   .03 (.28)   .08 (.37) 
     Procedural   .36 (.25)   .26 (.30) 
 
There also was a significant 3-way interaction between clause subject, knowledge type, 
and clause, F(1, 79) = 5.20, p < .05, ηp2 = .06.  I hypothesized that participants in the 
redrafted clause condition would perform better on all of the comprehension subscales 
than participants in the original clause condition would.  Follow-up t-tests revealed that 
participants’ comprehension on the medical necessity declarative questions subscale, t(1, 
79) = .42, p = .67, d =.09, the claims procedure declarative questions subscale, t(1, 79) = 
.72, p = .48, d =.16, and the claims procedure procedural questions subscale, t(1, 79) = 
1.59, p = .12, d =.36, did not differ significantly by clause condition.  However, the 
means were in the expected directions, except on the claims procedure procedural 
questions subscale.  Consistent with hypotheses, there was a significant difference 
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between participants in the redrafted clause condition and participants in the original 
clause condition on medical necessity procedural questions, t(1, 79) = 2.39, p < .05, d 
=.54, with participants in the redrafted clause condition performing better on that 
subscale.  Because I did not predict that comprehension would vary depending on 
question type and the subscale differences found in Study 2 may not generalize, these 
differences are discussed in relation to results from Study 3. 
Health History and Insurance Status.  I also expected that employees with more 
experience with the healthcare industry would demonstrate greater comprehension than 
employees with less familiarity with the healthcare industry.  Participants’ health history 
is presented in Table 10.  Several t-tests were run to determine if several measures of 
health history were related to overall comprehension.  Participants reporting poor or fair 
health were compared to participants reporting good or excellent health, participants with 
a chronic disease were compared to participants without a chronic disease, participants 
hospitalized in the last two years were compared to participants who were not 
hospitalized in the last two years, participants who had seen a doctor in the last two years 
were compared to participants who had not seen a doctor in the last two years, and 
participants who had seen a specialist were compared to participants who had not seen a 
specialist.  The only effect that was significant was inconsistent with hypotheses.  
Participants who had seen a specialist in the last two years had lower overall 
comprehension (M = .10, SD = .18) than participants who had not seen a specialist (M = 
.19, SD = .21), t(1, 75) = 2.14, p < .05, d =.49.  Therefore, the present study did not find 
any evidence for the hypothesis that more experience with the healthcare industry leads 
to better comprehension of healthcare documents. 
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Table 10.  Participant Health History 
Status 
 Poor   1.2% 
 Fair   21.0% 
 Good   53.1% 
 Excellent  24.7% 
Chronic disease  23.5% 
Hospital (in last year) 24.7%  
Days hospitalized  4.94 
Doctor (in last 2 years) 84.0% 
Doctors seen  2.81 
Specialist    54.5% 
 
Participants’ insurance status is presented in Table 11.  T-tests were run to 
determine if two measures of insurance status had an influence on comprehension.  
Participants with insurance (M = .16, SD = .20) were compared to participants without 
insurance (M = .13, SD = .20), and participants with some claims experience (M = .15, 
SD = .21) were compared to participants without any claims experience (M = .15, SD = 
.18).  There were no significant effects of insurance status or claims experience on overall 
comprehension, ts (1, 79) = .58, .14, ps = .57, .89, ds =.13, .03.  Therefore, the present 
study did not find any evidence that more experience with the health insurance industry 
leads to better comprehension of health insurance documents. 
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Table 11.  Participant Insurance Status 
No insurance   22.2% 
Private insurer   33.3% 
Public insurer   13.6% 
Employer insurer   44.4% 
Supplemental insurance  1.2% 
Years insured   11.58 
Claims experience   61.7% 
 Pre-authorization  43.2% 
 Pre-service claim  17.3% 
Post-service claim  23.5% 
 Denied coverage  2.5% 
 Appealed denial  1.2% 
 
Repeated measure ANOVAs were run to determine if insurance status and claims 
experience moderated the 3-way interaction between clause subject, knowledge type, and 
clause.  Although the 3-way interaction between clause subject, knowledge type, and 
clause was not significant for the uninsured, F(1, 16) = .32, p = .58, ηp2 = .02, the 
interaction was significant for the insured, F(1, 61) = 6.60, p < .05, ηp2 = .10.  The main 
effect for clause was not significant for the uninsured, F(1, 16) = 2.29, p = .15, ηp2 = .13, 
but it was marginally significant for the insured, F(1, 61) = 3.44, p = .07, ηp2 = .05.  The 
main effect for clause subject was not significant for the uninsured, F(1, 16) = .00, p = 
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.96, ηp2 = .00, but it was significant for the insured, F(1, 61) = 7.46, p < .01, ηp2 = .11.  
The 2-way interaction between clause subject and knowledge type was not significant for 
the uninsured, F(1, 16) = 3.27, p = .09, ηp2 = .17, but it was significant for the insured, 
F(1, 61) = 77.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .56.  In contrast, the 2-way interaction between clause 
subject and clause was significant for the uninsured, F(1, 16) = 5.51, p < .05, , ηp2 = .26, 
but not for the insured, F(1, 61) = 1.89, p = .17, ηp2 = .03. 
Although the 3-way interaction between clause subject, knowledge type, and 
clause was not significant for those without claims experience, F(1, 29) = .07, p = 
.79, ηp2 = .00, the interaction was significant for those with claims experience, F(1, 48) = 
8.74, p < .01, ηp2 = .15.  The main effect for clause was not significant for those without 
claims experience, F(1, 29) =.90, p = .35, ηp2 = .03, but it was marginally significant for 
those with claims experience, F(1, 48) = 3.32, p = .08, ηp2 = .07.  The main effect for 
clause subject was not significant for those without claims experience, F(1, 29) = .54, p = 
.47, ηp2 = .02, but it was significant for those with claims experience, F(1, 48) = 6.71, p < 
.05, ηp2 = .12.  The presence of a 2-way interaction between clause subject and 
knowledge type and the lack of a 2-way interaction between clause subject and clause 
was consistent across claims experience.  These results suggest that the positive effect 
redrafting had on comprehension of certain subscales only existed for participants with 
health insurance and/or claims experience.  Perhaps, individuals need some experience 
with the health insurance industry to benefit from simplified healthcare documents. 
Study 3 
In Study 3, employees and undergraduates read the same clauses presented in 
Study 2.  Participants either read plan documents without any a priori knowledge 
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(reading-to-learn condition) or knowing they had been denied coverage (reading-to-do 
condition).  In addition to completing the comprehension test used in Study 2, 
participants were told the Health Plan had denied them care that they had requested and 
they took part in a simulated appeals process.  Participants assessed the procedural 
fairness of the appeal process and their satisfaction with the plan.  I expected 
comprehension to be better for the redrafted clauses, as compared to the original clauses, 
and for the reading-to-do task, as compared to the reading-to-learn task.  I also expected 
comprehension, plan approval, and the strength of the claim to predict the decision to 
appeal.  I hypothesized that better comprehension would be associated with an increased 
propensity to appeal a strong claim and a decreased propensity to appeal a weak claim.  I 
also expected participants to appeal the plan administrator’s decision more often when 
they perceived the decision-making process as procedurally unfair and when they were 
less satisfied with the plan. 
Method 
Participants.  Employed adults (N = 800), who had volunteered to participate in 
web-based research through www.studyresponse.com, were recruited through an email 
which contained a link to the study website.  Employees were entered into a lottery to 
receive gift certificates for their participation.  Of the 800 employees recruited to 
participate in the study, 126 individuals (16%) completed the study. 
Because an insufficient number of employee participants completed the study, 
undergraduate students were recruited from University of Nebraska-Lincoln psychology 
courses.  Students (N = 126) received extra credit for their participation. 
Materials.  Participants read the same clauses used in Study 2. 
 48 
In addition, participants were provided benefit denial letters (see Appendix E) 
from the hypothetical Health Plan’s claims administrator.  The letter was adapted from an 
actual benefit denial letter collected along with the litigated SPDs. 
Procedure.  Participants were randomly assigned to the 2 (clause: original v. 
redrafted) x 2 (task: reading-to-learn v. reading-to-do) x 2 (claim: weak v. strong) 
between-subjects factorial.  Participants completed the study over the internet and 
provided informed consent. 
 In the reading-to-learn task condition, participants were instructed to read the 
sections of a Health Plan as if they were members of the Health Plan.  They were 
informed that they would be questioned about the Health Plan and the Health Plan would 
be available for them to refer back.  In the reading-to-do task condition, participants 
received additional instructions: “As you read about the Health Plan, keep in mind that 
the claims administrator for the Health Plan has denied you coverage for care your 
physician believed was medically necessary.” 
After reading the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses, participants 
answered demographic questions. 
Participants completed the same manipulation checks as Study 2.  In addition, 
participants were asked whether they were instructed that the claims administrator for the 
Health Plan had denied them coverage for care their physician believed was medically 
necessary before they read the Health Plan. 
Then, participants completed the same comprehension test from Study 2. 
After completing the comprehension test, participants were instructed to imagine 
that they were members of the Health Plan about which they just had read and that they 
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had been seeing their doctors about varicose veins in their legs.  In the weak claim 
condition, participants were told that they, in agreement with their doctor, thought the 
varicose veins should be removed because they were visibly unattractive and 
occasionally painful.  In the strong claim condition, participants were told that they, in 
agreement with their doctor, thought the varicose veins should be removed because they 
had made walking and exercise painful.  Participants were informed that they had filed a 
pre-service claim for surgical removal of varicose veins and then read the Health Plan’s 
response to their request (see Appendix E). 
As a manipulation check, participants rated their agreement with the following 
statements on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree): (1) 
in this situation, I would have had a strong claim for surgical removal of varicose veins 
and (2) in this situation, the Health Plan was right to deny my claim for surgical removal 
of varicose veins. 
Participants were asked how they would respond to the denial.  They answered 
the following questions on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 5 
(extremely likely): (1) in this situation, how likely would you be to appeal the claim 
administrator’s decision through the Health Plan’s appeal process and (2) in this 
situation, how likely would you be to seek legal counsel before you appeal the decision 
through the Health Plan’s appeal process. 
Then, participants rated their agreement with procedural fairness statements about 
the Health Plan on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree) (see Appendix F).  The questions were drawn from studies that examined 
procedural fairness in the healthcare context (e.g., Hibbard & Jewett, 1997; Murphy-
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Berman et al., 1999; Roberts & Markel, 2001; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).  The questions 
addressed several characteristics of procedural fairness: control, neutrality, trust, and 
social standing (Tyler, 1989).  Participants also were asked questions regarding their 
satisfaction with the Health Plan (see Appendix F) based on previous studies (i.e., 
Edgman-Levitan & Cleary, 1996; Harris-Kojetin et al., 2001; Hibbard & Jewett, 1997).  
The procedural fairness and plan satisfaction items were combined to create an index of 
plan approval. 
Then, participants received a second benefit denial letter (see Appendix E) that 
confirmed the Health Plan’s first denial of coverage.  Participants answered the following 
questions on 5-point scales, ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (extremely likely): (1) in 
this situation, how likely would you be to sue the Health Plan under Section 502(a) of 
ERISA and (2) in this situation, how likely would you be to seek legal counsel in order to 
decide whether you should appeal the Health Plan’s decision through the legal system.  
At this point, participants answered the questions regarding procedural fairness and plan 
satisfaction again. 
Finally, participants completed the S-TOFHLA and questions about their health 
history and insurance status from Study 2. 
Results and Discussion 
Participants (N = 21) who spent less than ten minutes answering study questions 
were excluded from data analyses, leaving 210 participants.  Ns across conditions ranged 
from 98 to 112.  Participants dropped from data analyses were not more likely to be in the 
original clause condition than in the redrafted clause condition, χ2(1, N = 231) = 1.00, p = 
.32.  Participants included in analyses spent an average of 2101.73 seconds (~35 minutes; 
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SD = 5817.19) answering questions.  The demographic characteristics of the 210 
participants included in subsequent analyses are presented in Table 12.  There were few 
differences in comprehension across demographic groups.  Women (M = .21, SD = .18) 
had better comprehension than men (M = .13, SD = .18), t(1, 206) = 2.71, p < .01, d = 
.38, which is inconsistent with the finding that greater knowledge of health insurance has 
been associated with being male (Lambert, 1980; McCormack et al., 2002).  Consistent 
with results from Study 2, older participants had better comprehension, r(201) = .19, p < 
.01.  Inconsisent with other studies, higher education, higher income, and being White 
were not associated with greater knowledge of health insurance information. 
Because 100% of participants demonstrated adequate health literacy (M = 34.93, 
SD = 1.33, Range = 28-36) as measured by the S-TOFHLA, I was not able to use health 
literacy in subsequent analyses. 
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Table 12.  Participant Demographic Information 
    Employees (N = 93)  Students (N = 117) 
Gender   28.3% men   26.5% men 
Race    80.6% Caucasian  82.9% Caucasian 
Age    M = 40.52 years  M = 21.72 years 
Education   48.4% some college or more 100% some college 
Household Income  50.5% less than $50,000 30.8% less than $50,000 
Work for pay   93.5%    72.6% 
Work > 30 hrs a week  76.3%    19% 
States represented  33    Nebraska 
 
Participant Type Differences.  I compared the scores on the comprehension scale 
and subscales for each participant type to determine whether the two groups could be 
combined for analyses.  Table 13 shows employees’ and students’ scores on the 
comprehension subscales. 
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Table 13.  Employee and Student Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales 
      Employees (N = 93)     Students (N = 117) 
M (SD)   M (SD) 
Medical Necessity 
     Declarative   .35 (.34)   .22 (.32) 
     Procedural   .03 (.35)   .02 (.31) 
Claims Procedure 
     Declarative   .17 (.29)   .09 (.29) 
     Procedural   .31 (.27)   .31 (.26) 
Overall   .22 (.19)   .16 (.17) 
 
Employees scored significantly higher than students on the medical necessity declarative 
question subscale, claims procedure declarative question subscale, and overall 
comprehension scale, ts(1, 208) = 2.88, 2.03, 2.20, ps <.05, ds = .40, .28, .31.  Employees 
and students did not differ from each other on the medical necessity procedural question 
subscale and the claims procedure procedural question subscale, ts(1, 208) = .10, .23, ps 
= .92, .82, ds = .01, .03.  Because employees and students did differ from each other on 
some of the comprehension measures, participant type was included as a separate factor 
in subsequent analyses. 
Plan Differences.  Again, I compared the scores on the appropriate 
comprehension subscales for each Health Plan to determine whether the clauses from 
Plan 1 and 2 could be combined for analyses.  For the medical necessity clauses, scores 
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of participants who received the original version of Plan 1 (M = .29, SD = .35; M = .03, 
SD = .33) did not differ on the declarative and procedural question subscales from scores 
of participants who received the original version of Plan 2 (M = .30, SD = .33; M = .10, 
SD = .36), ts(1, 102) = .17, 1.02, ps = .87, .31.  However, scores of participants who 
received the redrafted version of Plan 1 (M = .20, SD = .31; M = .06, SD = .29) did differ 
on the declarative and procedural question subscales from scores of participants who 
received the redrafted version of Plan 2 (M = .34, SD = .34; M = -.09, SD = .30), ts(1, 
104) = 2.14, 2.59, ps < .05, ds = .42, .51.  Participants who read the redrafted version of 
Plan 1, as compared to Plan 2, performed worse on the declarative question subscale but 
performed better on the procedural question subscale.  Because the results of the Plans 
were mixed in Study 3 and there were no differences between the Plans in Study 2, the 
Plans were collapsed for analyses. 
For the claims procedure clauses, scores of participants who received the original 
version of Plan 1 (M = .13, SD = .27; M = .31, SD = .26) did not differ on the declarative 
and procedural question subscales from scores of participants who received the original 
version of Plan 2 (M = .05, SD = .30; M = .27, SD = .23), ts(1, 102) = 1.50, .92, p = .14, 
.36.  Scores of participants who received the redrafted version of Plan 1 (M = .19, SD = 
.29; M = .35, SD = .29) did not differ on the declarative and procedural question 
subscales from scores of participants who received the redrafted version of Plan 2 (M = 
.14, SD = .31; M = .31, SD = .28), ts(1, 104) = .94, .61, p = .35, .54.  Because scores on 
the declarative and procedural questions did not differ depending on whether participants 
read the claims procedure clause from Plan 1 or Plan 2, the Plans were collapsed for 
analyses. 
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Manipulation Checks.  Again, t-tests were used to examine perceptions of 
understandability to test whether participants detected a difference in the readability of 
the original and redrafted clauses.  Participants were asked to rate how easy it was to 
understand the clauses and how well they understood the clauses.  For the medical 
necessity clauses, participants in the redrafted clause condition (M = 3.39, SD = .97) rated 
the clause they read as significantly easier to understand than participants in the original 
clause condition (M = 3.10, SD = 1.05) did, t(1, 208) = 2.09, p < .05, d = .29.  However, 
participants in the redrafted clause condition (M = 3.56, SD = .92) did not claim that they 
personally understood the clause they read any better than participants in the original 
clause condition (M = 3.51, SD = .99) did, t(1, 206) = .36, p = .72, d = .05. 
For the claims procedure clauses, participants in the redrafted clause condition (M 
= 3.29, SD = 1.02) rated the clause they read as marginally easier to understand than 
participants in the original clause condition (M = 3.04, SD = 1.06) did, t(1, 207) = 1.72, p 
= .09, d = .24.  However, participants in the redrafted clause condition (M = 3.42, SD = 
.93) did not claim that they personally understood the clause they read any better than 
participants in the original clause condition (M = 3.30, SD = 1.05) did, t(1, 206) = .88, p = 
.38, d = .12.  Therefore, participants rated the redrafted versions of the clauses as easier to 
understand, but they did not feel that they personally understood the redrafted versions 
any more than they understood the original versions.  These results suggest that although 
the redrafted clauses appeared more readable than the original clauses, participants did 
not feel like they understood them any better.  However, these results were based on 
participants reading only one type of clause.  When participants read both the original 
and redrafted versions of the clauses in the post-hoc study reported in Study 2, 
 56 
participants rated the redrafted clauses as more readable than the original clauses.  Thus, 
despite the mixed results of the manipulation check, the redrafting did appear to affect 
perceptions of the clauses’ readability and comprehensibility. 
As a manipulation check for the task condition, participants were asked whether 
they were instructed before they read the Health Plan that the claims administrator for the 
Health Plan had denied them coverage for care their physician believed was medically 
necessary.  Seventy percent of participants in the reading-to-do task condition correctly 
reported that before they read plan documents they were instructed that the claims 
administrator had denied them coverage for care.  Correspondingly, 81% of participants 
in the reading-to-learn task condition correctly reported that before they read plan 
documents they were not instructed that the claims administrator had denied them 
coverage for care.  Because so many participants (N = 50) would be dropped based on the 
task manipulation check, analyses were performed both with (N = 210) and without (N = 
160) participants who failed the manipulation check.  These analyses yielded highly 
comparable findings, so the following sections present results for the entire sample. 
 As a manipulation check for claim condition, participants were asked to rate the 
strength of their claim for surgical removal of varicose veins and the rightness of the 
plan’s denial of their claim after the first and second benefit denial letter.  Because the 
reliability coefficients for the four questions was high (α = .86), the measures were 
combined into one claim strength index.  Participants in the strong claim condition (M = 
3.46, SD = .86) rated their claim as significantly stronger than participants in the weak 
claim condition (M = 2.34, SD = .83), t(1, 207) = 9.57, p < .001, d = 1.33.  Therefore, the 
claim strength manipulation was successful. 
 57 
Participant Type.  I did not have any a priori hypotheses regarding employees’ 
and students’ comprehension of the clauses.  Because employees scored better than 
students on some of the subscales, I included participant type in my analyses.  A repeated 
measures ANOVA was performed with clause subject (i.e., medical necessity and claims 
procedure) and knowledge type (i.e., declarative and procedural) as within-subjects 
factors and clause (original v. redrafted), task (reading-to-learn v. reading-to-do), and 
participant type (employees v. students) as between-subjects factors.  The ANOVA 
revealed a main effect for participant type, F(1, 202) = 4.64, p < .05, ηp2 = .02. 
Employees’ and students’ scores on the comprehension tests are shown in Table 
13 above.  There also was a significant 2-way interaction between knowledge type and 
participant type, F(1, 202) = 7.40, p < .01, ηp2 = .04, such that employees demonstrated 
greater declarative knowledge than students, t(1, 208) = 3.06, p < .01, d = .42, but the two 
groups did not differ in procedural knowledge, t(1, 208) = .22, p = .83, d = .03.  As 
discussed above, employees’ and students’ comprehension did not differ on the medical 
necessity procedural question subscale and the claims procedure procedural question 
subscale, but employees scored significantly higher than students on the medical 
necessity declarative question subscale, claims procedure declarative question subscale, 
and overall comprehension scale.  Therefore, employees retained more declarative 
knowledge regarding the clauses than students did.  One explanation for why employees 
performed better than students on some measures could have been that employees spent 
more time on the task.  However, employees (M = 825.24 seconds, SD = 1208.03) did not 
spend more time on the comprehension test than students did (M = 846.23 seconds, SD = 
590.12), t(1, 208) = .17, p = .87; indeed, employees spent slightly less time on the task 
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than students.  A more likely reason that employees may have performed better than 
students is that employees had slightly more experience with the healthcare system and 
the insurance industry than students.  This finding is discussed below in the section on 
health history and insurance status (see Tables 18 and 19). 
Redrafting.  Participants completed a comprehension test to demonstrate their 
understanding of the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses.  Across employee 
and student participants, the mean overall comprehension accuracy score across all test 
items was .19 (SD = .18), which indicates that participants made slightly more correct 
responses than incorrect responses.  This result is slightly higher than the mean overall 
comprehension accuracy score found in Study 2 (M = .15).  Although .19 is not very far 
above the chance level of zero, an independent t-test showed that this difference was 
significant, t(1, 209) = 14.99, p < .001, d = 2.07.  On average, 52.57% of participants’ 
responses were hits, 33.66% were misses, and 13.77% were do not know answers.  
Therefore, participants demonstrated poor comprehension of their benefits and their 
rights and responsibilities regarding the Health Plan.  These percentages are similar to 
those found in Study 2.  Table 14 shows the comprehension rates broken out by 
participant type. 
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Table 14.  Comprehension Rates as a Function of Participant Type 
   Employees (N = 93)  Students (N = 117) 
Overall   .22    .16 
Hits    .54    .51 
Misses   .33    .35 
Do Not Know  .13    .14 
T-test from zero t(1, 92) = 10.88,   t(1, 116) = 10.50, 
p < .001, d = 2.27  p < .001, d = 1.95 
 
Again, I hypothesized that comprehension would be better for the redrafted clause 
as compared to the original clause.  The repeated measures ANOVA revealed no main 
effect for clause, F(1, 202) = .01, p = .91, ηp2 = .00.  Both Study 2 and 3 found that 
redrafting did not improve comprehension of medical necessity and claims procedure 
clauses.  Although the post-hoc study reported in Study 2 and the manipulation check on 
redrafting in Study 3 indicated that there was a difference between the readability of the 
clauses, the comprehension test demonstrated that redrafting was not effective in 
improving understanding.  Participants detected a subjective improvement in readability 
that did not materialize into an objective difference in comprehension. 
There are several possible reasons why redrafting had little effect on participants’ 
understanding in both Study 2 and 3.  Perhaps, the comprehension test was not sensitive 
enough to detect slight improvement in understanding.  Another possible reason that 
redrafting may not have had more of an effect on participants in the present study is that 
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participants had such high health literacy as demonstrated by their average score of 34.10 
in Study 2 and 34.93 in Study 3 out of a possible score of 36 on the S-TOFHLA.  Due to 
their high levels of health literacy, participants may not have struggled to understand the 
original version of the clauses.  However, the mean overall comprehension accuracy 
score of .15 in Study 2 and .19 in Study 3 suggests comprehension was relatively poor 
regardless of which version of the clauses participants read.  Perhaps, medical necessity 
and claims procedure clauses are too complex to understand even when they are 
simplified.  On the other hand, participants may not have had enough incentive to expend 
the cognitive effort required to understand such complex material.  However, participants 
who spent more time on the task did not demonstrate greater comprehension in Study 2, 
r(81) = -.04, p = .74, or Study 3, r(210) = .07, p = .32. 
One of the most plausible reasons for the lack of a redrafting effect is that the 
redrafted document was not different enough from the original document.  Although 
participants who viewed the clauses side by side in a post-hoc study rated the redrafted 
clauses as more readable than the original clauses, participants in Study 2 and 3 did not 
report that strong a difference (i.e., only one of the two manipulation check measures was 
significant in Study 3) and their comprehension scores did not vary by clause condition.  
Because it is difficult to reduce word count without changing meaning, I decided to keep 
word count similar for the original and redrafted clauses.  Perhaps redrafting would have 
had more of an effect if the redrafted clause had been shorter than the original clause.  
Other researchers have found that shortening text did improve comprehension of medical 
consent forms (Mann, 1984; Wogalter et al., 1999). 
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There was a significant main effect for clause subject, F(1, 202) = 8.40, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .04, such that participants had better knowledge for the claims procedure clauses (M 
=.22, SD = .22) than for the medical necessity clauses (M = .15, SD = .25).  Consistent 
with results from Study 2, this finding suggests that the claims procedure questions may 
have been easier than the medical necessity questions.  There also was a significant main 
effect for knowledge, F(1, 202) = 4.86, p < .05, ηp2 = .02, such that participants had 
better declarative knowledge (M =.19, SD = .25) than procedural knowledge (M = .18, SD 
= .22).  Consistent with results from Study 2, there was a significant 2-way interaction 
between clause subject and knowledge type, F(1, 202) = 163.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .45; the 
means for the different subscales are presented in Table 15. 
 
Table 15.  Average Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales 
 M  SD  Range 
Medical Necessity 
     Declarative   .28  .34  -.71-1.00 
     Procedural   .02  .33  -.71-.86 
Claims Procedure 
     Declarative   .13  .30  -.78-1.00 
     Procedural   .31  .26  -.44-1.00 
 
Again, participants were more accurate when medical necessity questions were directed 
at declarative knowledge rather than procedural knowledge, t(1, 209) = 8.83, p < .001, d 
= 1.22, and when claims procedure questions were directed at procedural knowledge 
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rather than declarative knowledge t(1, 209) = 7.70, p < .001, d = 1.07.  It appears that 
medical necessity clauses lend themselves to declarative knowledge and claims procedure 
clauses lend themselves to procedural knowledge. 
As in Study 2, there was a significant 2-way interaction between clause subject 
and clause, F(1, 202) = 6.57, p < .05, ηp2 = .03.  However, whereas redrafting improved 
comprehension for the medical necessity clauses but not for the claims procedure clauses 
in Study 2, redrafting improved comprehension for the claims procedure clauses, t(1, 
208) = 1.96, p = .05, d =.27, but not for the medical necessity clauses in Study 3, t(1, 208) 
= 1.46, p = .15, d =.20.  The average scores for the clause subjects and the subscales as a 
function of clause are shown in Table 16. 
 
Table 16.  Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales as a Function of Clause 
    Original (N = 104)      Redrafted (N = 106) 
 M (SD)     M (SD) 
Medical Necessity  .18 (.26)   .13 (.24) 
     Declarative   .29 (.34)   .27 (.33) 
     Procedural   .07 (.34)   -.02 (.30) 
Claims Procedure  .19 (.21)   .25 (.22) 
     Declarative   .09 (.29)   .16 (.30) 
     Procedural   .29 (.24)   .33 (.28) 
 
In contrast to Study 2, there was not a 3-way interaction between clause subject, 
knowledge type, and clause, F(1, 202) = .09, p = .77, ηp2 = .00.  I hypothesized that 
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participants in the redrafted clause condition would perform better on all of the 
comprehension subscales than participants in the original clause condition would.  This 
prediction received mixed results in Study 2 and little support in Study 3. 
It is difficult to explain the differences in question type as a function of clause for 
two reasons: (1) I did not predict that comprehension would vary depending on question 
type, and (2) the subscale differences found in Study 3 are not consistent with the 
subscale differences found in Study 2.  In Study 2, means were in the expected direction 
for all the subscales except for the claims procedure procedural questions subscale.  In 
Study 3, means on the claims procedure subscales were in the expected directions, but 
means on the medical necessity subscales were not.  The only result that was consistent 
with hypotheses was that participants’ performance on the medical necessity procedural 
questions subscale in Study 2 was significantly better in the redrafted clause condition 
than the original clause condition.  In general, redrafting medical necessity and claims 
procedure clauses did not improve participants’ comprehension in either study. 
Task.  I also expected that comprehension would be better for the reading-to-do 
task as compared to the reading-to-learn task because the former task promotes deeper 
integration of material than the latter.  The average scores for the comprehension 
subscales as a function of task are shown in Table 17. 
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Table 17.  Scores on Comprehension Test Subscales as a Function of Task 
Reading-to-learn (N = 98) Reading-to-do (N = 112) 
 M (SD)      M (SD) 
Medical Necessity 
     Declarative   .26 (.33)   .30 (.34) 
     Procedural   .05 (.32)   .00 (.33) 
Claims Procedure 
     Declarative   .09 (.31)   .15 (.28) 
     Procedural   .31 (.27)   .31 (.26) 
 
The same repeated measures ANOVA as above revealed that task produced no main 
effect, F(1, 202) = .32, p = .57, ηp2 = .00, or any interactions, F(1, 202) < 3.47, p > .06, 
ηp2 < .02.  Therefore, the present study found no support for the hypotheses that the 
reading-to-do task would improve comprehension or that redrafting would interact with 
the reading-to-do task to improve comprehension.  Perhaps Duffy and Kabance’s (1982) 
broad-based research on readability and comprehension does not generalize to 
comprehension of healthcare documents.  Healthcare documents may be too complicated 
for consumers to understand even when they have a priori knowledge of what 
information will be relevant to them.  Furthermore, consumers may not realize what 
health plan information is important in the face of an impending benefit denial because 
they are unfamiliar with the appeals process.  Alternatively, the manipulation of task 
condition in the present study may have been too weak.  Before they read the Health 
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Plan, participants either received no instructions or received instructions that their Health 
Plan had determined that care they had requested was not medically necessary and that 
they would be questioned about the Health Plan.  This instruction may not have been 
sufficient to motivate participants to engage in deeper integration of the materials.  
Participants in the reading-to-do task condition (M = 1833.70 seconds, SD = 2258.80) did 
not spend more time completing the study than participants in the reading-to-learn task 
did (M = 2408.05 seconds, SD = 8179.00), t(1, 208) = .71, p = .48, d = .10; indeed, 
participants in the reading-to-do condition spent about 10 minutes less time on the task 
than participants in the reading-to-learn task. 
Health History and Insurance Status.  I also expected that participants with more 
experience with the healthcare industry would demonstrate greater comprehension than 
participants with less familiarity with the healthcare industry.  Participants’ health history 
is presented in Table 18. 
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Table 18.  Participant Health History 
Employees  Students   Overall 
  (N = 93)  (N = 117)  (N = 210) 
Status 
 Poor   3.2%   0%   1.4% 
 Fair   16.1%   6.0%   10.5% 
 Good   61.3%   46.6%   53.1% 
 Excellent  19.4%   47.4%   34.9% 
Chronic disease  30.4%   12.2%   20.3% 
Hospital (in last year)  16.1%   16.2%   16.2% 
Days hospitalized  5.08   2.75   3.79 
Doctor (in last 2 years) 85.9%   91.5%   89.0% 
Doctors seen   3.21   2.83   2.99 
Specialist    53.3%   52.6%   52.9% 
 
More employees reported being in poor or fair health than students did and more students 
reported being in good or excellent health than employees did, χ2(1, N = 209) = 8.70, p < 
.01.  In addition, employees were more likely to have a chronic illness than students 
were, χ2(1, N = 207) = 10.54, p < .01.  Employees and students reported similar rates of 
visiting a hospital in the last year (χ2(1, N = 210) =.00, p = .98), visiting a doctor in the 
last two years (χ2(1, N = 209) = 1.64, p = .20), and visiting a specialist (χ2(1, N = 204) = 
.01, p = .92).  Similarly, employees and students were hospitalized for a similar amount 
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of days (t(1, 27) = 1.06, p = .31) and visited a similar number of doctors (t(1, 185) = 1.18, 
p = .24).  Overall, employees appeared to have slightly more experience with the 
healthcare industry than students, which might explain why employees performed better 
than students on the medical necessity declarative question subscale, claims procedure 
declarative question subscale, and overall comprehension scale. 
Several t-tests were run to determine if several measures of health history were 
related to overall comprehension.  Participants reporting poor or fair health were 
compared to participants reporting good or excellent health, participants with a chronic 
disease were compared to participants without a chronic disease, participants hospitalized 
in the last two years were compared to participants who were not hospitalized in the last 
two years, participants who had seen a doctor in the last two years were compared to 
participants who had not seen a doctor in the last two years, and participants who had 
seen a specialist were compared to participants who had not seen a specialist.  The only 
effect that was significant was consistent with hypotheses: participants who had seen a 
doctor in the last two years had better overall comprehension (M = .20, SD = .18) than 
participants who had not seen a doctor (M = .12, SD = .20), t(1, 207) = 2.03, p < .05, d = 
.28.  Therefore, the present study found very little evidence for the hypothesis that more 
experience with the healthcare industry leads to better comprehension of healthcare 
documents. 
Participants’ insurance status is presented in Table 19. 
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Table 19.  Participant Insurance Status 
Employees  Students   Overall 
  (N = 93)  (N = 117)  (N = 210) 
No insurance   16.1%   4.3%   9.5% 
Private insurer   40.9%   29.9%   34.8% 
Public insurer   20.4%   7.7%   13.3% 
Employer insurer  47.3%   68.4%   59.0% 
Supplemental insurance 5.4%   4.3%   4.8% 
Years insured   14.12   15.15   14.7 
Claims experience  61.3%   53.0%   56.7% 
 Pre-authorization 40.9%   33.3%   36.7% 
 Pre-service claim 22.6%   25.6%   24.3% 
Post-service claim 28.0%   23.9%   25.7% 
 Denied coverage 10.8%   6.8%   8.6% 
 Appealed denial 3.2%   0.9%   1.9% 
 
Employees reported being without insurance more than students, χ2(1, N = 210) = 8.45, p 
< .01.  Employees were covered by public insurers more than students, χ2(1, N = 210) = 
7.28, p < .01, but students were covered by employer insurers more than employees, χ2(1, 
N = 210) = 9.51, p < .01.  A similar percentage of employees and students were covered 
by private insurers (χ2(1, N = 210) = 2.74, p = .10) and had supplemental insurance (χ2(1, 
N = 210) =.14, p = .71).  Employees and students had insurance coverage for a similar 
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amount of years, t(1, 208) = .66, p = .51.  Employees and students had a similar amount 
of claims experience: pre-authorization (χ2(1, N = 210) = 1.26, p = .26), pre-service claim 
(χ2(1, N = 210) = .26, p = .61), post-service claim (χ2(1, N = 210) = .44, p = .51), denied 
coverage (χ2(1, N = 210) = 1.01, p = .31), and appealed denial (χ2(1, N = 210) = 1.56, p = 
.21).  Although employees and students may have had similar insurance coverage, if most 
students had coverage through their parents, employees may have had more actual 
experience with the insurance industry.  This experience might explain why employees 
performed better than students on the medical necessity declarative question subscale, 
claims procedure declarative question subscale, and overall comprehension scale. 
T-tests were run to determine if two measures of insurance status had an influence 
on comprehension: participants with insurance (M = .19, SD = .19) were compared to 
participants without insurance (M = .14, SD = .15), and participants with some claims 
experience (M = .20, SD = .20) were compared to participants without any claims 
experience (M = .18, SD = .16).  There were no significant effects of insurance status or 
claims experience on overall comprehension, ts (1, 208) = 1.37, .74, ps = .17, .46, ds = 
.19, .10.  Therefore, the present study did not find any evidence that more experience 
with the health insurance industry leads to better comprehension of health insurance 
documents. 
Repeated measure ANOVAs were run to determine if insurance status and claims 
experience moderated the 2-way interaction between clause subject and clause.  Although 
the 2-way interaction between clause subject and clause was not significant for the 
uninsured, F(1, 13) = .85, p = .38, ηp2 = .06, the interaction was significant for the 
insured, F(1, 182) = 7.12, p < .01, ηp2 = .04.  The main effect for clause subject was not 
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significant for the uninsured, F(1, 13) = .53, p = .48, ηp2 = .04, but it was significant for 
the insured, F(1, 182) = 10.19, p < .01, ηp2 = .05.  The main effect for knowledge type 
was not significant for the uninsured, F(1, 13) = .32, p = .58, ηp2 = .02, but it was 
significant for the insured, F(1, 182) = 4.96, p < .05, ηp2 = .03.  The 2-way interaction 
between knowledge type and participant type was not significant for the uninsured, F(1, 
13) = 2.72, p = .12, ηp2 = .17, but it was significant for the insured, F(1, 182) = 6.24, p < 
.05, ηp2 = .03.  The 2-way interaction between clause subject and knowledge type was not 
significant for the uninsured, F(1, 13) = 3.75, p = .08, ηp2 = .22, but it was significant for 
the insured, F(1, 182) = 161.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .47.  The lack of a main effect for clause 
and the presence of a main effect for participant type was consistent across insurance 
status. 
Although the 2-way interaction between clause subject and clause was not 
significant for those without claims experience, F(1, 83) = .90, p = .35, ηp2 = .01, the 
interaction was significant for those with claims experience, F(1, 111) = 7.32, p < .01, ηp2 
= .06.  The main effect for clause subject was not significant for those without claims 
experience, F(1, 83) = 1.22, p = .27, ηp2 = .02, but it was significant for those with claims 
experience, F(1, 111) = 9.62, p < .01, ηp2 = .08.  The main effect for knowledge type was 
not significant for those without claims experience, F(1, 83) = .49, p = .49, ηp2 = .01, but 
it was significant for those with claims experience, F(1, 111) = 4.83, p < .05, ηp2 = .04.  
The 2-way interaction between knowledge type and participant type was not significant 
for those without claims experience, F(1, 83) = 2.45, p = .12, ηp2 = .03, but it was 
significant for those with claims experience, F(1, 111) = 5.18, p < .05, ηp2 = .05.  The 
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lack of a main effect for clause and participant type and the presence of an interaction 
between clause subject and knowledge type was consistent across claims experience.  
Similar to results in Study 2, these findings suggest that the positive effect redrafting had 
on comprehension of the claims procedure subscales only existed for participants with 
health insurance and/or claims experience.  Perhaps, when consumers have some 
experience with the health insurance industry, their attention is drawn to certain clauses, 
such as claims procedure clauses, but not to all health plan information.  Once attention is 
focused on a clause, redrafting of that clause may improve comprehension slightly. 
Appeal Decisions, Procedural Fairness, and Plan Satisfaction.  After the first 
benefit denial letter, participants rated how likely they would be to appeal the claim 
administrator’s decision through the Health Plan’s appeal process.  After the second 
benefit denial letter, participants rated how likely they would be to sue the Health Plan 
under Section 502(a) of ERISA.  Because these two measures were highly correlated, 
r(206) = .66, p < .001, the measures were combined into a single “appeal” measure, 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
I expected more appeals in the strong claim condition and fewer appeals in the 
weak claim condition when participants read the redrafted clause, as opposed to the 
original clause, and completed the reading-to-do task, as opposed to the reading-to-learn 
task.  A 4-way ANOVA was performed with clause, task, claim, and participant type as 
between-subjects factors and denial as the dependent variable.  There was a main effect 
for claim, F(1, 193) = 74.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, such that participants in the strong claim 
condition (M = 3.82, SD = 1.02) were more likely to appeal the denial than participants in 
the weak claim condition (M = 2.56, SD = 1.04).  However, there were no other 
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significant main effects or interactions.  Therefore, the hypothesis that readability and 
reading task would interact with claim strength to predict appeals was not supported.  
Perhaps, the claim manipulation was so strong that it simply overpowered the relatively 
weaker clause and task manipulations. 
Similarly, I hypothesized that better comprehension would be associated with an 
increased propensity to appeal a strong claim and a decreased propensity to appeal a 
weak claim.  The correlation between participants’ overall scores on the comprehension 
test and their likelihood of appealing their denied claim depended on the strength of their 
claim.  There was no correlation between comprehension and propensity to appeal for 
participants in the strong claim condition, r(100) = .09, p = .39.  However, in the weak 
claim condition, the more participants understood the medical necessity and claims 
procedure clauses, the less likely they were to appeal a denied benefit, r(109) = -.21, p < 
.05.  Therefore, the hypothesis that better comprehension would lead to more appropriate 
appeal decisions was partially supported. 
After the first benefit denial letter, participants rated how likely they would be to 
seek legal counsel before appealing the decision through the Health Plan’s appeal 
process.  After the second benefit denial letter, participants rated how likely they would 
be to seek legal counsel in order to decide whether they should appeal the Health Plan’s 
decision through the legal system.  Because these two measures were highly correlated, 
r(208) = .48, p < .001, the measures were combined.  A 4-way ANOVA was performed 
with clause, task, claim, and participant type as between-subjects factors and legal 
assistance as the dependent variable.  There was a main effect for claim, F(1, 193) = 
36.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .16, such that participants in the strong claim condition (M = 3.36, 
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SD = .98) were more likely to seek legal assistance than participants in the weak claim 
condition (M = 2.53, SD = 1.07).  It makes sense that participants who thought they had a 
more serious claim would seek out legal advice.  There was a marginally significant 
interaction between clause and claim, F(1, 193) = 3.49, p = .06, ηp2 = .02, and a 
significant 3-way interaction between clause, task, and claim, F(1, 193) = 4.73, p < 
.05, ηp2 = .02.  Although the 2-way interaction between clause and claim was not 
significant when participants completed the reading-to-learn task (F(1, 89) = .04, p = 
.84, ηp2 = .00; Figure 1), the interaction was significant when participants completed the 
reading-to-do task (F(1, 104) = 9.17, p < .01, ηp2 = .08; Figure 2).  Participants in the 
strong claim condition were more likely to seek legal assistance when they read the 
original clause (M = 3.83, SD = .79) than when they read the redrafted clause (M = 3.02, 
SD = 1.09). 
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Figure 1.  Interaction between Clause and Claim for Reading-To-Learn Task 
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Figure 2.  Interaction between Clause and Claim for Reading-To-Do Task 
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In the weak claim condition, participants’ likelihood of seeking legal counsel did not vary 
by clause condition (original: M = 2.22, SD = .72; redrafted: M = 2.50, SD = 1.16).  
Perhaps, participants in the strong claim condition felt that they had a viable claim and 
were more likely to realize they needed a lawyer’s expertise to understand their claim in 
the original clause condition, as compared to the redrafted clause condition.  Participants 
in the weak claim condition probably did not think they needed to seek legal counsel, 
regardless of their ability to understand the clauses.  No other interactions for seeking 
legal counsel were significant. 
I also expected participants to appeal the plan administrator’s decision more often 
when they perceived the decision-making process as procedurally unfair and when they 
were less satisfied with the plan.  After the first and second benefit denial letters, 
participants rated their agreement with procedural fairness statements concerning control 
(α = .82), neutrality (α = .80), trust (α = .83), and social standing (α = .92) and with plan 
satisfaction statements (α = .74).  Because the reliability coefficient for the procedural 
fairness statements and the plan satisfaction statements made after the first and second 
benefit denial letters was high (α = .95), the measures were combined into one plan 
approval index.  The ratings for each of the questions and the combined plan approval 
index are presented in Table 20.  As reported here, higher scores indicate that participants 
had a more positive perception of the Health Plan. 
 76 
  
Table 20.  Average Procedural Fairness and Plan Satisfaction Ratings 
      First Denial Letter     Second Denial Letter 
  M (SD)     M (SD)  
Control   3.04 (.78)   3.00 (.86) 
Neutrality   2.98 (.70)   2.94 (.81) 
Trust   3.11 (.84)   3.01 (.89) 
Social Standing  2.80 (.80)   2.69 (.88) 
Plan Satisfaction  3.10 (.53)   3.06 (.67) 
Plan Approval Index 3.01 (.62)   3.00 (.71) 
 
Because agreement with the statements was measured on a 5-point scale, the means 
indicate that, on average, participants felt neutral about the Health Plan.  As predicted, the 
more participants felt the Health Plan was procedurally fair and the more participants 
were satisfied with the Health Plan, the less likely they were to appeal the denied claim, 
r(209) = -.27, p < .001.  This result suggests that plan administrators can reduce the 
number of appeals filed against them by improving plan characteristics indicative of 
procedural fairness, such as control, neutrality, trust, and social standing. 
Several t-tests were run to determine whether health history and insurance status 
affected plan approval or the propensity to appeal.  For health history, participants 
reporting poor or fair health were compared to participants reporting good or excellent 
health, participants with a chronic disease were compared to participants without a 
chronic disease, participants hospitalized in the last two years were compared to 
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participants who were not hospitalized in the last two years, participants who had seen a 
doctor in the last two years were compared to participants who had not seen a doctor in 
the last two years, and participants who had seen a specialist were compared to 
participants who had not seen a specialist.  There were no significant effects of health 
history on plan approval or the propensity to appeal.  T-tests were run to determine if two 
measures of insurance status had an influence on plan approval or the propensity to 
appeal.  Participants with insurance were compared to participants without insurance, and 
participants with some claims experience were compared to participants without any 
claims experience.  There were no significant effects of insurance status or claims 
experience on plan approval or the propensity to appeal. 
Predictors of Decision to Appeal Denied Benefits.  I expected claim strength, 
comprehension, and plan approval to predict the decision to appeal.  A path analysis was 
created to determine whether (1) the drafting of the clause, the type of task, and the type 
of participant predicted comprehension, (2) the strength of the claim, comprehension, and 
the interaction between comprehension and claim strength influenced plan approval, and 
(3) plan approval predicted the decision to appeal.  Analyses were performed with 
procedural fairness and plan satisfaction as separate factors and with procedural fairness 
and plan satisfaction combined as one plan approval factor.  These analyses yielded 
highly comparable findings, so the following section presents results using the plan 
approval factor.  The results are presented in Figure 3, in which solid arrows indicate 
significant relationships and dashed arrows indicate marginally significant relationships. 
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Figure 3.  Path Model for Decision to Appeal Denied Benefits 
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  Finally, I tested whether the decision to appeal denied benefits was predicted by 
clause, task, participant type, claim strength, comprehension, the interaction between 
comprehension and claim strength, and plan approval.  As predicted, participants were 
more likely to appeal a denied benefit when they had a strong claim (ß = .50, p < .001).  
They were less likely to appeal a claim the more they approved of the Health Plan (ß = -
.22, p < .001).  It appears that participants were less likely to challenge denied benefits 
when they were satisfied with the Health Plan’s appeal process.  In addition, participants 
were less likely to appeal a claim the more they comprehended the Health Plan (ß = -.24, 
p < .01), especially when they had a weak claim (ß = .21, p < .05), R2 = .34, F(4, 204) = 
26.04, p < .001.  Thus, improved comprehension reduced the propensity to appeal denied 
claims.  This effect was more pronounced in the weak claim condition where participants 
realized the futility of pursuing a weak claim.  Therefore, the hypothesis that better 
comprehension would lead to more appropriate appeal decisions was partially supported. 
General Discussion 
The present study attempted to systematically evaluate the readability and 
comprehensibility of the language used in SPDs for healthcare plans in an effort to 
determine if SPDs are understandable to the average plan participant.  ERISA requires 
that plan administrators provide consumers with understandable documents regarding 
their healthcare plans.  ERISA § 102(a) requires that SPDs "shall be written in a manner 
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently 
accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of 
their rights and obligations under the plan" (29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)).  ERISA’s disclosure 
requirement recognizes that plan participants cannot effectively protect their rights to 
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plan benefits unless they are well-informed.  This objective is frustrated if SPDs are 
written above the reading ability of the average plan participant. 
Comprehension 
Readability.  The present study examined understanding indirectly through 
readability tests and directly through multiple-choice comprehension tests.  The present 
study focused on two portions of the SPD that have proved particularly litigious—
medical necessity provisions and claims procedures for appealing denied coverage.  First 
of all, the low inter-rater agreement between experts who pulled out medical necessity 
and claims procedure clauses from SPDs for Study 1 demonstrates the difficulty even 
trained ERISA experts have identifying the language of these clauses in SPDs (Medill et 
al., 2006). 
More importantly, Study 1 found that both medical necessity clauses and claims 
procedure clauses were written at reading levels beyond those one might expect the 
average plan participant to possess.  According to the Flesch Reading Ease test, Flesch 
Grade Level test, and Fog Index, medical necessity clauses were written at the college 
reading level and above the recommended level for business material (Thomas et al, 
1975).  Claims procedure clauses received better scores on these measures but still 
required a college reading level according to the Flesch Reading Ease test and were 
above the recommended level for technical material according to the Fog Index (Thomas 
et al, 1975).  Therefore, similar to medical consent forms, some SPDs clauses appear to 
require high levels of reading ability, which many consumers do not possess. 
Comprehension.  Few studies have explored comprehension of legal rights from 
written documents, and the present study is the first to examine comprehension of ERISA 
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rights from SPD clauses.  Studies 2 and 3 confirmed that actual consumers struggled to 
understand these clauses.  In both studies, participants’ overall comprehension accuracy 
scores (.15 in Study 2 and .19 in Study 3) indicated that respondents made slightly more 
correct responses than incorrect responses.  In both studies, participants’ performance 
was significantly better than chance, but they provided incorrect answers to multiple-
choice questions nearly half of the time.  These findings are consistent with research that 
suggests a high percentage of Americans do not understand how their healthcare plans 
operate and, consequently, are not equipped to deal with a complicated appeals process 
that often favors plan administrators over plan participants (Edgman-Levitan & Cleary, 
1996; Hibbard & Jewett, 1997; Hibbard et al., 1998; Isaacs, 1996; Lubalin & Harris-
Kojetin, 1999; McCormack et al., 2002).  Even though the vast majority of participants in 
Studies 2 and 3 had adequate functional health literacy, most participants did not 
demonstrate good comprehension of their benefits or their rights and responsibilities 
regarding the health plan. 
These findings indicate that some SPDs may not comply with ERISA § 102(a)’s 
requirement that SPDs “shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the 
average plan participant” (29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)).  Because results from the present study 
are based on a small sample of SPDs and a small number of participants, these results 
should be interpreted with caution.  Nevertheless, the National Adult Literacy Survey 
suggests that 20 to 23% of adults are functionally illiterate and another 26% have 
marginal literary skills (Kirsh et al., 1993).  As a result, the majority of surveyed 
institutional review boards require that medical consent forms be written at 5th- to 10th-
grade reading levels (Paasche-Orlow et al., 2003).  In contrast, many SPDs appear to be 
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written at the college reading level, and, more importantly, many consumers do not 
understand their content.  Because many SPDs require such a high level of reading 
ability, they defeat the federal law’s purpose of providing participants and beneficiaries 
with full disclosure of important information concerning their health plans.  In this age of 
consumer-driven healthcare, SPDs are meant to be the primary source of information for 
participants in employer-sponsored healthcare plans.  ERISA litigation is premised on the 
assumption that plan participants are able to use the information in their SPDs to protect 
their rights regarding their health plans.  Findings from the present study suggest that the 
written language of many SPDs may be inadequate to satisfy the legal standard for 
participant understanding established under ERISA.  Indeed, the Advisory Council on 
Employee Welfare and Pension Plans has advised the Secretary of Labor to provide 
additional regulatory guidance to help plan administrators prepare understandable and 
user-friendly SPDs and to enhance regulatory mechanisms to enforce the requirement 
that SPDs be understandable (U.S. Department of Labor, 2005). 
Improving Comprehension.  In an effort to improve the readability of medical 
necessity and claims procedure clauses, I redrafted them by breaking up complex 
sentences into simpler sentences, making long words into shorter words, changing the 
tone from third to second person, and reducing the technical nature of the documents by 
eliminating jargon (Wogalter et al., 1999).  In both Studies 2 and 3, these efforts failed to 
improve consumers’ comprehension of their health plans.  Although participants reported 
a subjective difference in the readability of the original and redrafted versions of the 
clauses, an objective difference was not found on the comprehension tests.  There are 
several reasons why redrafting might not have improved comprehension in the present 
 83 
study.  On the one hand, the highly literate sample may have understood all of the 
information in the original version that was “clarified” in the redrafted version.  More 
likely, the material was too complex to understand, even when redrafted, creating a floor 
effect in comprehension scores.  Given the length of the study in general and the 
difficulty of the comprehension test in particular, fatigue may have been responsible for 
poor comprehension of the medical necessity and claims procedure clauses.  In addition, 
participants may not have invested enough cognitive energy into trying to understand 
either version of the clauses.  Participants may not have had enough motivation to read 
the clauses closely due to the simulated nature of the experiment.  The possibility that the 
redrafted clauses may not have been different enough from the original clauses is 
discussed further in the section below on limitations of the present study. 
Even though redrafting did not improve comprehension in the present study, the 
low comprehension rates found in Study 2 and 3 show that there is plenty of room to 
improve the understandability of SPDs.  Other studies have demonstrated that it is 
possible to improve comprehension by redrafting legal documents (Mann, 1984; Masson 
& Waldron, 1994; Wogalter et al, 1999; Young et al., 1990).  Plan administrators should 
strive to make SPDs as understandable as possible because the law requires that SPDs be 
understandable to the average plan participant.  ERISA and contract law in general is 
premised on the assumption that both parties understand the terms of their agreement.  
Theoretically, both parties benefit when they each appreciate their responsibilities under 
the contract and realize the limitations of the scope of the contract.  One policy 
consideration underlying ERISA’s disclosure requirement is that plan administrators 
should be held accountable for their compliance with ERISA and the terms of their plans.  
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This purpose cannot be realized if plan participants do not understand their benefits or 
their rights under their health plans. 
The Appeals Process 
The purpose of making SPDs more understandable is not simply to decrease the 
number of appeals brought, though that would certainly be one benefit, but rather to 
increase the number of “appropriate” decisions to appeal.  Consumers should accept plan 
administrators’ decisions when they have weak claims and appeal denials when they have 
strong claims.  Thus, in addition to being in compliance with ERISA’s disclosure 
requirement, plan administrators may find that more understandable materials result in 
more appropriate appeal decisions.  The present study is the first to have participants 
engage in a simulated health plan appeals process.  I wanted to determine if claim 
strength, comprehension, and plan approval would influence the propensity to appeal 
denied benefits.  Appropriately, participants were more likely to appeal a strong claim 
than a weak claim and were more likely to seek legal counsel when they had a strong, as 
opposed to weak, claim.  Participants also reported greater plan approval when they had a 
weak claim, probably because it seemed more reasonable that the health plan would deny 
their claim.  Interestingly, in the reading-to-do task condition, participants with a strong 
claim were more likely to seek legal advice when they read the original version of the 
clauses.  One explanation for this finding is that, in the face of strong claims and poorly 
drafted documents, consumers are more likely to feel a lawyer’s services are worth 
pursuing. 
A big concern in ERISA litigation is that plan participants will hire lawyers too 
late in the appeals process.  A lawyer can ensure that a plan participant exhausts the 
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plan’s administrative appeal procedure before bringing a lawsuit and that plan 
administrators have the participant’s strongest evidence before them at the time of the 
benefit denial.  Findings from the present study suggest that consumers want to hire 
attorneys early in the appeal process when they have a strong claim.  However, 
consumers may be less likely to seek out attorneys in the real world where they have to 
find them and pay for their services. 
More importantly, the present study found that participants who understood the 
health plan were more likely to make the appropriate decision of not pursing weak claims 
for denied benefits.  The path analysis showed that greater comprehension was associated 
with fewer appeals, especially of weak claims.  From a business perspective, this finding 
provides a convincing argument for investing money into redrafting SPDs.  This finding 
has important policy implications because it should motivate employers and plan 
administrators to improve the readability of their SPDs.  By improving the readability of 
plan documents, plan administrators could reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits over 
plan coverage and, therefore, decrease the administrative costs of sponsoring plans. 
Consistent with hypotheses, the present study also found that participants were 
less likely to appeal denied claims when they viewed the plan as more procedurally fair 
and were more satisfied with the plan.  Therefore, participants’ feelings about the health 
plan influenced their claiming behavior.  Skarlicki and Folger (1997) and Roberts and 
Markel (2001) did not find that procedural fairness influenced claiming behavior, but 
their research was set in the business context, whereas the present study was set in the 
healthcare context.  Research has found that patients are more likely to file medical 
malpractice suits against providers with poor patient-provider communication (Levinson, 
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Roter, Mullooly, Dull, & Frankel, 1997; Moore, Adler, & Robertson, 2000).  Results 
from the present study suggest that plan participants are more likely to sue their 
healthcare insurers when they are dissatisfied with communication from those insurers.  
Perhaps, consumers are using their feelings toward their health plan as a substitute 
heuristic for putting forth the effort necessary to achieve actual comprehension of the 
plan and to assess whether their claim has been properly denied under the terms of the 
plan.  The present study suggests that plan administrators might be able to reduce the 
number of appeals filed against them by improving participants’ perceptions of their 
plans.  Plan administrators should be highly motivated to reduce the number of appeals 
filed against them not only because appeals cost money but because as many as 50% of 
plan denials are reversed (Studdert & Gresenz, 2003). 
The present study also found that perceptions of procedural fairness and plan 
satisfaction were highly correlated.  This result is consistent with Murphy-Berman et al.’s 
(1999) finding that participants felt better about their health plan when they felt the plan 
was procedurally fair.  According to the Ethical Fundamental Obligations Report Card 
Evaluations program, unfair coverage decisions may lead not only to dissatisfaction with 
a health plan but also to withdrawal from that health plan, which can be costly to plan 
administrators (Wynia et al., 2004).  I was unsure about how comprehension would 
influence participants’ perceptions of the health plan.  In the present study, increased 
comprehension did not lead to greater plan approval, which would have provided plan 
administrators with another incentive to redraft their plan documents.  Instead, the more 
participants understood the health plan, the less participants felt the health plan was 
procedurally fair and the less participants were satisfied with the health plan.  Although 
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speculative, increased comprehension perhaps led to more dissatisfaction because 
participants realized the limitations of the health plan’s benefits and the administrative 
roadblocks to appealing denied benefits.  This result is inconsistent with the Consumer 
Assessment of Health Plans Survey, which found that poorer comprehension was 
associated with less plan satisfaction (Venus et al., 2003).  Perhaps, the more participants 
understood the health plan in the face of a pending appeals process, the more they 
realized the health plan did not provide all of the information they felt was necessary to 
make informed decisions (EBRI/Commonwealth Fund, 2005). 
Other Findings 
The present study also attempted to improve comprehension by manipulating 
task.  Consumers engage in reading-to-learn tasks when they attempt to store and retain 
information for use in the future, such as when they read their SPDs when they first 
receive them.  Consumers engage in reading-to-do tasks when they read with specific 
objectives and plan to use their newly-acquired information immediately, such as when 
they revisit their SPDs once a dispute has arisen.  In the present study, some participants 
were told, before they read health plan documents, that they would be denied coverage.  
This reading-to-do instruction was meant to prompt participants to pay greater attention 
to relevant information, process information more selectively, and engage in deeper 
integration of information.  The reading-to-do task was supposed to encourage text 
learning, which promotes deeper understanding of the subject matter and allows 
application of newly acquired information to novel situations (Kintsch, 1994).  As a 
result, I hypothesized that participants in the reading-to-do condition would demonstrate 
greater comprehension of the health plan than participants in the reading-to-learn 
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condition.  The present study found no support for this hypothesis.  Based on Duffy and 
Kabance’s (1982) reasoning, participants’ comprehension should have improved in the 
reading-to-do task because they would have integrated and organized the health plan 
information in anticipation of their upcoming appeal.  The readability levels required to 
understand health plan documents suggest that these documents may by too complicated 
for consumers to understand even when they know ahead of time what information will 
be important to them.  In addition, consumers may be unfamiliar with the appeals process 
and not realize what information will be critical in that process.  On the other hand, the 
present study may not have adequately manipulated task condition, as discussed below in 
the section on limitations of the present study.  If redrafting facilitates comprehension 
only when readers are required to integrate the information, failure of the reading-to-do 
manipulation could be partially responsible for the lack of a redrafting effect. 
The present study did find differences in comprehension across the different types 
of knowledge measured.  Declarative knowledge is meaning- and content-based 
information stored as semantic concepts, schemata, scripts, or prototypes, and procedural 
knowledge operates on the declarative knowledge stored in long- and short-term memory 
(Smith, 1994).  Participants had better declarative knowledge of medical necessity 
clauses and better procedural knowledge of claims procedure clauses.  This finding 
makes sense given that medical necessity clauses contain content-based information and 
claims procedure clauses contain application of concepts.  It does not appear that 
declarative questions were associated with text memory or that procedural questions were 
associated with deeper text learning (Kintsch, 1994).  Redrafting medical necessity 
clauses to include scenarios and hypothetical problems may improve procedural 
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knowledge of this clause, and redrafting claims procedure clauses to highlight and define 
critical content areas may improve declarative knowledge of this clause. 
I hypothesized that consumers’ health literacy and their experience with the 
healthcare industry would influence their ability to understand health plan documents.  
Because nearly all of the participants in Studies 2 and 3 had adequate health literacy, I 
was not able to determine if higher health literacy was associated with better 
comprehension of SPD clauses.  The sample in the present study did not represent the 90 
million American adults that are functionally illiterate (Kirsh et al., 1993).  The study 
sample’s health history and insurance status was sufficiently varied to examine the 
influence of these factors.  Nevertheless, across both studies, more experience with the 
healthcare industry did not lead to better comprehension of plan documents.  Experience 
with the healthcare industry also did not affect plan approval or the propensity to appeal 
denied claims.  One explanation for these findings is that the measures of healthcare 
industry experience in the present study (e.g., health status, doctor visits, insurance 
provider, claims experience) were not relevant to the type of knowledge being tested by 
the comprehension test or to the skills necessary to appeal denied benefits.  In addition, 
very few participants in Study 2 (1.2%) and Study 3 (1.9%) could reflect on the 
experience of appealing an actual claim.  Perhaps, the clauses were too complicated for 
individuals, regardless of previous experience with technical healthcare documents.  
Interestingly, the positive effects that redrafting had on certain types of knowledge only 
existed for participants with health insurance or claims experience.  These results suggest 
that individuals’ understanding of simplified healthcare documents improves somewhat 
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from experience with the health insurance industry.  Study 3 sampled both employees and 
students.   
In general, employees had more experience than students with the healthcare 
industry and the insurance industry.  This experience may be why employees 
demonstrated better comprehension of plan documents than students, especially on the 
declarative knowledge subscales.  Due to the difference between students and employees’ 
experience with the healthcare and insurance industry and the difference between 
students and employees’ levels of education, it may not be appropriate to generalize 
results from student samples to the working population when studying health plan 
decision making. 
Limitations and Future Studies 
One of the biggest weaknesses of the present study, and therefore an area to 
improve upon in future studies, was the method of redrafting the SPD clauses.  For many 
of the same reasons that legal documents are difficult to read (e.g., their length, 
complexity, and technical nature; Hartley, 2000; Wogalter et al., 1999), they also are 
difficult to redraft.  In the present study, SPD clauses were redrafted by breaking up 
complex sentences into simpler sentences, making long words into shorter words, 
changing the tone from third to second person, reducing the technical nature of the 
documents by eliminating jargon, enlarging the font, reordering the text, and indenting 
subcategories (Wogalter et al., 1999).  These techniques were used because they improve 
scores on the Flesch Reading Ease test, Flesch Grade Level test, and Fog Index.  A 
significant limitation of these measures is that they do not capture some of the commonly 
accepted psycholinguistic principles of redrafting such as improving sentence structure 
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(English & Sales, 1997; Lieberman & Sales, 1997).  Several researchers have been able 
to improve comprehension of jury instructions by replacing uncommon words with 
common ones, replacing abstract words with concrete ones, avoiding homonyms and 
nominalizations, removing prepositional phrases and misplaced phrases, eliminating 
negatively modified sentences, and using active voice (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; 
Elwork et al., 1977, 1982).  One of the most promising redrafting techniques that was not 
used in the present study is logical organization of information.  For example, two ways 
of improving the logical organization of information are using a hierarchical structure, 
where high-level concepts are broken down into lower-level components and then 
integrated, or an algorithmic structure, where presentation order requires understanding 
of one concept for understanding of the next concept (Elwork et al., 1982).  Other studies 
have successfully improved comprehension for procedural tasks through visual aids such 
as flowcharts (Kammann, 1975; Phillips & Quinn, 1993; Wiener et al., 2004). 
Although six people made suggestions for improving the readability of each 
clause used in the present study, more time and effort could have been spent on redrafting 
the clauses.  Future studies should have cognitive linguists and educational specialists 
involved in the redrafting efforts.  Although readability scores are heavily dependent on 
word count, I attempted to keep the word count similar for the original and redrafted 
versions in order to avoid changing the meaning of the clauses.  Future studies should 
examine whether shortening the text of SPD clauses—if it is possible to do so without 
significantly altering their meaning—improves their comprehension.  Shortening text has 
been shown to improve comprehension of medical consent forms (Mann, 1984; Wogalter 
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et al., 1999).  Future studies may want to determine whether shortening texts, improving 
readability level, or a combination of both strategies improves comprehension the most. 
The task manipulation in the present study also could be improved upon.  Duffy 
and Kabance (1982) describe reading-to-learn tasks as tasks where individuals attempt to 
store and retain information for use in the future and reading-to-do tasks as tasks where 
individuals read with specific objectives and plan to use their newly-acquired information 
immediately.  The only difference between the reading-to-learn and reading-to-do tasks 
in the present study was that participants in the reading-to-do task were forewarned that 
their claim for benefits would be denied.  Even if participants remembered this 
instruction, it was probably not sufficient to motivate participants to engage in deeper 
integration of the upcoming material.  Participants in the present study were asked to take 
on the daunting task of reading five to seven type-written pages of a SPD and completing 
a 32-question comprehension test.  The task manipulation may have produced greater 
differences if the study was shorter (e.g., by cutting out the second denial letter and the 
second set of plan approval measures) or participants received more compensation for 
completing the study. 
Future studies should employ more drastic means of manipulating the task, such 
as providing a more detailed description of the forthcoming problem, tying compensation 
to performance, or increasing accountability.  In order to hone in on relevant plan 
language, participants might need to be informed of their ailment, the specific actions the 
health plan is going to take against them, and their ability to appeal those actions.  
Participants could receive this information in the form of a benefit denial letter before 
they read the SPD language.  Participants also could be told their compensation for 
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participating in the study will depend on whether they successfully complete the 
comprehension test or win their appeal.  To increase participants’ accountability for their 
decision to appeal, participants could have to explain their reasoning to a third-party, 
such as a health plan administrator or another health plan participant.  In the present 
study, participants in the reading-to-do condition did not actually “do” anything.  
Consumers probably are more motivated to understand health plan language when they 
are reading their own health plan and facing an actual benefit denial, rather than reading a 
hypothetical plan and engaging in a simulated appeal of denied benefits.  Although the 
present study benefited from a controlled design, the simulated appeal may lack the 
external validity necessary to generalize its findings to a real-world appeals process with 
real consequences (Bornstein & McCabe, 2005).  Nevertheless, the present study was a 
first attempt at identifying factors, such as procedural fairness and plan satisfaction, that 
should be examined when studying appeal decisions in the real world. 
The participant sample and the method of surveying participants are also 
limitations of the present study.  Employee participants in the present study were 
recruited through the internet, and all participants completed the study over the internet.  
This methodology provided a larger and more geographically diverse sample population.  
However, it may have attracted a sample of the population that is disproportionately 
health literate.  Whereas over 30% of English-speaking Americans have inadequate or 
marginal health literacy (Gazmararian et al., 1999; Gazmararian et al., 2003; Parker & 
Gazmararian, 2003; Williams et al., 1995), only 3.7% of participants in Study 2 and none 
of the participants in Study 3 had inadequate or marginal health literacy.  Similarly, more 
participants in Study 2 (98.5%) and Study 3 (98.5%) had a high school diploma than the 
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national average (84%) according to 2005 U.S. Census data.  To give a more accurate 
measure of comprehension, future studies should strive to recruit more participants with 
inadequate and marginal health literacy and with less education.  Future research also 
may consider using a different measure of health literacy than the S-TOFHLA. 
Although running the study over the internet was realistic because many SPDs are 
available to employees on-line, future studies might consider providing participants with 
hard copies of health plan documents.  Plan participants may receive or print out hard 
copies of their SPDs, and plan administrators often mail participants claim denial letters.  
Yet, the results would probably be similar to the present study because web-based and 
paper-pencil studies generally yield comparable results (Gosling, Vazire, & Srivastava, 
2004).  Future research also should assess whether participants actually read the study 
documents because a national survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates (1996) 
found that half of insureds do not read or merely skim materials about their health plans 
(as cited by Isaacs, 1996).  Future studies should ask participants how carefully they read 
the study documents as Wogalter et al. (1999) did and ask participants if they referred 
back to the health plan documents when they were completing the comprehension test. 
There are several opportunities to determine whether findings from the present 
study generalize.  The present study assessed the readability of 40 SPDs obtained from 
the internet, employees, and attorneys.  Although these SPDs represented employers from 
across the United States and several types of plans, a larger sample of SPDs would more 
accurately reflect the readability of SPDs and allow comparison across different plan 
types.  A larger sample of SPDs also would have improved the likelihood that the clauses 
chosen for Studies 2 and 3 were representative.  The clauses selected for redrafting were 
 95 
chosen based on their representativeness of the quartile of clauses with poor readability, 
two versions of each type of clause were presented, the clauses were all from different 
SPDs, and participants read both medical necessity and claims procedure clauses.  
Nevertheless, there is a risk that the present study’s findings are idiosyncratic to the 
clauses pulled out of the limited number of SPDs collected.  Future studies should 
evaluate comprehension of more than two versions of the same clause.  In addition, the 
present study only examined the readability and comprehension of medical necessity and 
claims procedure clauses.  Future research should look into other clauses.  In addition to 
examining medical necessity and claims procedure clauses, Medill et al. (2006) collected 
Firestone clauses, mental health and substance abuse benefits clauses, pre-existing 
condition coverage exclusion clauses, and reimbursement or subrogation clauses.  There 
was great variability in inter-rater agreement across the different types of clauses, but 
there were only small differences in readability across the six topic areas—all clauses 
were written at reading levels beyond those one might expect the average plan participant 
to possess. 
Participants in the present study engaged in a simulated appeals process based on 
denial of prospective appeals (i.e., appeals concerning denials of access to services).  
Future studies should examine whether perceptions of procedural fairness and plan 
satisfaction differ when participants engage in retrospective appeals (i.e., appeals 
concerning denial of reimbursement for services already obtained).  Results may depend 
on whether participants can afford to pay for the procedure if the health plan continues to 
deny coverage.  The appeal in the present study concerned denial of surgery to remove 
varicose veins.  Future research should determine whether findings from this study 
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generalize to other services that are commonly denied and appealed, such as gastric 
bypass, office consultations with psychiatrists, and magnetic resonance imaging tests 
(Studdert & Gresenz, 2003).  Results may differ depending on whether participants view 
the sought after treatment as clinically indicated or as elective or cosmetic. 
The present study asked participants what they would do in the event that a health 
plan denied them coverage because this line of questioning tapped into the reading-to-do 
task manipulation and this study focused on whether individual decision makers would 
themselves pursue a claim.  Future studies might consider asking participants what a 
generic other should do in the same situation.  Research has found that perceptions of 
fairness depend on whether participants are viewing the world from their own or 
another’s perspective (Bègue & Bastounis, 2003; Sutton & Douglas, 2005).  Future 
studies also should parse apart the relationship between plan approval and comprehension 
to determine if positive plan approval influences the decision to appeal more than high 
comprehension levels.  Instead of using a simulated appeals process, future research 
could target individuals who actually have been denied coverage and assess their 
perceptions of their health plans.  Studies that examine consumers’ actual interactions 
with health plans should consider using the Health Care Justice Inventory – Health Plan 
(HCJI – HP), which assesses the trust, impartiality, and participation dimensions of 
procedural justice (Fondacaro, Frogner, & Moos, 2005). 
Conclusion 
 The present study found that medical necessity and claims procedure clauses in 
SPDs are written at the college reading level and, thus, above the reading ability one 
would expect the average plan participant to possess.  Indeed, poor performance on 
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comprehension tests of plan documents confirmed that consumers do not understand 
these clauses well.  These findings indicate that some SPDs may not comply with ERISA 
§ 102(a)’s disclosure requirement.  Improving comprehension of SPDs will not be easy, 
as demonstrated by the lack of a redrafting effect in the present study.  Nevertheless, plan 
administrators should be motivated to make their plans more readable based on the 
finding that more informed consumers are less likely to pursue futile claims.  By reducing 
the number of frivolous lawsuits over plan coverage, plan administrators can decrease the 
administrative costs of sponsoring plans. 
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Appendix A: Selections from Coding Instruction Book 
 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SUMMARY PLAN DESCRIPTION LANGUAGE 
 
CODING INSTRUCTION BOOK 
 
Introduction  
 
The purpose of this research study is to measure the readability of the language 
used in summary plan descriptions (SPDs) for employer-sponsored health care plans that 
are subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). In 
addition to measuring the overall readability of each SPD in the study, the study also 
measures the readability of the following selected clauses that are typically found in 
health care plan SPDs: 
 
1.  Medical necessity clauses. 
 
2.  Claim filing and appeal procedure clauses. 
 
3.  Firestone clauses. 
 
4.  Mental health and substance abuse clauses. 
 
5.  Pre-existing condition coverage exclusion clauses. 
 
6.  Reimbursement clauses. 
 
Your task is to identify or “code” these clauses in the SPD documents.  An 
explanation of each clause, and the criteria that you should use to identify each clause, 
are described below in the Definitions and Coding Criteria section for each clause. 
 
Coding Methodology 
 
Each SPD document is accompanied by a coding sheet (see Appendix A).  As you 
identify the relevant clauses in the SPD document, you should: 
 
1.  Circle the relevant clause language on the document and indicate the number 
of the clause that corresponds to the language (i.e., “1" for language that relates to a 
medical necessity clause, “3" for Firestone clause language, etc.).   
 
2.  Each time you identify language in the SPD document as part of a coded 
clause, write the page number(s) where the language is found under the appropriate 
clause heading on the coding sheet.  
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This methodology ensures that the research assistant who is responsible for 
inputting the coded language into the computer system has two ways to verify the 
language to be coded as part of each clause. 
 
Definitions and Coding Criteria 
 
General Instructions 
 
The language that you select and code as part of a SPD clause may be used in 
subsequent studies to test the comprehension level of individual readers.  To make these 
subsequent studies as realistic as possible, you should include as part of the coded 
language any relevant topic headings or subheadings used in the document that 
correspond to the coded language.  In addition, as a general rule you should include the 
entire paragraph in which the coded language appears so that a human reader will have 
the context necessary to comprehend the significance of the clause language.   
 
Medical necessity clauses represent the one exception to this general rule.  
Specific detailed criteria for coding medical necessity clauses are described in the next 
section.  
 
1.  Medical Necessity Clauses 
 
a.  Definition  
 
Medical necessity clauses restrict the type of medical treatment that plans are 
obligated to cover.1  A medical necessity clause is an optional plan design feature that is 
used to reduce the cost of the health care plan by limiting the scope of coverage to 
treatment that is deemed to be medically necessary by the plan administrator. 
 
In general, medical necessity clauses function:  
 
(1) as a general prerequisite for coverage (e.g., charges are considered covered 
expenses to the extent that the services and supplies provided are recommended 
by a physician and are necessary for the care and treatment of an injury or a 
sickness);  
 
(2) as a criterion for providing specific covered services (e.g., hearing aids are 
covered only when medically necessary); or  
 
                                                 
1
 David M. Eddy, Benefit Language: Criteria that Will Improve Quality While Reducing Costs, 
275 JAMA 650 (1996).
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(3) as a general exclusion from coverage (e.g., services and supplies to the extent 
that they are not medically necessary are excluded).2 
 
b.  Coding Criteria for Medical Necessity Clauses 
 
Medical necessity clauses require the most detailed coding criteria because SPDs 
vary in how medical necessity clauses are presented.  In coding a medical necessity 
clause, you should determine if the relevant language conveys primary information or 
tertiary information.  Primary information should be coded as part of the medical 
necessity clause.  Tertiary information should not be coded as part of the medical 
necessity clause.   
 
i) Primary Information 
 
References to medical necessity in the SPD document are to be coded as primary 
information if: 
 
(1) the reference is part of an explanation of the prerequisites for coverage; 
 
(2) the reference is part of an explanation of covered services or benefits;  
 
(3) the reference is part of an explanation of the services or benefits that are 
excluded from coverage; or 
 
(4) the language is part of a definition or a glossary description of the term 
“medical necessity,” “medically necessary,” or similar terminology. 
 
Some SPD documents may contain a general provision stating that all covered 
services or benefits must be medically necessary, followed by a detailed list of the types 
of services and benefits that are covered by the plan.  In this situation, you should code 
only the general provision as part of the medical necessity clause and not code the 
detailed list of services and benefits that follows the general provision as part of the 
medical necessity clause. 
 
Other SPD documents may describe the types of services and benefits that are 
covered by the plan, and selectively qualify certain listed services and benefits by 
indicating that the particular service or benefit will be covered only if it is medically 
necessary.  In this situation, you should code these particular services and benefits as part 
of the medical necessity clause. 
 
 Some SPD documents may describe several options available under the plan 
(e.g., PPO, POS, HMO options), with each option containing a medical necessity clause.  
In this situation, you should code the medical necessity clause language for each plan 
                                                 
2
 CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH 
REFORM 125–26 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1995).
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option, even if the SPD document language used to describe the medical necessity clause 
for each plan option is identical.  
 
ii) Tertiary Information 
 
References in the SPD document to medical necessity are tertiary and should not 
be coded as part of the medical necessity clause if the reference is: 
 
(1) part of an explanation of the requirements of the plan for the pre-authorization 
of medical treatment, utilization review procedures, procedures for reviewing the 
appropriate length or continuation of a hospital stay, procedures for the 
coordination of benefits paid by multiple plans, or case management review 
procedures; 
 
(2) included as part of a separate description of prescription drug benefits, 
disability plan benefits, dental plan benefits, vision plan benefits, or other welfare 
plan benefits that are not medical benefits; 
 
(3) included as part of a description of mental health and substance abuse 
benefits;3 
 
(4) included as part of a description of the procedures for claims filing and 
appeals of denied claims;4  
 
(5) ad hoc references to medical necessity, or cross-references to other provisions 
of the SPD document, already coded as primary and included as part of the 
document’s medical necessity clause; or 
 
(6) a cross-reference to medical necessity that is included as part of an 
explanation of other federal laws that impact the administration of the plan, such 
as the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (COBRA).  
 
                                                 
3
 In this situation, references to medical necessity are coded as part of the mental health and 
substance abuse clause.
 
4
 In this situation, references to medical necessity are coded as part of the claims filing and appeal 
procedure clause.
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3.  Claim Filing and Appeal Procedure Clauses  
 
a.  Definition 
 
Claim filing and appeal procedure clauses inform plan participants of the 
procedure the participant must follow to submit a claim for health care plan benefits and 
to appeal a claim for health care plan benefits that has been denied by the plan 
administrator.  The legal source for claim filing and appeal procedure clauses is ERISA 
Section 503,5 which provides in relevant part that every plan must “afford a reasonable 
opportunity to any participant whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and fair 
review.”6  Department of Labor regulations implementing Section 503 set forth specific 
and detailed requirements for the claims procedures used by group health plans.7 
 
b.  Coding Criteria for Claim Filing and Appeal Procedure Clauses  
 
Subject to the exceptions listed below, you should code as part of the claim filing 
and appeal procedure clause any language in the SPD document that describes the 
procedure the participant must follow to submit a claim for health care benefits and to 
appeal a claim for health care benefits that has been denied by the plan administrator.  
The following information in the SPD document should not be coded as part of the claim 
filing and procedure clause: 
 
(1) a description of the requirements of the plan for the pre-authorization of 
medical treatment, utilization review procedures, procedures for reviewing the 
appropriate length or continuation of a hospital stay, procedures for the 
coordination of benefits paid by multiple plans, or case management review 
procedures; 
 
(2) claim filing and appeal procedures that are contained in a separate description 
of prescription drug benefits, disability plan benefits, dental plan benefits, vision 
plan benefits, or other welfare plan benefits that are not medical benefits;  
 
(3) claim filing and appeal procedures that are unique to mental health and 
substance abuse benefits;8 or 
 
(4) references to claims and appeals that are contained in the model statement of 
ERISA rights that is required by ERISA Section 104(c) and described in 
Department of Labor Regulation 2520.102-3(t)(2).9 
                                                 
5
 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2).
 
6
 The complete text of ERISA Section 503 is contained in Appendix B.
 
7
 See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1.
 
8
 In this situation, claim filing and appeal procedures that are unique to mental health and 
substance abuse benefits are coded as part of the mental health and substance abuse clause.
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Some SPDs may describe the procedure for filing an initial claim for plan benefits 
separately from the procedure for appealing a claim that has been denied.  Other SPDs 
may describe claim filing and claim appeal procedures in one section.  You should code 
all of the language in the SPD document that relates to the filing of claims and the appeal 
of denied claims as part of the claim filing and appeal procedure clause, whether those 
provisions are contained in a single section or in separate sections.  
 
Some SPDs may include a sample form for submitting a claim or appealing a 
claim for benefits that has been denied by the plan administrator.  You should code any 
sample claim forms as part of the claim filing and appeal procedure clause. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
9
 29 C.F.R. §2520.102-3(t)(2).  The text of the Department of Labor’s model statement of ERISA 
rights is contained in Appendix C. 
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Appendix B: Original and Redrafted Versions of Clauses 
Medical Necessity Clause, Plan 1 
Original Redrafted 
COVERED BENEFITS 
A Member shall be entitled to the Covered 
Benefits as specified below, in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of this 
Certificate. Unless specifically stated 
otherwise, in order for benefits to be 
covered, they must be Medically Necessary. 
For the purpose of coverage, HMO may 
determine whether any benefit provided 
under the Certificate is Medically Necessary, 
and HMO has the option to only authorize 
coverage for a Covered Benefit performed 
by a particular Provider. Preventive care, as 
described below, will be considered 
Medically Necessary.  
To be Medically Necessary, the service or 
supply must:  
• be care or treatment as likely to 
produce a significant positive outcome 
as, and no more likely to produce a 
negative outcome than, any alternative 
service or supply, both as to the disease 
or injury involved and the Member’s 
overall health condition;  
• be care or services related to diagnosis 
or treatment of an existing illness or 
injury, except for covered periodic health 
evaluations and preventive and well baby 
care, as determined by HMO;  
• be a diagnostic procedure, indicated by 
the health status of the Member and be as 
likely to result in information that could 
affect the course of treatment as, and no 
more likely to produce a negative 
outcome than, any alternative service or 
supply, both as to the disease or injury 
involved and the Member’s overall 
health condition;  
• include only those services and supplies 
COVERED BENEFITS 
A member of this Health Plan is entitled to 
the covered benefits as described below.  In 
order for benefits to be paid for, or covered, 
they must be considered “medically 
necessary.” The Health Maintenance 
Organization (HMO) that runs this Plan 
decides whether benefits are medically 
necessary. If the HMO determines that one 
of the benefits listed below is medically 
necessary, the benefit will be covered by the 
company. In addition, the HMO may only 
authorize a particular provider to perform a 
covered benefit. Preventive care, as 
described below, is always considered 
medically necessary.  
To be medically necessary, services and 
supplies must meet all the standards 
described below.  
• To be medically necessary, the service 
or supply must be as likely to have a 
significant positive impact on the 
member’s illness and the member’s 
overall health as any other option. The 
service or supply cannot have more of a 
negative impact on the member’s illness 
and the member’s overall health than any 
other option. 
• To be medically necessary, the service 
or supply must be care or services to 
diagnose or treat an existing illness or 
injury. The HMO provides an exception 
to this rule for care or services related to 
periodic health evaluations, preventive 
care, or well baby care.  
• To be medically necessary, the service 
or supply must be a procedure needed to 
diagnose the member’s health status.  
This procedure must be as likely to 
produce information that could affect the 
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that cannot be safely and satisfactorily 
provided at home, in a Physician’s 
office, on an outpatient basis, or in any 
facility other than a Hospital, when used 
in relation to inpatient Hospital Services; 
and  
• as to diagnosis, care and treatment be 
no more costly (taking into account all 
health expenses incurred in connection 
with the service or supply) than any 
equally effective service or supply in 
meeting the above tests.  
In determining if a service or supply is 
Medically Necessary, HMO’s Patient 
Management Medical Director or its 
Physician designee will consider:  
• information provided on the Member’s 
health status;  
• reports in peer reviewed medical 
literature;  
• reports and guidelines published by 
nationally recognized health care 
organizations that include supporting 
scientific data;  
• professional standards of safety and 
effectiveness which are generally 
recognized in the United States for 
diagnosis, care or treatment;  
• the opinion of Health Professionals in 
the generally recognized health specialty 
involved;  
• the opinion of the attending Physicians, 
which have credence but do not overrule 
contrary opinions; and  
• any other relevant information brought 
to HMO’s attention.  
 
Inpatient Hospital & Skilled 
Nursing Facility Benefits 
As an exception to the Medically Necessary 
requirements of this Certificate, the 
following coverage is provided for a mother 
and newly born child:  
course of treatment as any other option. 
The procedure cannot have more of a 
negative impact on the member’s illness 
and the member’s overall health than any 
other option.  
• To be medically necessary, the service 
or supply must include only inpatient 
care that cannot be received as safely and 
satisfactorily as outpatient care or care 
received at home, a physician’s office, or 
a facility other than a hospital. Inpatient 
care requires an overnight stay, whereas 
outpatient care does not.  
• To be medically necessary, the service 
or supply must be no more costly than 
any equally effective service or supply. 
The cost must take into account all 
medical expenses resulting from the 
service or supply.  
In determining if a service or supply is 
medically necessary, the HMO will consider:  
• information about the member’s health 
status;  
• reports in peer reviewed medical 
journals;  
• reports and guidelines that are 
published by nationally recognized 
health care groups and use scientific data 
to support their claims;  
• professional standards of safety and 
effectiveness that are generally applied to 
diagnosis, care and treatment in the 
United States;  
• the opinions of health professionals 
who specialize in the health problem at 
issue;  
• the opinions of the member’s 
physicians, whose opinions carry weight 
but do not overrule differing opinions; 
and  
• any other relevant information brought 
to the HMO’s attention.  
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1. a minimum of 48 hours of 
inpatient care in a Participating 
Hospital following a vaginal 
delivery;  
2. a minimum of 96 hours of 
inpatient care in a Participating 
Hospital following a cesarean 
section; or  
3. a shorter Hospital stay, if 
requested by a mother, and if 
determined to be medically 
appropriate by the Participating 
Providers in consultation with the 
mother.  
 
Benefits for Temporomandibular 
Joint Disorders (TMJ)  
Benefits for TMJ will be provided when 
preauthorized by HMO. This includes 
diagnostic and surgical treatment of TMJ 
that is Medically Necessary as a result of an 
accident, a trauma, a congenital defect, a 
develop-mental defect, or a pathology.  
 
EXCLUSIONS AND 
LIMITATIONS 
Exclusions  
The following are not Covered Benefits 
except as de-scribed in the Covered Benefits 
section of this Certificate or by a rider 
attached to this Certificate:  
• Cosmetic Surgery, or treatment relating 
to the consequences of, or as a result of, 
Cosmetic Surgery, other than Medically 
Necessary Services. This exclusion 
includes, but is not limited to, surgery to 
correct gynecomastia and breast 
augmentation procedures, and 
otoplasties. Reduction mammoplasty, 
except when deter-mined to be Medically 
Necessary by an HMO Medical Director, 
Inpatient Hospital & Skilled 
Nursing Facility Benefits 
As an exception to the medically necessary 
requirements described above, the following 
coverage is provided for a mother and newly 
born child:  
1. a minimum of 48 hours of 
inpatient care, in a hospital approved 
by the HMO, following a vaginal 
delivery;  
2. a minimum of 96 hours of 
inpatient care, in a hospital approved 
by the HMO, following a cesarean 
section (C-section); or  
3. a shorter hospital stay, if requested 
by a mother, and if judged medically 
appropriate by the health care 
provider. 
 
Benefits for Temporomandibular 
Joint Disorders (TMJ)  
Benefits for TMJ must be authorized by the 
HMO before they are received. This is the 
case even if the TMJ is medically necessary 
due to an accident, a birth defect, a 
developmental defect, or a disease.  
 
EXCLUSIONS AND 
LIMITATIONS 
Exclusions  
Except as described above in the Covered 
Benefits section or in supplemental 
materials, the following are not covered 
benefits:  
• Non-medically necessary cosmetic 
surgery or non-medically necessary 
treatment to address the consequences of 
an earlier cosmetic surgery.  This 
includes, but is not limited to, surgery for 
breast enlargement or reduction, 
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is not covered.  
• Non-medically necessary services, 
including but not limited to, those 
services and supplies:  
1. which are not Medically 
Necessary, as determined by HMO, 
for the diagnosis and treatment of 
illness, in-jury, restoration of 
physiological functions, or covered 
preventive services;  
2. that do not require the technical 
skills of a medical, mental health or a 
dental professional;  
3. furnished mainly for the personal 
comfort or convenience of the 
Member, or any person who cares for 
the Member, or any person who is 
part of the Member’s family, or any 
Provider;  
4. furnished solely because the 
Member is an inpatient on any day in 
which the Member’s disease or injury 
could safely and adequately be 
diagnosed or treated while not 
confined;  
5. furnished solely because of the 
setting if the service or supply could 
safely and adequately be furnished in 
a Physician’s or a dentist’s office or 
other less costly setting.  
 
DEFINITIONS 
• Medically Necessary, Medically Necessary 
Services, or Medical Necessity. Services that 
are appropriate and consistent with the 
diagnosis in accordance with accepted 
medical standards as described in the 
Covered Benefits section of this Certificate. 
Medical Necessity, when used in relation to 
services, shall have the same meaning as 
Medically Necessary Services. This 
definition applies only to the determination 
by HMO of whether health care services are 
abnormal growth of breasts in males, and 
large ears.  
• Non-medically necessary services, 
including but not limited to, the services 
described below.  
1. Services that are not medically 
necessary, as determined by the 
HMO, for the diagnosis and 
treatment of illness or injury, for the 
restoration of body functions, or for 
covered preventive services.  
2. Services that do not require the 
technical skills of a medical, mental 
health or dental professional.  
3. Services that are delivered mainly 
for the personal comfort or 
convenience of the member, any 
person who cares for the member, 
any person who is part of the 
member’s family, or any provider.  
4. Services that are delivered solely 
because the member is an inpatient 
when the member’s disease or injury 
could safely and adequately be 
diagnosed or treated as an outpatient. 
5. Services that are delivered solely 
because of the setting when the 
service or supply could be safely and 
adequately provided in a physician’s 
office, a dentist’s office, or another 
less costly setting.  
 
DEFINITIONS 
• Medically necessary, medically 
necessary services, or medical necessity.  
These are services that are considered 
appropriate and consistent with the 
diagnosis according to accepted 
medical standards as described in the 
Covered Benefits section. Medical 
necessity, when used in relation to 
services, has the same meaning as 
medically necessary services. This 
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Covered Benefits under this Certificate. 
 
definition applies only to the 
determination by the HMO of 
whether health care services are 
covered benefits under this policy. 
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Medical Necessity Clause, Plan 2 
Original Redrafted 
SOME TERMS AND 
EXPLANATIONS 
What is ‘Medically Necessary’? 
The medical plan options pay benefits for 
eligible expenses that are considered 
medically necessary by the claims 
administrator. The claims administrator 
considers a treatment, service, or supply as 
medically necessary if it is: 
• Ordered and approved by a licensed 
physician 
• Reasonably required for the diagnosis 
or treatment of a medical symptom or 
condition 
• A treatment that is economical, safe, 
and provided in a manner and setting 
consistent with generally accepted 
United States medical standards 
• Not primarily for the convenience of 
the patient or the health care provider 
• The most appropriate level of 
treatment, service, or supply that can be 
safely provided. (With respect to 
hospitalization, acute care as an inpatient 
is judged to be necessary based on the 
type of services the patient is receiving 
or the severity of the patient's condition. 
It also means that safe and adequate care 
cannot be received as an outpatient or in 
a less intense medical setting.) 
• Not educational, vocational, 
experimental, or investigational in nature 
except for individuals with diabetes. The 
plan provides for education about 
diabetes. 
• Not specifically excluded by the plan. 
When you are hospitalized, your provider 
and the claims administrator determine how 
long your hospital stay is medically 
TERMS AND 
EXPLANATIONS 
Medically Necessary 
The Health Plan will pay for medical 
expenses that the Plan’s claims administrator 
considers “medically necessary.” A 
treatment, service, or supply is medically 
necessary if it is: 
• ordered and approved by a licensed 
physician; 
• reasonably required to diagnose or treat 
a medical symptom or condition; 
• cost-effective and safe; 
• generally accepted according to 
national medical standards; 
• the most appropriate level of treatment, 
service, or supply that can be safely 
provided;  
• Inpatient care requires an overnight 
stay, whereas outpatient care does 
not. Inpatient care is only medically 
necessary if the same care cannot be 
received as an outpatient or in a less 
intense medical setting than a 
hospital. This judgment will be based 
on the type of services the patient is 
receiving or the severity of the 
patient's condition.  
• not for the purpose of education or an 
experiment (except for educating patients 
about their diabetes);  
• not mainly for the convenience of the 
patient or the health care provider; and 
• not specifically listed in this Plan under 
the section Medical Expenses that are 
Not Covered. 
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necessary. Even though your physician or 
other health care provider prescribes, orders, 
recommends, or approves a service or 
supply, it is not automatically considered 
medically necessary. This rule applies even 
if the service or supply is not listed in this 
guide as an ineligible expense. 
Consequently, pre-certification of expenses 
is essential to determine eligibility for 
benefits. 
Hospital inpatient services are medically 
necessary if they cannot be safely provided 
to you as an outpatient. 
Adult physicals, newborn baby care and 
childhood immunizations that you receive 
from a network provider are considered 
medically necessary. Maternity hospital 
stays for mothers and newborn children are 
considered medically necessary for at least 
48 hours following a normal vaginal delivery 
or 96 hours following a cesarean birth. 
Out-of-network services and supplies 
provided to a newborn child are considered 
medically necessary if they: 
• Meet all the requirements listed in the 
Eligible Medical Expenses section. 
• Are provided to treat a diagnosed 
sickness or injury (including a congenital 
defect or birth abnormality). 
 
EMERGENCY CARE AND 
HOSPITALIZATION 
Eligible Medical Expenses 
• Ambulance service to a local facility 
for a life-threatening condition or a 
condition that could cause serious harm 
to your body 
(The medical plan options also cover air 
ambulance service to the nearest 
appropriate facility when this service is 
medically necessary. There is no 
coverage under any of the medical plan 
Hospitalization 
Hospital inpatient services are medically 
necessary if they cannot be safely provided 
to you as an outpatient. 
When you are in the hospital, your health 
care provider and the claims administrator 
decide how long your hospital stay is 
medically necessary. Even though your 
health care provider prescribes or 
recommends a service or supply, it is not 
automatically considered medically 
necessary. This rule applies even if the 
service or supply is not specifically listed in 
this Plan under the section Medical Expenses 
that are Not Covered. The best way to make 
sure the services and supplies you receive 
will be covered is to ask the claims 
administrator before you receive them. 
Preventative Care 
From Network Providers 
Network providers are those doctors that 
have an agreement to provide care to patients 
with this Plan and be paid by this Plan for 
“medically necessary” services. 
Adult physicals that you receive from a 
network provider are considered medically 
necessary. 
Newborn baby care and childhood 
immunizations from a network provider are 
considered medically necessary. Hospital 
stays for mothers and newborns are 
considered medically necessary for at least 
48 hours following a normal vaginal delivery 
or 96 hours following a cesarean section (C-
section). 
From Out-of-Network Providers 
Out-of-network services and supplies 
provided to a newborn child are considered 
medically necessary if they: 
• Meet all the criteria listed in the section 
on Covered Medical Expenses. 
• Are provided to treat a diagnosed 
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options for ambulance use when there is 
no emergency.) 
• Medically necessary surgery that 
results from a previous cosmetic surgery 
(Cosmetic surgery performed mainly to 
change a person's appearance is not an 
eligible expense.) 
• Educational expenses related to 
diabetes, when medically necessary and 
prescribed by a physician and approved 
by the claims administrator 
• Infertility services, including diagnostic 
services to determine the cause of 
infertility, and medical procedures 
required to correct a physical condition 
causing infertility 
• Further, administrative fees related 
to non-medically necessary infertility 
services, such as egg and sperm 
donor search fees and travel 
expenses, also are not eligible. 
• Temporomandibular joint (TMJ) 
syndrome, including medically necessary 
initial surgical consultation and surgical 
treatment of dysfunction of the 
temporomandibular joint. (The medical 
plan options do not cover therapy [before 
or after surgery], appliances or the 
shortening or lengthening of the maxilla 
or mandible for cosmetic purposes or for 
correction of malocclusion.) 
 
Ineligible Medical Expenses 
• Charges for services or supplies that are 
not medically necessary 
• Expenses related to court-ordered 
treatment, unless certified as medically 
or psychologically necessary 
• Expenses related to infertility 
administration fees that are not medically 
necessary, such as egg and sperm costs 
and donor search fees 
sickness or injury, including a birth 
defect. 
 
EMERGENCY CARE AND 
HOSPITALIZATION 
Covered Medical Expenses 
• Ambulance service to a local hospital 
for a life-threatening condition or a 
condition that could cause serious harm 
to the patient’s body. 
• Helicopter ambulance service to the 
nearest hospital that is equipped to 
handle the patient’s condition when this 
service is medically necessary. 
• There is no coverage for any ambulance 
service when there is no emergency. 
• Medically necessary surgery that 
results from a previous cosmetic surgery  
• Cosmetic surgery performed mainly 
to change the way a person looks is 
not covered. 
• Educational expenses for patients with 
diabetes, when prescribed by a doctor 
and approved by the claims administrator 
• Infertility services 
• When a couple cannot get pregnant, 
the Plan will cover tests to determine 
the cause of infertility and medical 
procedures to fix it 
• Expenses related to non-medically 
necessary infertility services, such as 
egg and sperm donor search fees and 
travel expenses, are not covered. 
• Temporomandibular joint (TMJ) 
syndrome, including medically necessary 
surgery. 
• The Plan does not cover therapy 
before or after surgery, devices or 
procedures to shorten or lengthen the 
jaw bones for cosmetic or 
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GLOSSARY 
Medically necessary In general, services or 
supplies that meet the following criteria: 
• Are appropriate and necessary for the 
symptoms, diagnosis or treatment of the 
medical condition, disease, injury or 
illness. 
• Are provided for the diagnosis or direct 
care and treatment of the medical 
condition, disease, injury or illness. 
• Meet the standards of sound medical 
practice in the medical community in the 
service area and that, if omitted, would 
adversely affect the patient's medical 
condition. 
• Are not primarily for the convenience 
of the patient or health care provider. 
• Are the most appropriate level or 
amount that can safely be provided. 
The medical and dental plans pay benefits 
for services and supplies that are considered 
medically necessary, as determined by the 
plan administrator. The fact that a physician 
or other health care provider prescribes or 
orders the service or supply does not make it 
a medically necessary, eligible expense. 
orthodontic purposes. 
 
Medical Expenses that are Not 
Covered 
• Charges for services or supplies that are 
not medically necessary 
• Expenses related to court-ordered 
treatment, unless the claims 
administrator decides the expenses are 
medically or psychologically necessary 
• Expenses related to infertility expenses 
that are not medically necessary, such as 
egg and sperm costs and donor search 
fees 
 
GLOSSARY 
Medically Necessary  
In general, services or supplies are medically 
necessary if they: 
• are appropriate and necessary and are 
provided to diagnose or treat the injury 
or illness; 
• meet the standards of medical practice 
in the local medical community; 
• would negatively affect the patient's 
medical condition if not provided; 
• are not provided mainly for the 
convenience of the patient or health care 
provider; and 
• are provided at the most appropriate 
level that is safe. 
The Plan pays for services and supplies that 
the claims administrator deems medically 
necessary. The fact that a health care 
provider prescribes or orders the service or 
supply does not, by itself, make it medically 
necessary. 
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Claims Procedure Clause, Plan 1 
Original Redrafted 
CLAIMS INFORMATION 
AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
How to Obtain Benefits 
When you receive Covered Services, a claim 
must be filed for you to obtain benefits. 
Network Providers will file claims for you. If 
you need to submit the claim yourself for 
Covered Services (such as claims for 
treatment by an Out-of-Network Provider), 
you should use a claim form. 
These claim forms are available in your 
human resources department or on the human 
resources page of the Intranet. You can also 
obtain forms by calling the Customer Service 
Center at the number on the back of your 
insurance card. The claim form, as well as 
your insurance card, provides the correct 
address to where claims should be sent. 
 
Medical Claim Submission 
A claim form must be submitted to the Plan’s 
Claims Administrator at the address that is 
indicated on the back of your insurance card. 
Claims must be submitted within 90 days of 
receiving Covered Services and must include 
sufficient data to determine what benefits are 
covered by the Plan. 
Failure to submit a claim within 90 days will 
not reduce a benefit if you or your Provider 
can show that the claim was submitted as 
soon as reasonably possible. However, claims 
first submitted more than 180 days after the 
date of the Covered Service may be denied 
for lack of timely filing. 
 
Payment Determinations on Initial 
Claims 
The Plan endeavors to provide quick 
CLAIMS AND APPEALS 
Getting Services Paid for by the 
Plan 
When you receive services that are covered 
by the Plan, a claim must be filed for the 
Plan to pay for the services.  Health care 
providers who have network agreements to 
work with the Plan will file claims for you. 
When you receive services from an out-of-
network provider, you need to submit the 
claim form yourself. The Plan provides a 
claim form. 
You can get claim forms from your 
employer’s human resources department or 
website. You can also obtain forms by 
calling the Customer Service Center at the 
number on the back of your insurance card. 
The claim form and your insurance card 
both provide the address where claims 
should be sent. 
 
Medical Claim Submission 
A claim form must be mailed to the Plan’s 
Claims Administrator at the address on your 
insurance card. Claims must be submitted 
within 90 days of receiving services and 
must include enough information for the 
administrator to determine which of the 
services you received are covered by the 
Plan. 
If it takes you longer than 90 days to submit 
a claim, you can still get benefits. For this to 
happen, you or your health care provider 
must show that the claim was submitted as 
soon as it was reasonably possible. If it 
takes you longer than 180 days to submit 
your claim, your benefits may be denied for 
not filing in a timely manner.   
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processing of all health insurance Claims. 
There are two types of Claims that may be 
filed under the Plan: Pre-service Claims and 
Post-service Claims. A Pre-service Claim is a 
request for benefits prior to receipt of 
treatment or a Pre-authorization request as 
required under the Plan (see the 
Preauthorization section of the Plan for 
benefits requiring Pre-authorization). A Post-
service Claim is a Claim for benefits after the 
treatment has already been rendered. As 
illustrated below, Pre-service Claims and 
Post-service Claims are treated differently by 
the Plan. Moreover, the Plan will treat Pre-
service Claims differently based upon 
whether the Claim is an Urgent Care Claim. 
For purposes of this Claims Information and 
Appeal Procedures section of this Summary 
Plan Description, an Urgent Care Pre-service 
Claim is any Claim for medical care or 
treatment with respect to which the 
application of the time periods for making 
non-urgent care determinations could 
seriously jeopardize the life or health of the 
claimant or the ability of the claimant to 
regain maximum function or, in the opinion 
of a physician with knowledge of the 
claimant’s medical condition, would subject 
the claimant to severe pain that cannot be 
adequately managed without the care or 
treatment that is the subject of the Claim. 
Determinations of Urgent Care Pre-service 
Claims will be made by the Claims 
Administrator as soon as possible, taking into 
account the medical necessity, and 
notification of such determination shall be 
given to the Member not later than 72 hours 
from the time the Urgent Care Pre-service 
Claim is received unless the Member failed to 
provide sufficient information in order for the 
Claims Administrator to determine whether, 
or to what extent, benefits are covered or 
payable under the Plan. In the case of such a 
failure, the Claims Administrator shall notify 
the claimant as soon as possible, but not later 
than 24 hours after receipt of the Claim, of 
the specific information necessary to 
Decisions about Claims  
The Plan tries to process all claims quickly. 
There are two types of claims that may be 
filed under the Plan. 
• A Pre-service Claim is a request for 
benefits prior to receiving treatment, such 
as a pre-authorization request.  
• A pre-authorization request is a request 
that the Plan determine whether a 
proposed service is covered and is 
medically necessary. For some types of 
services, a pre-authorization request is 
required.  
• A Post-service Claim is a claim for 
benefits after the treatment has been 
received.  
• As described below, Pre-service Claims 
and Post-service Claims are treated 
differently by the Plan. The Plan treats Pre-
service Claims differently depending on 
whether the claim is for care that is needed 
urgently or not.  
Urgent Care Pre-service Claims 
An Urgent Care Pre-service Claim is any 
claim for medical care that is needed 
immediately.  Urgent Care Pre-service 
Claims are processed more quickly than 
claims for non-urgent care for several 
reasons.  In a doctor’s opinion, a delay 
might endanger the health of the patient, 
reduce the patient’s chance of a full 
recovery, or subject the patient to severe 
pain that cannot be managed without the 
requested services. 
Urgent Care Pre-service Claim decisions 
will be made by the Claims Administrator 
as soon as possible.  The Claims 
Administrator will consider the medical 
necessity of the service. You will learn of 
the Claims Administrator’s decision within 
72 hours from the time the claim was 
received. If you did not give the Claims 
Administrator enough information to 
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complete the Claim. The claimant will be 
given 48 hours after receipt of the notice to 
provide the requested information. Within 48 
hours of its receipt of the requested 
information, the Claims Administrator shall 
notify the claimant of its determination. If the 
claimant fails to timely provide the requested 
information, the Claims Administrator will 
notify the claimant of its determination 
within 48 hours after the expiration of the 
time to provide the information. 
If a claimant files an Urgent Care Pre-service 
Claim improperly, the Claims Administrator 
will notify the claimant of the improper filing 
and how to correct it as soon as possible (but 
not later than 24 hours) after the failure is 
discovered. This notice may be oral, unless 
written notification is requested by the 
claimant. 
Non-urgent care Pre-service Claims will be 
determined by the Claims Administrator 
within a reasonable period of time 
appropriate to the medical circumstances, and 
notification of such determination shall be 
given to the Member not later than 15 days 
from the time the non-urgent care Pre-service 
Claim is received. This 15-day period may be 
extended if the Claims Administrator 
determines that the extension is necessary 
due to matters beyond the control of the Plan 
and properly notifies the Member of such 
extension prior to the expiration of the initial 
15-day period. The extension notice shall 
include the circumstances requiring the 
extension and the expected date of the 
determination. If the extension is requested 
because of the need for additional 
information, the Claims Administrator will 
notify the claimant of the needed information 
within the initial 15-day period and pend the 
Claim until the information is received. The 
claimant will be given 45 days after receipt of 
the notice to provide the requested 
information. Within 15 days of its receipt of 
the requested information, the Claims 
Administrator shall notify the claimant of its 
determine which of the benefits you want 
are covered by the Plan, it might take 
longer.  
If you did not provide enough information, 
the Claims Administrator will notify you as 
soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours 
after receiving the claim. The Claims 
Administrator will tell you what information 
is needed to complete the claim. You will 
have 48 hours to provide the requested 
information. After you provide the 
requested information, you will be notified 
of the Claims Administrator’s decision 
within 48 hours. If you do not provide the 
requested information in time, you will be 
notified of the Claims Administrator’s 
decision within 48 hours after the requested 
information was due. 
If you do not file an Urgent Care Pre-
service Claim correctly, the Claims 
Administrator will notify you of the 
problem and tell you how to fix it.  The 
Claims Administrator will contact you as 
soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours 
after the problem is discovered. Notice of 
the problem may only be given to you 
verbally, unless you request written notice. 
Non-urgent Care Pre-service Claims 
Non-urgent Care Pre-service Claim 
decisions will be made by the Claims 
Administrator within a reasonable period of 
time depending on the medical 
circumstances. You will learn of the Claims 
Administrator’s decision no later than 15 
days from the time the claim was received. 
This 15-day period may be extended if the 
Claims Administrator determines that it is 
necessary due to matters beyond the Plan’s 
control. If an extension is needed, you will 
be notified before the initial 15-day period 
is over. The notice will inform you of the 
reasons for the extension and the date the 
Claims Administrator expects to make a 
decision about your claim. If the Claims 
Administrator needs more information to 
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determination. If the claimant fails to timely 
provide the requested information, the Claims 
Administrator will notify the claimant of its 
determination within 15 days after the 
expiration of the time to provide the 
information. 
If the claimant files a non-urgent care Pre-
service Claim improperly, the Claims 
Administrator will notify the claimant of the 
improper filing and how to correct it as soon 
as possible (but not later than 5 days) after 
the failure is discovered. This notice may be 
oral, unless written notification is requested 
by the claimant. 
If a Member has already received approval 
for a course of treatment to be provided over 
a specified number of treatments or a 
specified period of time, any cutback in that 
course of treatment is considered under these 
rules as an adverse benefit determination 
entitling the Member to utilize the Plan’s 
appeals procedures outlined below. Any such 
denial will be done sufficiently in advance of 
the cutback to allow the Member to appeal 
and obtain a determination on review before 
the benefit is reduced. 
If a Member has already received approval 
for a course of treatment and the Member 
desires to extend the treatment beyond the 
treatment already approved, such extension 
will be treated as a new Claim, but the Plan 
shall notify the Member of its determination 
regarding Urgent Care benefits as soon as 
possible, taking into account the medical 
necessity, not later than 24 hours after receipt 
of the request. However, if a request for 
extended treatment involving Urgent Care is 
not made at least 24 hours prior to the end of 
the already approved treatment, the request 
will instead be treated as an Urgent Care 
Claim, as discussed above. 
Post-service Claims will be determined by 
the Claims Administrator within a reasonable 
period of time, and notification of such 
determination shall be given to the Member 
make a decision, the Claims Administrator 
will notify you within the initial 15-day 
period.  The Claims Administrator will hold 
the claim until the requested information is 
received. After the Claims Administrator 
tells you what information is missing, you 
have 45 days to provide the requested 
information. After you provide the 
requested information, you will be notified 
of the Claims Administrator’s decision 
within 15 days. If you do not provide the 
requested information in time, you will be 
notified of the Claims Administrator’s 
decision within 15 days after the requested 
information was due. 
If you do not file a Non-urgent Care Pre-
service Claim properly, the Claims 
Administrator will notify you of the 
problem and tell you how to fix it. The 
Claims Administrator will contact you as 
soon as possible, but no later than 5 days 
after the problem is discovered. Notice of 
the problem may only be given to you 
verbally, unless you request written notice. 
If you already have received approval to 
receive a certain number of treatments or to 
receive treatment for a certain length of 
time, any reduction in your treatment is 
considered a benefit decision against you. If 
the Plan makes a benefit decision against 
you, you are entitled to appeal the Plan’s 
decision, as described below. If the Plan 
decides to reduce your treatment, the Plan 
will inform you of its decision in time for 
you to appeal the decision and hear back 
before the reduction takes place.   
If you already have gotten permission to 
receive a certain number of treatments or to 
receive treatment for a certain length of time 
and you request more treatment, your 
request will be treated as a new claim. The 
Plan will notify you of its decision about 
Urgent Care Claims as soon as possible. 
The Claims Administrator will take into 
account the medical necessity of the 
services, and will notify you no later than 24 
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not later than 30 days after receipt of the 
Claim. The Plan may extend this 30-day 
period by 15 days if the Claims Administrator 
determines that the extension is necessary 
due to matters beyond the control of the Plan 
and properly notifies the Member of the 
extension prior to the expiration of the initial 
30-day period. The extension notice shall 
include the circumstances requiring the 
extension and the expected date of the 
determination. If the extension is requested 
because of the need for additional 
information, the Claims Administrator will 
notify the claimant of the needed information 
within the initial 30-day period and pend the 
Claim until the information is received. The 
claimant will be given 45 days after receipt of 
the notice to provide the requested 
information. Within 15 days of its receipt of 
the requested information, the Claims 
Administrator shall notify the claimant of its 
determination. If the claimant fails to timely 
provide the requested information, the Claims 
Administrator will notify the claimant of its 
determination within 15 days after the 
expiration of the time to provide the 
information. 
If your Claim is denied by the Claims 
Administrator, the denial notice will provide: 
• the specific reason(s) for the denial, and, 
if applicable, either the specific internal 
rule, guideline, protocol or other similar 
criterion (if any) relied upon in making 
the denial, or a statement that the rule, 
guideline, protocol or other similar 
criterion that was relied upon in making 
the denial and that a copy of such rule, 
guideline, protocol or other similar 
criterion will be provided free of charge 
upon request 
• references to the part of the Plan on 
which the denial is based 
• a description of any additional material 
or information necessary for you to 
perfect your Claim and an explanation 
hours after receiving your request. If you 
want more treatment involving urgent care, 
you have to make your request at least 24 
hours before the already approved treatment 
is finished.  Otherwise, your request will be 
treated as an Urgent Care Claim, as 
described above. 
Post-service Claims 
Post-service Claims will be decided by the 
Claims Administrator within a reasonable 
period of time, but no later than 30 days 
after your claim is received. This 30-day 
period may be extended by 15 days if the 
Claims Administrator determines that it is 
necessary due to matters beyond the Plan’s 
control. If an extension is needed, you will 
be notified before the initial 30-day period 
is over. The notice will tell you the reasons 
for the extension and the date the Claims 
Administrator expects to make a decision 
about your claim. If the Claims 
Administrator needs more information to 
make a decision, the Claims Administrator 
will notify you within the initial 30-day 
period. The Claims Administrator will hold 
the claim until the requested information is 
received. After the Claims Administrator 
tells you what information is missing, you 
have 45 days to provide the requested 
information. After you provide the 
requested information, you will be notified 
of the Claims Administrator’s decision 
within 15 days. If you do not provide the 
requested information in time, you will be 
notified of the Claims Administrator’s 
decision within 15 days after the requested 
information was due. 
If your claim is denied by the Claims 
Administrator, the denial notice will provide 
you with the information described below. 
• The denial notice will inform you of 
the specific reasons for the denial. If 
applicable, the denial notice will either 
include the rule or protocol on which the 
denial is based, or it will state that the 
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why such material or information is 
necessary 
• appropriate information as to the steps 
to be taken if you desire to appeal the 
denial, including notice of applicable time 
limits, and a statement regarding your 
right to bring suit under Section 
502(a) of ERISA following an adverse 
benefit determination on review 
• if the denial is based on a medical 
necessity or experimental treatment or 
similar exclusion or limit, an explanation 
of the scientific or clinical judgment for 
such denial that applies the terms of the 
Plan to your medical circumstances, or a 
statement that such explanation will be 
provided free of charge upon request 
• a description of the expedited review 
process for Urgent Care Pre-service 
Claims. 
The Claims Administrator may orally provide 
you the above information if your Urgent 
Care Pre-service Claim is denied if written 
notification is subsequently furnished to you 
not later than 3 days after the oral 
notification. 
 
Appeals of Plan Determinations, 
Including Time Limits 
If you have a question about benefits, you 
may contact the Customer Service Center at 
the number listed on the back of your 
insurance card. Most issues can be resolved 
by the Customer Service Center and do not 
require a formal appeal. 
If you (or, a Provider) disagree with a benefit 
determination made by the Plan about 
coverage, payment or a Preauthorization 
request for services, you may request a 
formal Plan Review (“Plan Review”) within 
180 days after you receive notification of an 
adverse benefit determination. Requests 
received after 180 days will not be 
rule or protocol used to make the 
decision will be provided free of charge 
if requested. 
• The denial notice will refer you to the 
part of the Plan on which the denial is 
based. 
• The denial notice will describe any 
additional information that is necessary 
for your claim to be complete. It will 
explain why such information is 
necessary. 
• The denial notice will tell you the steps 
to take if you want to appeal the denial 
and the applicable time limits. The 
denial notice also will include a 
statement of your right to sue under 
Section 502(a) of the Employee 
Retirement Income Securities Act 
(ERISA) if the Claims Administrator 
reviews your appeal of denied benefits 
and again denies your claim. 
• The denial notice will tell you if the 
denial is based on a determination that 
the treatment is not medically necessary, 
is experimental or falls under a similar 
exclusion or limitation. The denial 
notice will either explain the scientific 
or clinical reasons for the denial, 
applying the terms of the Plan to your 
circumstances, or it will state that an 
explanation will be provided free of 
charge if requested. 
• The denial notice will describe the 
appeal process for Urgent Care Pre-
service Claims. If your Urgent Care Pre-
service Claim is denied, the Claims 
Administrator may notify you of the 
above information verbally, as long as 
you are given written notification no 
more than 3 days later. 
 
 
 
 129 
considered. All requests should be made in 
writing to the Claims Administrator; 
provided, however, that requests regarding 
Urgent Care Claims may be made orally to 
the Claims Administrator. Plan Reviews of 
Pre-service Claims are decided by the Plan’s 
Appeals Committee. Plan Reviews of Post-
service Claims are decided by the Medical 
Director (or, his designee). 
If a Plan Review is requested, the claimant 
shall have the following rights: 
• to submit written comments, documents, 
records and other information relating to 
the Claim for benefits and for the Plan 
Review to take into account all submitted 
materials regardless of whether such 
materials have already been submitted or 
considered during the initial benefit 
determination 
• upon request and free of charge, access 
to and copies of all documents, records 
and other information relevant to the 
Claim for benefits 
• for a Plan Review that does not take into 
account the initial adverse benefit 
determination, and that is conducted by 
an appropriate named fiduciary who is 
neither the individual who made the 
initial benefit determination nor the 
subordinate of such individual 
• if the Claim is based in whole or in part 
on a medical judgment, including 
determinations with regard to whether a 
particular treatment, drug or other item is 
experimental, investigational or not 
medically necessary or appropriate, a 
health care professional who has the 
appropriate training and experience in the 
field of medicine will be consulted (and 
that the consulted health care professional 
will not be an individual who was 
consulted during the initial benefit 
determination nor a subordinate of such 
individual) 
• to obtain the identification of the 
Appealing Plan Decisions 
If you have a question about benefits, you 
may contact the Customer Service Center at 
the number listed on the back of your 
insurance card. Most questions can be taken 
care of by Customer Service and do not 
require a formal appeal. 
If you (or your health care provider) 
disagree with a benefit decision made by the 
Plan about coverage or pre-authorization, 
you may request a formal “Plan Review.” 
You need to request a Plan Review within 
180 days after you receive notice that the 
Plan has made a benefit decision against 
you. Requests for Plan Review that are 
received after 180 days will not be 
considered. All requests should be made in 
writing to the Claims Administrator, except 
Urgent Care Claim requests. Urgent Care 
Claim requests may be made verbally to the 
Claims Administrator. Plan Reviews of Pre-
service Claims are decided by the Plan’s 
Appeals Committee. Plan Reviews of Post-
service Claims are decided by the Medical 
Director or his designee. 
If you request a Plan Review, you have the 
rights described below.  
• You have the right to submit written 
comments, documents and other 
information relating to your claim. The 
Plan Review must take into account all 
submitted materials, even if the 
materials have already been submitted 
or considered during the initial benefit 
decision. 
• You have access to and can get copies 
of all documents and other information 
regarding your claim free of charge if 
requested. 
• The Plan Review must not take into 
account the initial benefit decision. The 
Plan Review must be conducted by an 
appropriate named fiduciary who cannot 
be the individual who made the initial 
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medical or vocational experts whose 
advice was obtained on behalf of the Plan 
in connection with a claimant’s adverse 
benefit determination, without regard to 
whether the advice was relied upon in 
making the benefit determination. 
The determination regarding the appeal of a 
non-urgent care Pre-service Claim or a Post-
service Claim shall be communicated to the 
claimant (and/or relevant Providers, if 
applicable) within a reasonable period of time 
appropriate to the medical circumstances, but 
not later than 30 days after the appeal was 
received. The determination regarding the 
appeal of a Urgent Care Pre-service Claim 
shall be communicated to the claimant 
(and/or relevant Providers, if applicable) as 
soon as possible, taking into account the 
medical necessity, but not later than 72 hours 
after the appeal was received. 
In regard to Post-service Claims only, if a 
claimant disagrees with the Plan Review 
determination made by the Medical Director 
he may appeal that decision to the Plan’s 
Appeals Committee within 180 days after 
receipt of the denial. Requests received after 
180 days will not be considered. All requests 
should be in writing to the Claims 
Administrator, who will deliver the 
claimant’s request to the Plan’s Appeals 
Committee. While a Claim is on appeal to the 
Plan’s Appeals Committee, a claimant is 
entitled to the same rights as during the first 
appeal. This includes the right to have a 
person who was not the person who reviewed 
(or who was a subordinate of the person who 
reviewed) the initial Claim or the first appeal 
make a determination on the claimant’s latest 
appeal, and to a review by the Plan’s Appeals 
Committee that provides no deference to any 
earlier determinations. Additionally, if a 
claimant’s request involves a medical 
judgment, health care professionals who were 
not previously consulted and who are not the 
subordinates of any previously consulted 
health care professional will be consulted by 
benefit decision or that person’s 
assistant. 
• If the claim is based on a medical 
judgment that the treatment was 
experimental, investigational or not 
medically necessary or appropriate, a 
health care professional who has the 
appropriate training must be consulted. 
The health care professional that is 
consulted cannot be an individual who 
was consulted during the initial benefit 
decision or that person’s assistant. 
• You have the right to obtain the names 
of the medical or vocational experts 
whose advice was obtained by the Plan 
in connection with your benefit 
decision. You have this right whether or 
not the advice was actually used in 
making the decision. 
You (and/or the relevant health care 
providers) will be notified of the Plan’s 
decision regarding the appeal of a Non-
urgent Care Pre-service Claim or a Post-
service Claim within a reasonable period of 
time. A “reasonable period” depends on the 
medical circumstances, but is no later than 
30 days after the appeal was received. You 
(and/or the relevant health care providers) 
will be notified of the Plan’s decision 
regarding the appeal of an Urgent Care Pre-
service Claim as soon as possible. The 
amount of time depends on the medical 
necessity of the services, but will be no later 
than 72 hours after the appeal was received. 
In regard to Post-service Claims only, if you 
disagree with the Plan Review decision 
made by the Medical Director, you may 
appeal that decision to the Plan’s Appeals 
Committee within 180 days after you 
receive notice that your request has been 
denied. Requests received after 180 days 
will not be considered. All requests should 
be made in writing to the Claims 
Administrator. The Claims Administrator 
will deliver your request to the Plan’s 
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the Plan’s Appeals Committee. The Plan’s 
Appeals Committee’s determination shall be 
communicated to the claimant within a 
reasonable period of time not to exceed 30 
days after the appeal was received. 
If your Claim is denied, the denial notice will 
provide: 
• the specific reason(s) for the denial, and, 
if applicable, either the specific internal 
rule, guideline, protocol or other similar 
criterion (if any) relied upon in making 
the denial, or a statement that the rule, 
guideline, protocol or other similar 
criterion that was relied upon in making 
the denial and that a copy of such rule, 
guideline, protocol or other similar 
criterion will be provided free of charge 
upon request 
• references to the part of the Plan on 
which the denial is based 
• a statement that you are entitled to 
receive, upon request and free of charge, 
reasonable access to, and copies of, all 
documents, records, and other 
information relevant to your Claim for 
benefits; 
• a statement of your right to bring an 
action under Section 502(a) of ERISA 
after the exhaustion of the Plan’s appeal 
procedures 
• if the denial is based on a medical 
necessity or experimental treatment or 
similar exclusion or limit, an explanation 
of the scientific or clinical judgment for 
such denial that applies the terms of the 
Plan to your medical circumstances, or a 
statement that such explanation will be 
provided free of charge upon request 
• for the initial appeal of Post-service 
Claims only, appropriate information as 
to the steps to be taken if you desire to 
appeal the Plan Review’s determination 
to the Plan’s Appeals Committee, 
including notice of applicable time limits. 
Appeals Committee. While your claim is on 
appeal to the Plan’s Appeals Committee, 
you have the same rights you had during the 
first appeal.  
• This includes the right to have a 
person, other than the person (or that 
person’s assistant) who reviewed the 
initial claim or the first appeal, make a 
determination on your latest appeal.  
• You have a right to a review by the 
Plan’s Appeals Committee that does not 
defer to any earlier determinations.  
• If your request involves a medical 
judgment, the Plan’s Appeals 
Committee will consult health care 
professionals who were not previously 
consulted.  
You will be notified of the Plan’s Appeals 
Committee’s decision within a reasonable 
period of time, but no later than 30 days 
after the appeal was received. 
If your claim is denied, the denial notice 
will provide you with the information 
described below. 
• The denial notice will inform you of 
the specific reasons for the denial. If 
applicable, the denial notice will either 
include the rule or protocol on which the 
denial is based, or it will state that the 
rule or protocol used to make the 
decision will be provided free of charge 
if requested. 
• The denial notice will refer you to the 
part of the Plan on which the denial is 
based. 
• The denial notice will state that you 
have the right to reasonable access to 
and copies of all documents and other 
information regarding your claim free of 
charge if requested. 
• The denial notice will include a 
statement of your right to sue under 
Section 502(a) of ERISA after you have 
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The Claims Administrator, the Medical 
Director, the Plan’s Appeals Committee, 
and/or their respective delegates shall have 
absolute discretion in determining Claims for 
benefits under the Plan. 
done everything you can under the 
Plan’s appeal procedures. 
• The denial notice will tell you if the 
denial is based on a determination that 
the treatment is not medically necessary, 
is experimental or falls under a similar 
exclusion or limitation. The denial 
notice will either explain the scientific 
or clinical reasons for the denial, 
applying the terms of the Plan to your 
medical circumstances, or it will state 
that an explanation will be provided free 
of charge if requested. 
• For initial appeals of Post-service 
Claims only, the denial notice will tell 
you the steps to take if you want to 
appeal the Plan Review’s decision to the 
Plan’s Appeals Committee and the 
applicable time limits. 
The Claims Administrator, the Medical 
Director, the Plan’s Appeals Committee, 
and/or their agents shall have absolute 
discretion in determining claims for benefits 
under the Plan. 
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Claims Procedure Clause, Plan 2 
Original Redrafted 
CLAIMS PROCEDURE 
The following are the claims procedures for 
the Plans. Absent a showing of irreparable 
harm, you cannot bring a court action for 
benefits under the plans until the claim 
review process described below, including 
all appeals, has been completed. 
 
Claims Procedures for Medical, 
Dental and Vision Plans 
If you believe that you are entitled to 
benefits under the Medical, Dental or Vision 
Plans, then you should submit your claim in 
writing to the Claims Administrator for the 
appropriate Plan, as identified on the page 
with the heading "Claims Administrators".  
For purposes of these claims procedures, the 
following definitions will apply: 
• A "post-service claim" is any claim for 
a benefit that is not a pre-service claim. 
• A "pre-service claim" is a claim for a 
benefit with respect to which the terms of 
the Plan condition receipt of the benefit, 
in whole or in part, on approval of the 
benefit in advance of obtaining medical 
care. 
• An "urgent care claim" is a claim 
which, unless the special urgent care 
deadlines are followed either (1) could 
seriously jeopardize the patient's health 
or ability to regain maximum function, or 
(2) in the opinion of a physician with 
knowledge of the patient's medical 
condition, would subject the patient to 
severe pain that cannot be adequately 
managed without the care or treatment 
requested in the claim. An individual 
acting on behalf of the plan, applying the 
judgment of a prudent layperson, can 
determine whether the claim is an urgent 
CLAIMS PROCEDURE 
The following sections describe how to file a 
claim so that the Plan covers, or pays for, the 
care you receive. If your claim is denied, the 
sections below will tell you how to appeal 
the denial. Unless you can show that you 
will suffer irreparable harm, you cannot file 
a lawsuit against the Plan for benefits until 
you have completed all the appeal 
procedures described below.   
    
Claims Procedures 
If you think that you are entitled to benefits 
under the Plan, then you should submit your 
claim in writing to the Claims Administrator.  
  
The following definitions apply to claims 
procedures. 
• A "pre-service claim" is a claim for a 
benefit that is filed before you receive 
the benefit. The Plan will not pay for the 
benefit unless the Plan has approved the 
benefit before you receive it.    
• A "post-service claim" is a claim for a 
benefit that is filed after you have 
received the benefit. 
• An "urgent care claim" is a claim which 
asks the Plan to treat the claim as an 
emergency. There are two situations in 
which a person should file an urgent care 
claim.  First, if the claim is not processed 
more quickly than other types of claims, 
the patient’s health or ability to make a 
full recovery could be seriously 
endangered.  Second, a doctor believes 
that if the claim is not processed more 
quickly than other types of claims, the 
patient would be subjected to severe pain 
that cannot be managed without the 
requested services. An individual who 
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care claim. However, if a physician with 
knowledge of the patient's medical 
condition determines that the claim 
involves urgent care, it must be 
considered an urgent care claim. 
For urgent care claims and pre-service 
claims, the appropriate Claims Administrator 
will provide written or electronic notice to 
you of its benefit determination (whether 
adverse or not) within the following time 
frames: 
• 72 hours after receipt of an urgent care 
claim (a decision can be provided to you 
verbally, as long as written or electronic 
notification is provided to you within 
three days after the verbal notification) 
• 15 days after receipt of a pre-service 
claim. 
For post-service claims, the Claims 
Administrator will provide you with written 
or electronic notice of any denial of your 
claim within 30 days after receipt of the 
claim.  Regardless of the type of claim, you 
will receive written or electronic notification 
of any claim denial that includes: 
• The specific reason(s) for the denial. 
• References to the pertinent Plan 
provisions on which the decision is 
based. 
• A description of any additional material 
or information needed to support your 
claim and an explanation of why such 
material or information is necessary. 
• A description of the Plan's claim review 
procedure and the time limits applicable 
to such procedure (including information 
about your right to bring a civil action 
under section 502(a) of ERISA following 
an adverse benefit determination review). 
• Reference to any internal rule, 
guideline or protocol relied upon in 
making the decision. 
• If the claim denial is based on a 
makes decisions on behalf of the Plan 
can determine whether the claim is an 
urgent care claim by determining what a 
reasonable person would decide. 
However, if a doctor with knowledge of 
the patient's medical condition decides 
the patient needs urgent care, the Plan 
must treat the claim as an urgent care 
claim. 
Initial Claims Decisions 
For urgent care claims and pre-service 
claims, a Claims Administrator will provide 
you with written or electronic (i.e., through 
e-mail) notice of its benefit decision within 
the time frames described below. 
• If you file an urgent care claim, the 
Claims Administrator can notify you 
verbally of the Plan’s decision within 72 
hours after the claim was received, as 
long as you receive written or electronic 
notification no more than three days 
later. 
• If you file a pre-service claim, the 
Claims Administrator will notify you of 
the Plan’s decision within 15 days after 
the claim was received. 
For post-service claims, a Claims 
Administrator will provide you with written 
or electronic notice of any denial of your 
claim within 30 days after the claim was 
received.  
For all types of claims, you will receive 
written or electronic notification of any 
claim denial. The claim denial letter will:  
• inform you of the specific reasons for 
the denial; 
• refer you to the specific Plan sections 
on which the denial is based; 
• describe any additional information that 
is needed to support your claim and will 
explain why the information is needed; 
• describe the Plan's claim review 
procedure and the applicable time limits.  
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medical necessity or experimental 
treatment or similar exclusion or limit, 
either an explanation of the scientific or 
clinical judgment for the adverse 
determination, applying the terms of the 
plan to your medical circumstances, or a 
statement that such explanation will be 
provided free of charge upon request. 
• If the claim denial concerns an urgent 
care claim, a description of the expedited 
review process applicable to the claim. 
For urgent care and pre-service claims, if 
you fail to provide the Claims Administrator 
with sufficient information to determine 
whether, or to what extent, benefits are 
covered or payable under the plan, or if you 
fail to follow the Plan's procedures for filing 
such claims, the Claims Administrator must 
notify you within 24 hours of receiving your 
urgent care claim or within 5 days of 
receiving your pre-service claim of the 
specific information needed to complete the 
claim.  Notification may be verbal, unless 
you request written notification. In the case 
of an urgent care claim, you then have 48 
hours to provide the information needed to 
process the claim. You will be notified of a 
determination on your urgent care claim no 
later than 48 hours after the earlier of: 
• The Claims Administrator's receipt of 
the requested information; or 
• The end of the 48-hour period within 
which you were to provide the additional 
information. 
For pre- and post-service claims, a I5-day 
extension of the time period for deciding 
claims may be allowed, provided that the 
Claims Administrator determines that the 
extension is necessary due to matters beyond 
its control. If such an extension is necessary, 
the Claims Administrator must notify you 
before the end of the 15- or 30-day period of 
the reason(s) requiring the extension and the 
date it expects to provide a decision on your 
claim. If such an extension is necessary due 
• include information about your right to 
sue under Section 502(a) of the 
Employee Retirement Income Securities 
Act (ERISA) if the Claims Administrator 
reviews your appeal of denied benefits 
and again denies your claim; 
• refer you to any internal rule or 
protocol used in making the decision; 
and 
• describe the fastest appeal process 
available if the claim denial is for an 
urgent care claim. 
In some cases the denial is based on a 
determination that the treatment is not 
medically necessary, is experimental or falls 
under a similar exclusion or limitation. In 
such cases, the denial letter will either 
explain the scientific or clinical reasons for 
the denial, applying the terms of the Plan to 
your circumstances, or it will state that an 
explanation will be provided free of charge if 
requested. 
For urgent care and pre-service claims, if 
you do not give the Claims Administrator 
enough information to determine which of 
the services you received are covered by the 
Plan or if you do not correctly follow the 
Plan’s procedures for filing such claims, the 
Claims Administrator must tell you what 
information is needed to complete your 
claim. The Claims Administrator must notify 
you within 24 hours after receiving an urgent 
care claim or within 5 days after receiving a 
pre-service claim.  The Claims 
Administrator may only notify you verbally, 
unless you request written notification. In the 
case of an urgent care claim, you then have 
48 hours to provide the information needed 
to process the claim. If you provide the 
requested information, you will be notified 
of the Claims Administrator’s decision about 
your urgent care claim within 48 hours after 
the Claims Administrator received the 
requested information. If you do not provide 
the requested information in time, you will 
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to your failure to submit the information 
necessary to decide the claim, the notice of 
extension must also specifically describe the 
required information. You then have 45 days 
to provide the information needed to process 
your claim. For pre-service claims, the 
Claims Administrator must notify you 
regardless of whether the claim is denied or 
approved. For post-service claims, the 
Claims Administrator must notify you only 
if the claim is denied. If you do not provide 
the required information within the 45-day 
period, your claim may be denied. 
If an extension is necessary for pre- and 
post-service claims due to your failure to 
submit necessary information, the Plan's 
time frame for making a benefit 
determination is stopped from the date the 
Claims Administrator sends you an 
extension notification until the date you 
respond to the request for additional 
information.  If your claim is denied, you or 
your representative may appeal the decision. 
Your written request for review or recon-
sideration must be made in writing to the 
address indicated in the claim denial letter 
within 180 days after you receive notice of a 
claim denial. As part of your appeal, you 
have the right to: 
• Submit written comments, documents, 
records and other information relating to 
your claim for benefits that you wish to 
have considered. 
• Request, free of charge, reasonable 
access to, and copies of, all documents, 
records and other information relevant to 
your claim for benefits. 
• A review that takes into account all 
comments, documents, records and other 
information submitted by you related to 
the claim, regardless of whether the 
information was submitted or considered 
in the initial benefit determination. 
• A review that does not defer to the 
initial claim determination and that is 
be notified of the Claims Administrator’s 
decision within 48 hours after the 48-hour 
period you had to provide the requested 
information. 
For pre- and post-service claims, the Claims 
Administrator may determine that a 15-day 
extension of the time period for deciding 
claims is necessary due to matters beyond 
the Claims Administrator’s control. If an 
extension is needed, the Claims 
Administrator must notify you before the 
end of the 15- or 30-day period. The notice 
will inform you of the reasons for the 
extension and the date the Claims 
Administrator expects to provide a decision 
about your claim. If the Claims 
Administrator needs more information from 
you in order to make a decision, the notice of 
extension must also specifically describe the 
required information. After the Claims 
Administrator tells you what information is 
missing, you have 45 days to provide the 
requested information. For pre-service 
claims, the Claims Administrator must notify 
you regardless of whether the claim is denied 
or approved. For post-service claims, the 
Claims Administrator must notify you only 
if the claim is denied. If you do not provide 
the required information within the 45-day 
period, your claim may be denied. 
If an extension is needed for pre- and post-
service claims because you did not submit all 
the necessary information, the Plan’s time 
frame for making a benefit decision is 
stopped from the date the Claims 
Administrator sends you an extension 
notification until the date you respond to the 
request for additional information. If your 
claim is denied, you may appeal the 
decision. Your written request for 
reconsideration must be made in writing to 
the address in the claim denial letter within 
180 days after you receive notice of the 
claim denial. 
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conducted by someone other than the 
individual who made the adverse 
determination, and who is not such 
person's subordinate. 
• In cases where the claim denial was 
based in whole or in part on medical 
judgment, require the individual 
reviewing the appeal to consult with a 
health care professional who has 
appropriate training and experience in 
the field of medicine involved in the 
medical judgment, who was not 
consulted in connection with the initial 
claim determination, and who is not such 
person's subordinate. 
• The identification of medical or 
vocational experts whose advice was 
obtained in connection with benefit 
determination, regardless of whether the 
advice was relied upon in making the 
decision. 
• In the case of a claim for urgent care, 
an expedited review process in which 
you may submit a request (verbally or in 
writing) for an expedited appeal of a 
denied urgent care claim and where all 
necessary information, including the 
plan's benefit determination on review, 
will be transmitted between the Plan and 
you by telephone, facsimile or other 
available similarly prompt method. 
Ordinarily, a decision on an appeal will be 
reached within:  
• 72 hours after receipt of your appeal of 
an urgent care claim 
• 30 days after receipt of your appeal of a 
pre-service claim 
• 60 days after receipt of your appeal of a 
post-service claim 
You will be provided with written or 
electronic notification if your appeal is 
denied. Such notification will include: 
• The specific reason(s) for the denial. 
Appealing Claims Decisions 
If you request that the Plan review its 
decision, you have the rights described 
below. 
• You have the right to submit written 
comments, documents and other 
information relating to your claim that 
you wish the Plan to consider. 
• You have the right to reasonable access 
to copies of all documents and other 
information regarding your claim free of 
charge if requested. 
• The Plan’s review must take into 
account all the materials relating to your 
claim that you submitted, even if the 
materials have already been submitted or 
considered during the initial benefit 
decision. 
• The Plan’s review must not defer to the 
initial benefit decision. The Plan’s 
review must be conducted by someone 
other than the individual who made the 
initial benefit decision or that person’s 
assistant. 
• If the claim is based on a medical 
judgment, the individual reviewing the 
appeal must consult a health care 
professional who has the appropriate 
training in the field of medicine 
involved. The health care professional 
that is consulted cannot be an individual 
who was consulted during the initial 
benefit decision or that person’s 
assistant. 
• You have the right to the identification 
of the medical or vocational experts 
whose advice was obtained by the Plan 
in connection with your benefit decision. 
You have this right whether or not the 
advice was actually used in making the 
decision. 
• In the case of an urgent care claim, you 
have the right to a faster review process. 
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• References to the pertinent Plan 
provisions on which the denial is based. 
• Reference to any internal rule, 
guideline or protocol relied upon in 
making the decision. 
• If the claim denial is based on a 
medical necessity or experimental 
treatment or similar exclusion or limit, 
either an explanation of the scientific or 
clinical judgment for the adverse 
determination, applying the terms of the 
Plan to your medical circumstances, or a 
statement that such explanation will be 
provided free of charge upon request. 
• Information concerning your right to 
receive, upon request and free of charge, 
reasonable access to, and copies of, all 
documents, records and other 
information relevant to your claim. 
• Information concerning your right to 
bring a civil action for benefits under 
section 502(a) of ERISA with respect to 
your claim. 
 
Claims Procedures Regarding 
Coverage Eligibility 
If you are told that you are not eligible for 
coverage under any of the welfare plans or 
programs listed above, but you believe that 
you should be eligible, then you should 
request an eligibility claim initiation form 
from the Benefits Service Center. The claim 
must be submitted in writing to the address 
shown on the claim initiation form. 
 
Concurrent Care Claims 
If the plan has approved an ongoing course 
of treatment to be provided over a period of 
time or a number of treatments, any 
reduction or termination by the Plan of such 
course of treatment (other than by the Plan 
amendment or termination) before the end of 
You may submit a verbal or written 
request for a faster appeal of a denied 
urgent care claim. In this case, all 
necessary information will be 
communicated between you and the Plan 
by telephone, fax machine or another fast 
method. This includes information 
regarding the benefit decision under 
review. 
Ordinarily, a decision on an appeal will be 
reached within:  
• 72 hours after receipt of your appeal of 
an urgent care claim 
• 30 days after receipt of your appeal of a 
pre-service claim 
• 60 days after receipt of your appeal of a 
post-service claim 
If your appeal is denied, you will receive 
written or electronic notification. The appeal 
denial letter will: 
• inform you of the specific reasons for 
the denial; 
• refer you to the specific Plan sections 
on which the denial is based; 
• refer you to any internal rule or 
protocol used in making the decision; 
• state that you have the right to 
reasonable access to and copies of all 
documents and other information 
regarding your claim free of charge if 
requested; and 
• include information concerning your 
right to sue under Section 502(a) of 
ERISA with respect to your claim. 
In some cases, the denial is based on a 
determination that the treatment is not 
medically necessary, is experimental or falls 
under a similar exclusion or limitation. In 
such cases, the appeal denial letter will either 
explain the scientific or clinical reasons for 
the denial, applying the terms of the Plan to 
your circumstances, or it will state that an 
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such period of time or number of treatments 
shall be treated as a claim denial. The Claims 
Administrator shall notify you of the claim 
denial sufficiently in advance of the 
reduction or termination to allow you to 
appeal the denial and obtain a determination 
on review of that denial before the benefit is 
reduced or terminated. Any request by you 
to extend the course of treatment beyond the 
period of time or number of treatments 
previously approved that is an urgent care 
claim shall be decided as soon as possible, 
but not later than 24 hours after receipt of the 
claim by the Claims Administrator, provided 
that such claim is made at least 24 hours 
prior to the expiration of the prescribed 
period of time or number of treatments. 
This provision only applies to a failure that 
(1) is a communication by you or an 
authorized representative that is received by 
a person or organizational unit customarily 
responsible for handling benefit matters, and 
(2) is a communication that names you, a 
specific medical condition or symptom, and 
a specific treatment, service or product for 
which approval is requested. 
explanation will be provided free of charge if 
requested. 
 
Requests for More Treatment 
If you have already received approval to 
receive a certain number of treatments or to 
receive treatment for a certain length of time, 
any reduction in your treatment (other than 
by Plan amendment or termination) is 
considered a claim denial. The Claims 
Administrator will notify you of the claim 
denial in time for you to appeal the decision 
and hear back before the reduction takes 
place. For an urgent care claim, if you 
request more treatment than the amount of 
treatment already approved, your claim will 
be decided as soon as possible. The decision 
will be made no later than 24 hours after the 
claim was received, as long as you made the 
claim at least 24 hours before the approved 
treatment expired.  
This only applies if (1) the person or division 
customarily responsible for handling benefit 
matters receives a communication from you 
or your agent, and (2) the communication 
names you, your specific medical condition, 
and the specific service or product you want 
approved. 
 
Claims Procedures for Plan 
Eligibility 
If you are told that you are not eligible to 
participate in the Plan, but you believe that 
you are eligible, you should request an 
“Eligibility Claim Initiation Form” from the 
Benefits Service Center. The claim must be 
submitted in writing to the address shown on 
the claim initiation form. 
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Appendix C: Comprehension Test 
 
The following questions concern the Health Plan you just read. Please select the best answer 
from the available choices. 
 
Medical Necessity Clause, Declarative Questions 
 
Will the Health Plan cover benefits it does not consider medically necessary? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
Do benefits for Temporomandibular Joint Disorder (TMJ) have to be medically necessary to 
be covered? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
If two different treatments are expected to have the same outcome, will the treatment that is 
more convenient to the patient be provided? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
Is a treatment that will positively impact a patient’s medical condition considered medically 
necessary? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
If the same care cannot be provided as safely in an outpatient setting as in an inpatient 
setting, is the inpatient care considered medically necessary? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
Is treatment that is ordered and approved by a licensed physician covered by the Health 
Plan? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
Does the physician treating the patient have a say in what treatment is considered medically 
necessary? 
A. Yes  
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
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Medical Necessity Clause, Procedural Questions 
 
A patient complains to her doctor that she has a headache.  The doctor orders a battery of 
tests. Is the Health Plan likely to cover the scan? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
An expectant mother needs a cesarean section (C-section). Can the Health Plan determine a 
96-hour hospital stay is not medically necessary and therefore is not covered?  
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
If a doctor botches a patient’s nose job, can the patient’s treatment to fix her nose be covered 
by the Health Plan? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
If a patient’s doctor believes a kidney transplant is medically necessary to address his kidney 
failure, will the Health Plan cover the treatment? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
If a patient has a terminal cancer and has exhausted all the traditional treatments that are 
available, will the Health Plan cover an experimental treatment? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
A young child is hit by a car and taken to the emergency room. Will the hospital care be 
covered if the same care could have been provided in a pediatrician’s office? 
A.  Yes 
B.  No 
C.  I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
Bypass surgery is a standard treatment for clogged arteries. If a patient has clogged arteries, 
can the Health Plan refuse to cover bypass surgery? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
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Claims Procedure Clause, Declarative Questions 
 
Is a pre-service claim filed after the Health Plan has denied coverage but before treatment 
has been received? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
When reviewing a benefit denial, can the Health Plan take the initial decision to deny 
coverage into account? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
Is an urgent care claim only appropriate when the patient’s health could be seriously 
endangered unless treated quickly? 
A. Yes  
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
Does Section 502(a) of ERISA give you a right to sue the Health Plan for denied coverage? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
If the Health Plan denies coverage for a requested treatment based on a determination that 
the treatment is not medically necessary, does the Health Plan choose which medical 
professionals review the Plan’s decision? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
Can the individual who reviews a denial of coverage be the same individual who made the 
initial benefit decision? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
Do patients have the right to know who gave professional advice to the Plan in regard to 
their claim? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
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If a patient does not include all the necessary information in his/her claim, will the 
Health Plan first deny the claim and then give the patient a chance to reverse this decision?  
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
If a patient does not include all the necessary information for a post-service claim, can the 
Health Plan wait 45 days to notify the patient of its decision? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
Claims Procedure Clause, Procedural Questions 
 
A patient files a post-service claim for X-rays. The post-service claim is denied. If the 
patient decides to appeal the denial, can she submit a note from the doctor who treated her 
that says the doctor thought the care was medically necessary? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
A patient finds a suspicious mole on his arm that he has the doctor check. The doctor tells 
him that the mole is dangerous and should be removed. He files a claim with the Health Plan 
for coverage but his claim is denied. He wants to sue the Health Plan for coverage. Should 
his first step be filing a request with the Health Plan to review its decision? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
A Plan member’s son needs surgery. The Plan member files an urgent care claim. The 
Claims Administrator calls the Plan member later that same day and tells her that she forgot 
to include her son’s social security number in the paperwork, which is necessary for the 
claim to be approved.  Does the Plan member have to provide the requested information 
within 48 hours for the Health Plan to make a decision? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
A patient requests that the Health Plan review its decision to deny coverage for back 
surgery. In the claim denial letter, the Plan states that the coverage was denied based on a 
lack of medical necessity. Can the Plan member get more specific information about the 
reason for the denial? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
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While exercising two months ago, a patient damaged some tendons in his ankle. He filed 
a pre-service claim for physical therapy treatment and was approved to attend 24 physical 
therapy sessions to treat the injury. He has already attended 12 sessions and his ankle is 
starting to feel better. He receives notification that the Health Plan has decided to reduce his 
approved treatment to 15 sessions. Is he most likely to get coverage for all 24 sessions if he 
keeps going to the remaining 12 sessions he was originally approved for and then files a 
post-service claim? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
The Health Plan denies coverage for a Plan member’s knee surgery. The Plan member is not 
satisfied with the Health Plan’s decision.  Does the Plan member have to appeal the decision 
to the Health Plan before filing a lawsuit against the Health Plan? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
A patient needs a kidney transplant. The transplant was scheduled for 3 days from now, but 
the date has been set back to 10 days from now. The patient needs kidney dialysis in the 
meantime to stay alive. The patient has been approved under an urgent care claim to receive 
dialysis for 3 days. Now, the patient needs dialysis for 7 additional days so she files an 
urgent care claim request for more treatment. If the patient calls the Claims Administrator, 
does the Claims Administrator have to notify her of the Health Plan’s decision immediately? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
A patient needs a skin graft. Can the Claims Administrator extend the deadline for making a 
claims decision if the patient did not provide her doctor’s name on the pre-service claim 
form? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
 
A patient snores loudly at night. His doctor tells him a tonsillectomy will reduce his snoring. 
He files a pre-service claim for treatment and is denied. He calls the Claims Administrator, 
requesting an appeal of the decision. If he tells the Claims Administrator all the information 
the Health Plan needs to process his appeal, has he followed the proper appeal procedure? 
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. I did not understand the Health Plan material regarding this question 
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Appendix D: Short Test of Functional Health Literacy in Adults 
 
Here are some medical instructions that you or anybody might see around a 
hospital.  These instructions are in sentences and have some of the words 
missing.  Where a word is missing, a blank line is drawn, and 4 possible 
words that could go in the blank appear just below it.  I want you to figure 
out which of those 4 words should go in the blank, which word makes the 
sentence make sense.  When you think you know which one it is, pick that 
choice and go on to the next blank. 
 
PASSAGE A: X-RAY PREPARATION 
 
Your doctor has sent you to have a ____________ X-ray. 
stomach 
diabetes 
stitches 
germs 
 
 
You must have an __________ stomach when you come for __________. 
asthma      is.  
empty      am. 
incest       if. 
anemia      it. 
 
 
The X-ray will ____________ from 1 to 3 ____________ to do. 
   take    beds 
   view    brains 
   talk    hours 
   look    diets 
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THE DAY BEFORE THE X-RAY. 
 
For supper have only a ____________ snack of fruit, ____________ and 
jelly, with coffee or tea. little     toes 
    broth     throat 
    attack     toast 
    nausea    thigh 
 
 
After ____________, you must not ____________ or drink anything at  
 minute,    easy 
 midnight,    ate 
 during,    drank 
 before ,    eat 
 
____________ until after you have ____________ the X-ray. 
ill      are 
all      has 
each      had 
any      was 
 
 
THE DAY OF THE X-RAY. 
 
Do not eat ____________. 
  appointment 
  walk-in 
  breakfast 
  clinic 
 
 
Do not ____________, even ____________. 
  drive,   heart. 
  drink,  breath. 
  dress,   water. 
  dose,    cancer. 
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If you have any ___________, call the X-ray ____________ at 616-4500. 
   answers,      Department 
   exercises,      Sprain 
   tracts,       Pharmacy 
   questions,       Toothache 
 
 
PASSAGE B: MEDICAID RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
I agree to give correct information to __________ if I can receive Medicaid. 
      hair 
      salt 
      see 
      ache 
 
I ____________ to provide the county information to ____________ any  
 agree        hide 
 probe        risk 
 send        discharge 
 gain        prove 
  
statements given in this ____________ and hereby give permission to the  
    emphysema 
    application 
    gallbladder 
    relationship 
 
____________ to get such proof.  I ____________ that for Medicaid I must 
report 
inflammation    investigate 
religion     entertain 
iron      understand 
county     establish 
 
any ____________ in my circumstances within ____________ (10) days of 
 changes      three 
 hormones      one 
 antacids      five 
 charges      ten 
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becoming _________ of the change.  I understand __________ if I DO NOT  
  award       thus 
  aware      this 
  away       that 
  await       than 
 
like the ____________ made on my case, I have the ____________ to a fair 
  marital      bright 
  occupation      left 
  adult       wrong 
  decision       right 
 
hearing.  I can _________ a hearing by writing or __________ the county  
       request     counting 
       refuse     reading 
       fail     calling 
       mend     smelling 
 
where I applied.  If you __________ TANF for any family __________, you  
    wash         member, 
    want         history, 
    cover         weight, 
    tape         seatbelt, 
 
will have to ________ a different application form.  ____________, we will  
  relax       Since, 
  break       Whether, 
  inhale       However, 
  sign       Because, 
 
use the ____________ on this form to determine your ____________. 
  lung       hypoglycemia. 
  date       eligibility.   
  meal       osteoporosis. 
  pelvic       schizophrenia. 
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Appendix E: Benefit Denial Letters 
 
Now imagine that you are a member of the Health Plan you read. You have been seeing 
your doctor about varicose veins that you have in your legs. Varicose veins are enlarged 
veins commonly found close to the skin's surface. You and your doctor think you should 
have the veins removed because they have made walking and exercise painful (strong 
claim)/they are visibly unattractive and occasionally painful (weak claim). You filed a 
pre-service claim. The following letter is the Health Plan’s response to your request. 
 
First Benefit Denial Letter 
Dear Plan Member: 
 
Your request for coverage for the surgical removal of varicose veins that have made 
walking and exercise painful (strong claim)/that are visibly unattractive and occasionally 
painful (weak claim) has been reviewed by our Claim Administrator and denied by the 
Health Plan for the following reason: Request for surgery has been denied due to lack of 
medical necessity for the procedure requested. 
 
You have the right to appeal our decision. The appeal must be in writing and it should 
include the complete medical record and identify issues you wish us to consider. 
 
We have advised your doctor that financial liability for the above service is currently 
entirely your responsibility. 
 
If you have questions regarding the appeal procedure, please contact the Claims 
Department. 
 
Sincerely, 
Diane Smith, R.N. 
Claims Administrator 
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The following letter is the Health Plan's response to your appeal. 
 
Second Benefit Denial Letter 
Dear Plan Member: 
 
You have requested that the Health Plan reconsider its denial of your request for pre-
certification for the surgical removal of varicose veins that have made walking and 
exercise painful (strong claim)/that are visibly unattractive and occasionally painful 
(weak claim). The Health Plan affirms its decision to deny coverage for the treatment 
proposed. 
 
In investigating your request, the Health Plan has (1) conducted a search of Medline (an 
online database of journal articles about medicine), (2) reviewed the medical literature, 
and (3) obtained opinions from two local board certified surgeons, Dr. William Tanner 
and Dr. Carrie Johnson. 
 
After obtaining this information, the Health Plan denies your claim for the following 
reason: Request for surgery has been denied due to lack of medical necessity for the 
procedure requested. 
 
You have the right to challenge the Health Plan’s decision through a lawsuit, under 
Section 502(a) of ERISA.  
 
Sincerely, 
Dan Munroe, M.D. 
Medical Director 
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Appendix F: Procedural Fairness and Plan Satisfaction Questions 
 
Procedural Fairness 
Based on how you feel at this point in the claims process, rate your agreement with the 
following statements regarding the Health Plan you read about.  
 
Control 
 
Health Plan members get the information and education they need to participate 
effectively in their care and treatment. 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 
 
4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The Health Plan has procedures that give members the chance to have their say regarding 
the Health Plan. 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The Health Plan makes sure that members’ concerns are heard before claims decisions 
are made. 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Neutrality 
 
The procedures followed in the claims process favor members over the Health Plan.  
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The procedures followed by the Health Plan in the claims process ensure that everyone is 
treated fairly.  
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
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The Health Plan collects accurate and complete information in order to make claims 
decisions.  
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Trust 
 
The claims procedures used by the Health Plan protect members from unfair treatment. 
  
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Overall, the Health Plan tries to handle members’ situations fairly. 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
Social Standing 
 
The Health Plan is respectful of its members.  
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The Health Plan is caring to its members.  
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The Health Plan values what is best for each member.  
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
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Plan Satisfaction 
 
The procedures used to handle this claim were fair. 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The Health Plan provides adequate coverage to Plan members. 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The Health Plan gives too high a priority to holding down the cost of medical care instead 
of providing the best medical care. 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
The Health Plan takes appeals seriously. 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
If I were a member of this Health Plan, I would be satisfied with it. 
 
1 
Strongly 
Disagree 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
